State v. Dixon

Citation114 Wn.2d 857,792 P.2d 137
Decision Date07 June 1990
Docket NumberNo. 56491-4,56491-4
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Trevor A. DIXON, Respondent. En Banc

Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Donna L. Wise, Sr. Appellate Atty., Seattle, for petitioner.

Washington Appellate Defender Ass'n, Theresa B. Doyle, Seattle, for respondent.

Seth R. Dawson, Snohomish County Prosecutor, Seth Aaron Fine, Deputy, Everett, amici curiae for petitioner.

GUY, Justice.

Respondent was found guilty of second degree burglary for a crime he committed when 16 years old. At the time of judgment and sentencing, he had turned 18 and consequently was sentenced as an adult. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the basis that the

                State's delay in charging the respondent resulted in a loss of juvenile court jurisdiction and thus violated the respondent's right to due process.   We find the delay in this case was justified and within prosecutorial discretion.   Consequently, we reverse the Court of Appeals
                
FACTS

On February 19, 1986, at approximately 1:30 p.m., police responded to a burglary report at a residence in Renton. As they were positioning themselves around the house, two individuals ran out the front door. Officer Peters recognized one of the individuals as the respondent, Trevor Dixon. Upon giving chase, Danton DeMarr was apprehended; however, Dixon managed to elude the police.

Inside the house police found a pair of cowboy boots which Dixon's mother and sister identified as his. Police also removed fingerprints from a stereo that had been moved but not taken. A latent fingerprint examination performed approximately 15 months after the crime was committed showed the prints belonged to Dixon. Upon questioning, DeMarr indicated he knew the owner of the home and admitted that he and Dixon had intended to steal some marijuana they knew the owner had.

The owner of the home provided police with an itemized statement detailing what had been stolen. However, police were never able to verify that the items were actually missing. Moreover, the only item recovered was a bag containing $2.95 in change which was not listed as missing.

DeMarr was subsequently charged with second degree burglary and his trial set for September 2, 1986; however, he failed to appear. He was eventually apprehended and pled guilty March 18, 1987. Dixon had not yet been charged.

On March 4, 1987, Dixon turned 18 years old. As a result, on October 12, 1987 he was charged as an adult with second degree burglary. He moved to dismiss the charge, alleging that his right to due process had been violated by the State's delay in filing charges, which had resulted in his The Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the charge on the basis that Dixon's right to due process had been violated by the State's delay in filing charges. State v. Dixon, 55 Wash.App. 221, 777 P.2d 547 (1989). This court granted discretionary review and now reverses the Court of Appeals.

                turning 18 and the subsequent loss of juvenile court jurisdiction.   The motion was denied and he was subsequently found guilty of second degree burglary
                
ANALYSIS

This court has developed a 3-step test from United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) to determine whether preaccusatorial delay by the State in filing charges violates an individual's right to due process where juvenile court jurisdiction is lost as a result of the delay. This test provides: (1) that the defendant show prejudice resulting from the delay; (2) that there are reasons for the delay which the court must consider; and (3) where the State can justify the delay, that the court engage in balancing the State's interest against the prejudice to the accused. State v. Lidge, 111 Wash.2d 845, 848, 765 P.2d 1292 (1989) (citing State v. Alvin, 109 Wash.2d 602, 604, 746 P.2d 807 (1987)).

In balancing the interest of the State against the prejudice to the accused, the standard this court has used is " 'whether the action complained of ... violates those "fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions' ". State v. Calderon, 102 Wash.2d 348, 353, 684 P.2d 1293 (1984) (quoting United States v. Lovasco, supra 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. at 2049).

Initially we note there is no constitutional right to be tried in a juvenile court. State v. Sharon, 33 Wash.App. 491, 494, 655 P.2d 1193 (1982), aff'd, 100 Wash.2d 230, 668 P.2d 584 (1983). However, recognizing that the loss of juvenile court jurisdiction deprives an offender of numerous benefits, which include avoiding the stigma of an adult criminal conviction as well as receiving less harsh penalties this court has held that offenders carry their burden of showing the minimal prerequisite of prejudice when a delay in filing charges deprives the juvenile court of jurisdiction. State v. Alvin, 109 Wash.2d at 604, 746 P.2d 807 (citing State v. Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 353, 684 P.2d 1293). Consequently, because the State's delay in filing charges against Dixon resulted in a loss of juvenile court jurisdiction, we find the Court of Appeals correctly held that Dixon had satisfied the first prong of the Lidge test. State v. Dixon, 55 Wash.App. at 223, 777 P.2d 547.

In analyzing whether the requirements of the second prong have been fulfilled, the State argues that proceeding sequentially by first obtaining DeMarr's testimony was necessary to establish intent in order to prosecute Dixon successfully for second degree burglary. Our courts have recognized sequential prosecution as a legitimate and sufficient reason justifying preaccusatorial delay by the State in filing charges. See State v. Boseck, 45 Wash.App. 62, 67, 723 P.2d 1182 (1986). Consequently, we find the second prong of the Lidge test has been satisfied.

In applying the third and final prong of the Lidge test, the Court of Appeals deviates from the rationale set forth by this court and in doing so apparently contradicts its resolution of the second prong. Although acknowledging Boseck and conceding the legitimacy of the State's reason for delay, the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that the State's reason was not justified. In doing so, the court applies an incorrect standard of review for prosecutorial discretion and improperly concludes that the delay constituted an abuse of that discretion. In balancing the interests of the State against the prejudice to Dixon, the Court of Appeals departs from the traditional "fundamental conceptions of justice" standard used by this court and instead applies its own standard, stating:

In our view, it takes more than a plausible reason for delay to outweigh the valuable right to fact-finding and disposition as a juvenile. In balancing, the following are significant, but not exclusive, factors to be considered in evaluating delay: (1) the seriousness of the offense: the more serious the offense, the more deference should be extended to the prosecutor's determination of what is needed for conviction; (2) the defendant's age: more weight should be given to the loss of jurisdiction if the trial and terms of disposition can be completed before age 18; (3) the strength of the prosecutor's case; the stronger the case without the evidence that is the reason for the delay, the less weight the reason has; and (4) the weight of the sought evidence: a corollary of (3), the greater the weight of the sought evidence, the greater the weight of the reason for waiting for it.

State v. Dixon, 55 Wash.App. at 226, 777 P.2d 547.

As to evaluating preaccusatorial delay by the State, the appropriateness of these factors is questionable. In particular, the Court of Appeals concludes that although burglary is sometimes very serious, burglary by juveniles is very common and therefore does not rank high in the seriousness level of offenses. State v. Dixon, at 227, 777 P.2d 547. We note that from a victim's perspective, every crime is serious. Therefore, we agree with the dissent that the seriousness of a crime is not a proper criterion for determining whether a delay in charging is justified. State v. Dixon, at 230, 777 P.2d 547 (Coleman, J., dissenting). Further, assuming arguendo that it is, it is unacceptable that a crime becomes less serious simply because it occurs more frequently.

Moreover, these factors do not relate to the fundamental conceptions of justice standard. In particular, (1), (3) and (4) address the reasons for the delay, which more appropriately belong under the second prong of the test. Further, factors (3) and (4) would allow the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the prosecutors as to when charges should be filed.

This court has held that " '[t]he determination of when the evidence available to the prosecution is sufficient to obtain a conviction is seldom clear-cut, and reasonable persons often will reach conflicting conclusions.' " State v. Lidge, 111 Wash.2d at 850, 765 P.2d 1292 (quoting United States v. Lovasco, supra 431 U.S. at 793, 97 S.Ct. at 2050). Therefore, prosecutors are allowed broad discretion in delaying the filing of charges until they are " 'completely satisfied that [they] should prosecute and will be able promptly to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt' ". State v. Lidge, 111 Wash.2d at 850, 765 P.2d 1292 (quoting Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 795, 97 S.Ct. at 2051). See also State v. Judge, 100 Wash.2d 706, 713, 675 P.2d 219 (1984).

This principle of broad discretion mandates certain limitations on judicial decisionmaking:

[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit courts to abort criminal prosecutions simply because they disagree with a prosecutor's judgment as to when to seek an indictment. Judges are not free, in defining "due process," to impose on law enforcement officials our "personal and private notions" of fairness and to "disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function."

State v. Lidge, 111 Wash.2d at 850, 765 P.2d 1292...

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