State v. Dixon

• Citation: 534 N.W.2d 435
• Decision Date: 19 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-1762,94-1762
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Michael Charles DIXON, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Page 435

534 N.W.2d 435

STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Michael Charles DIXON, Appellee.

No. 94-1762.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 19, 1995.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Ann E. Brenden, Asst. Atty. Gen., John Sarcone, County Atty., and Odell G. McGhee, Asst. County Atty., for appellant.

Patrick H. Payton and Ronald G. Cable of Patrick H. Payton & Assoc., P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, SNELL, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ.

SNELL, Justice.

Criminal defendant Michael C. Dixon challenged as violative of double jeopardy his retrial following the termination of his initial trial. The second trial court granted Dixon's motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial judge presiding over the first trial acted without manifest necessity in sua sponte declaring a mistrial after the judge personally volunteered comments during the trial. On the State's appeal of the dismissal, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On March 23, 1994, a car allegedly being operated by Dixon struck and killed a young child named Binh-Mo Thi Le. The State charged Dixon with involuntary manslaughter, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.5 (1993), and failure to give aid and information in violation of Iowa Code sections 321.261(3) and .263.

The trial court, Judge Rodney J. Ryan presiding, began a jury trial on June 27, 1994. During cross-examination of the State's third witness, Andre Jones, the defense counsel attempted to get Jones to describe the scene of the accident with the help of a diagram. The trial judge interjected his own remarks regarding the accuracy of the diagram. The following colloquy occurred:

Q: Where did the little girl get hit if she got hit on Drake Park?

THE COURT: Well, you're doing a great job of mixing up a street with an area.

A. I don't know--

THE COURT: Excuse me. Can we identify for the jury what we're talking about in regard to a street and an area? We're calling everything Drake Park, and everybody is getting mixed up.

MR. MCGHEE: Judge, I think the witness got confused, and I think Mr. Payton--

THE COURT: Just identify--We're calling two different areas the same thing, and that's getting confusing to everybody. There is not--There is a Drake Park Street, and there is a Drake Park where there's a basketball court and other things. Let's separate those so we know what it is, and maybe the witnesses can distinguish between those two areas.

THE WITNESS: On the map, though--The map from it is different, because where I was standing--Well, actually everything would be down here instead of up here. See what I'm saying? This is a perfect format of the map of everything in the area, but it would be down here because the street is right here.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones, read the diagram closely. And I tend to agree with you that anybody that's familiar with it--I don't think the tennis courts are that close to the street, but I know that might be what's confusing the witness.

MR. PAYTON: Your honor, I'm going to object. I'm going to object to you testifying to how close the tennis courts are in this courtroom. You're not a witness in this courtroom.

THE COURT: I'm telling the jury--

MR. PAYTON: I want to make record outside the presence of the jury, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm going to call a mistrial. That's it. Thank you, folks. You are now excused.

The trial judge then immediately left the courtroom. The State's attorney and Dixon's counsel then secured a date for retrial of the matter. Dixon's counsel at no time objected to the declaration of the mistrial. The trial judge later issued a written statement in which he indicated he had interpreted Dixon's counsel's objection to his comments as a motion for a mistrial and had granted the request.

Dixon subsequently filed a motion to dismiss in which he asserted that, under the circumstances, the trial judge's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial constituted an abuse of discretion and therefore retrial of the matter would improperly subject Dixon to double jeopardy. Following a hearing before Judge Joel D. Novak, the court granted Dixon's motion to dismiss and dismissed the charges with prejudice.

II. Scope of Review

We review for errors of law a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss criminal charges on the ground that double jeopardy forbids reprosecution of the defendant. Iowa R.App.P. 4; see State v. White, 209 N.W.2d 15, 16 (Iowa 1973); cf. State v. Stanley, 351 N.W.2d 539, 540 (Iowa Ct.App.1984).

III. Manifest Necessity

When a criminal defendant challenges as violative of double jeopardy his or her retrial following a trial court's declaration of a mistrial, whether the retrial violates double jeopardy principles turns on the propriety of the court's declaration of a mistrial. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend V; see United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 121 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 426, 429 n. 3, 66 L.Ed.2d 328, 335 n. 3 (1980); State v. Franzen, 495 N.W.2d 714, 715 (Iowa 1993). The relevant provision of the Iowa Constitution is not as broad: "[n]o person shall after acquittal, be tried for the same offense." Iowa Const. art. I, § 12; see Franzen, 495 N.W.2d at 715. However, the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution makes the federal Double Jeopardy Clause applicable to Iowa criminal proceedings. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2062, 23 L.Ed.2d 707, 716 (1969); Franzen, 495 N.W.2d at 715. The same constitutional standards govern our analysis of potential jeopardy attachment circumstances as control the federal courts. Franzen, 495 N.W.2d at 716.

A criminal defendant is placed in jeopardy once he or she is put to trial before the trier of fact, whether the trier is a judge or jury. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 91 S.Ct. 547, 554, 27 L.Ed.2d 543, 553 (1971). In the case at bar, Dixon was placed in jeopardy when the jury was sworn. See State v. Watts, 244 N.W.2d 586, 588 (Iowa 1986). The federal Double Jeopardy Clause is based on the policy that

the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.

Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223, 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 204 (1957); see DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 127-28, 101 S.Ct. at 432, 66 L.Ed.2d at 349; Jorn, 400 U.S. at 479, 91 S.Ct. at 554, 27 L.Ed.2d at 553; White, 209 N.W.2d at 16. "As a general rule, the prosecutor is entitled to one, and only one, opportunity to require an accused to stand trial." Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505, 98 S.Ct. 824, 830, 54 L.Ed.2d 717, 727-28 (1978). However, the United States Supreme Court has on a number of occasions stated that in some instances, the "public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments" must outweigh a criminal defendant's "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal." E.g., Jorn, 400 U.S. at 480, 91 S.Ct. at 554-55, 27 L.Ed.2d at 554; Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.Ct. 834, 836, 93 L.Ed. 974, 978 (1949); see also White, 209 N.W.2d at 16.

At its most basic, the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids: (1) retrial following an acquittal, Arizona, 434 U.S. at 503, 98 S.Ct. at 829, 54 L.Ed.2d at 726; Crawford v. Fenton, 646 F.2d 810, 816 (3d Cir.1981); (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 129, 101 S.Ct. at 433, 66 L.Ed.2d at 340; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. Id. The double jeopardy principle does not forbid reprosecution of a criminal defendant after he or she has successfully appealed a conviction. White, 209 N.W.2d at 17. American courts have long utilized the following standard when measuring the double jeopardy implications of a court's declaration of a mistrial where the defendant has been neither acquitted nor convicted:

[I]n all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice with authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all circumstances which would render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with great caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes.

United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165, 165 (1824) (emphasis added); see Crawford, 646 F.2d at 816; White, 209 N.W.2d at 16.

A trial judge has considerable discretion to declare a mistrial after a procedural error has occurred during a trial and we will not reverse the court's decision absent a finding of abuse of discretion. Watts, 244 N.W.2d at 588; see State v. Givens, 161 Ariz. 278, 778 P.2d 643, 644 (Ct.App.1989).

A trial judge properly exercises his [or her] discretion to declare a mistrial if an impartial verdict cannot be reached, or if a verdict of conviction could be reached but would have to be reversed on appeal due to an obvious procedural error in the trial. If an error would make reversal on appeal a certainty, it would not serve the ends of public justice to require that the Government proceed with its proof when, if it succeeded before the jury, it would automatically be stripped of that success by an appellate court.

Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 464, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1070, 35 L.Ed.2d 425, 431 (1973); Schaffer v. State, 649 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex.Crim.App.1983).

When a trial judge determines in...