State v. Dock
| Decision Date | 03 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | 49,784–KA. |
| Citation | 167 So.3d 1097 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Rashunda D. DOCK, Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Carlos D. Prudhomme, for Appellant.
Dale G. Cox, District Attorney, Tommy J. Johnson, J. Aaron Crawford, George Winston, III, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.
Before WILLIAMS, STEWART and CARAWAY, JJ.
The defendant, Rashunda D. Dock, was charged by bill of information with two counts of vehicular homicide, a violation of La. R.S. 14:32.1. Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged of two counts of vehicular homicide. She was sentenced to serve 10 years at hard labor, with the first three years to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, for each count. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. The remainder of each sentence was suspended and she was given five years of supervised probation. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial and a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, which were denied by the trial court. The defendant now appeals. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.
On April 11, 2009, at approximately 8:45 p.m., at the intersection of Broadway Avenue and Tate Street/Illinois Street, in Shreveport, Louisiana, the defendant crashed into the passenger side of a vehicle driven by Shirley Mourning. Two passengers in Mourning's vehicle, two-year-old Tranita Thomas and 42–year–old Lashanda Thomas, were killed.
On August 18, 2011, via amended bill of information, the defendant was charged with two counts of vehicular homicide, in violation of La. R.S. 14:32.1. The bill also charged Mourning with one count of negligent homicide. The defendant and Mourning were tried together.
The jury trial commenced on February 3, 2014. The following evidence was adduced at trial.
At the time of the accident, the defendant was operating a Chevrolet Trailblazer southbound on Broadway Avenue, a four-lane highway, with a posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour. Mourning was operating a Chrysler 300 westbound on Tate Street crossing Broadway Avenue. Tate Street is a two-lane road, with a posted speed limit of 25 miles per hour, which turns into Illinois Street once it crosses Broadway Avenue. A stop sign was located on Tate Street at the intersection with Broadway Avenue. In the middle of this intersection, the defendant's vehicle collided with the passenger side of Mourning's vehicle. The vehicles then traveled to the southwest quadrant of the intersection, off the roadway, coming to a stop side by side in front of a building. Mourning's vehicle hit part of the building, causing damage.
Gabriel Morris, the passenger in the defendant's vehicle at the time of the accident, testified that on the day of the accident, he went to the defendant's house, where she was having a small family gathering. Morris stated that he brought two 32–ounce daiquiris to the defendant's house, one for the defendant and one for himself. He witnessed the defendant take a couple of sips of her daiquiri before they decided to go purchase some crawfish for the children. The defendant operated the vehicle. On their way back home with the crawfish, Morris testified that the defendant received a phone call concerning something her sister's boyfriend was doing to her son at her house. Morris stated that after the phone call, the defendant appeared mad and increased the speed of the vehicle. Approximately two minutes after the phone call, the accident occurred.
Morris further testified that he was unsure about whether Mourning stopped at the stop sign, or whether she did a rolling stop. He stated that it was not possible for the defendant to avoid the accident. Morris also stated that he did not have any reservations about riding the defendant, that the defendant did not appear intoxicated, and that he did not have any problem with the defendant's driving until she started speeding.
Officer Wyatt Alexander of the Shreveport Police Department testified regarding his observations upon arriving at the accident scene. He determined Mourning to be at fault since she did not stop at the stop sign.
Officer Harry Brown of the Shreveport Police Department also testified about what he observed upon arriving at the accident scene. Brown's photographs that he took at the scene, which the state introduced into evidence, depicted severe damage to the front of the defendant's vehicle and the passenger side of Mourning's vehicle. One of the photographs depicted a styrofoam cup, which appeared to be a daiquiri cup, on the driver's side floorboard of the defendant's vehicle. Brown also testified that no child restraint was found inside Mourning's vehicle.
Sergeant William Vincent of the Shreveport Police Department, an expert in automobile crash reconstruction, testified regarding his investigation of the crash. Several days after the accident, he took daytime photos of the vehicles at central storage to better depict the damages. He also testified that no child restraint was found inside Mourning's vehicle. Vincent took daytime photos of the accident scene, which depicted the defendant's and Mourning's viewpoint as they approached the intersection.
Vincent testified that based on his investigation, he was able to determine that three seconds prior to impact, the defendant was traveling 76 miles per hour. One second before impact, he determined that the defendant was traveling 56 miles per hour. At the point of impact, Mourning's vehicle was traveling 25 miles per hour.
Vincent testified that if the defendant would have been traveling at a lower speed, the damage to Mourning's vehicle would not have been as severe. He also determined that Mourning failed to stop at the stop sign on Tate Street before proceeding into the intersection. He stated that Mourning was at fault for the accident, because it would not have occurred had she stopped at the stop sign. Vincent also stated that even though the defendant's vehicle decreased speed prior to the crash, there were no pre-impact skid marks that would indicate she was braking.
The defendant testified that on the day of the accident, she drank a 12–ounce daiquiri before Morris arrived at her house. She further testified that she drank only two or three sips out the 32–ounce daiquiri that Morris brought her before they left her house to get the crawfish. Even though the defendant brought the daiquiri with her, she stated that she did not drink it while she was driving. The defendant testified that she did not feel intoxicated when she left her house, that she did not have any problems with her vision or navigating her vehicle, and that she was not distracted as she approached the intersection.
As she returned home, the defendant testified that she received a troubling text message from her niece informing her that something inappropriate was going on at her house with her nine-year-old son. The defendant admitted that she sped up because she was trying to get home. However, she did not think she was going 76 miles per hour as alleged. As the defendant approached the intersection, she testified that she observed Mourning fail to stop at the stop sign. The defendant stated that she applied her brakes, but was unable to avoid the accident.
Mourning also testified, stating that her niece, Lashanda, her great-niece, Tranita, and her grandson, Marcus Thomas, were passengers in her vehicle. Mourning admitted that she did not put Tranita in a child restraint. She further testified that she did stop at a stop sign, but could not remember what happened because she was knocked unconscious.
Samuel Mack, an eyewitness to the accident, testified that he was walking south on Broadway Avenue, crossing Illinois Street, when he heard a loud skidding, like a car was braking. He then witnessed the vehicles crash and begin sliding toward him at a high rate of speed, at which time he ran.
Following the accident, at approximately 10:50 p.m., the defendant was transported to LSU Hospital where her blood was drawn to test for alcohol. Randall Robillard, an expert in blood alcohol analysis, and a chemist at the North Louisiana Crime lab, testified that the defendant's blood contained 0.12 grams percent alcohol. Alcohol was not present in Mourning's blood.
Jimmy Barnhill, an expert in the filed of forensic technology and the effects of alcohol on humans, testified that studies have shown that a person with a blood concentration of 0.08 grams percent is sufficiently impaired to the extent that she cannot safely operate a motor vehicle.
Dr. James Taylor, an expert in forensic pathology, performed the autopsies on the victims, Tranita and Lashanda. He testified that both of them died from multiple blunt force injuries resulting from the accident.
On February 6, 2014, the jury unanimously found the defendant guilty as charged of two counts of vehicular homicide, in violation of La. R.S. 14:32.1. Mourning was also found guilty as charged of negligent homicide.
On February 19, 2014, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial and a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. She argued that the state failed to sufficiently establish her blood alcohol concentration, combined with her operation of the vehicle, caused the death of the victims. At a hearing that took place on February 24, 2014, the defendant's motions were denied.
On March 17, 2014, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 10 years at hard labor, with the first three years to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on each count. The remainder of each sentence was suspended, and the defendant was given five years of supervised probation. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.
The defendant filed the instant appeal, asserting one assignment of error.
In the defendant's sole assignment of error, she asserts that...
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State v. Nixon, 51,319–KA
...in an illegally lenient sentence, this court is not required to remand for imposition of a mandatory fine. State v. Dock , 49,784 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/3/15), 167 So.3d 1097. The state has not complained about the error and Nixon is not prejudiced by the trial court's failure to impose the fine......
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State v. Matthews
...constitute the sole cause of the killing, but rather, need only be a contributing factor. See La. R.S. 14:32.1; State v. Dock, 49,784 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/3/15), 167 So.3d 1097; State v. Lewis, 2013-1588 (La. App. 4 Cir.8/27/14), 147 So.3d 1251, 1261, writ denied, 2014-1992 (La. 5/15/15), 170......
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State v. Haley, 51,256–KA
...in an illegally lenient sentence, this Court is not required to remand for imposition of a mandatory fine. State v. Dock , 49,784 (La.App. 2 Cir. 06/03/15), 167 So.3d 1097. The state has not urged the error, and Haley is not prejudiced by the trial court's failure to impose the fine. CONCLU......
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State v. Leger
...the sole cause of the killing, but rather, need only be a contributing factor. See La. R.S. 14:32.1 ; State v. Dock, 49,784 (La. App. 2d Cir. 6/3/15), 167 So.3d 1097, 1103. Causation is a question of fact which has to be considered in light of the totality of circumstances surrounding the u......