State v. Dixon
| Decision Date | 13 February 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 51898,51898,1 |
| Citation | 411 S.W.2d 185 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ollie DIXON, alias Richard Divonne, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Norman H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Charles C. Hatley, Asst. Atty. Gen., New Madrid, for respondent.
E. J. Murphy, H. H. McNabb, Jr., Harold L. Caskey, Butler, for appellant.
Defendant was charged with second degree burglary and stealing, by breaking into a general store at Rockville, Bates County, and stealing merchandise and foodstuffs therefrom. The information also charged prior felony convictions. Tried to a jury, defendant was found guilty October 23, 1965. The court fixed his punishment at fifteen years' imprisonment. Defendant has appealed.
Defendant's appointed counsel contend, first, error in permitting testimony that defendant at first gave an alias or different name, thus (it is claimed) implying to the jury that defendant had a criminal record, and, second, error in admitting certain incriminating statements of the defendant without his first having been warned of his constitutional rights.
The city marshal testified he, in response to a telephone call from a man who lived near the scene, went to the store about midnight, observed the store lights were out and a parked car on the west side of the store, right at the corner; that he stood under a tree across the street, and after waiting approximately forty-five minutes, saw the defendant come out the front door with an armload of bread, bologna, milk and bananas, whereupon he halted defendant, made him drop the articles and then walk to the middle of the street and stretch out prone while the marshal observed to see if anyone else was in the store. After deciding there was not, the marshal had defendant lean against a tree and searched him, discovering three hunting knives and scabbards, which the store owner subsequently identified (along with the items dropped on the widewalk) as merchandise from the store. The marshal took defendant back to the store, sat him down and called the sheriff, who arrived in about an hour. The two padlocks on the outer and inner front doors were gone and the marshal found them in the gutter where defendant later said he had thrown them.
Defendant did not offer any evidence.
On defendant's first point the record shows that the marshal, who talked to defendant while waiting for the sheriff, testified that when he asked defendant his name defendant said that 'his name was Richard Divonne'. Later, a deputy sheriff testified, without objection, that he heard defendant tell the sheriff his name was Richard Divonne and further, over objection, that at a later interrogration by the prosecuting attorney defendant said his name was Ollie Dixon. The word 'alias' was not mentioned and all the state showed was that when the arresting officer and later the sheriff asked defendant his name he said 'Richard Divonne' and subsequently when the prosecuting attorney asked, defendant said 'Ollie Dixon'. This is not error.
On defendant's second point, the record shows the city marshal talked with defendant while waiting for the sheriff, that the marshal asked defendant why he did it, that defendant answered he broke in because he was hungry; that he talked to defendant about the doors and defendant told him where he had thrown the locks. There was no showing the marshal said anything to defendant about constitutional rights.
The sheriff, who said he interrogated the defendant at the scene for approximately three-fourths of an hour, could not remember whether he informed defendant he had a right to have an attorney present, or that anything he might say might be used against him. The sheriff testified he examined the parked car on the west side of the store building and found therein about...
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State v. Aston, 51987
...beyond its stated facts, and we again so rule. State v. Howard, Mo., 383 S.W.2d 701; State v. Collins, Mo., 394 S.W.2d 368; State v. Dixon, Mo., 411 S.W.2d 185, decided February 13, 1967. In this situation we consider the 'totality of the circumstances' surrounding the making of the stateme......
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...here.' See also State v. Rapp, Mo., 412 S.W.2d 120, loc. cit. 125, State v. Holland, Mo., 412 S.W.2d 184, loc. cit. 186, and State v. Dixon, Mo., 411 S.W.2d 185, 186. As noted at outset of this opinion, the instant case was tried in June, 1958. Therefore the Miranda case has only tangential......
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Glenn v. State of Missouri
... ... Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966) ... The Missouri Supreme Court pointed out in regard to the inapplicability of Escobedo to this case, that it has frequently said that it will not extend the 341 F. Supp. 1058 ruling of Escobedo beyond the facts of that case, citing State v. Dixon, 411 S. W.2d 185 (Mo.1967), vacated on other grounds, 434 S.W.2d 564 (1968). In that case, the Missouri Supreme Court explained that in order for the precise holding of Escobedo to apply, there must be present the element of a request for counsel by the suspect and a denial by the police. A review ... ...
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State v. Glenn, 51873
...In regard to Escobedo, this court has frequently said that it will not expand that ruling beyond the facts of that case. State v. Dixon, Mo.Sup., 411 S.W.2d 185. It is obvious that the facts of the case before us do not call for the application of In the situation before us the proper rule ......