State v. Doe
Decision Date | 02 August 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 2946,2946 |
Citation | 91 N.M. 57,570 P.2d 595,1977 NMCA 85 |
Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Petitioner-Appellant, v. John DOE, a child, Respondent-Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Judge Ryan removed himself from this Children's Court case. Thereafter Mary Walters, sitting as "Judge Designate of the Children's Court" dismissed the petition alleging delinquency. The state appealed. Our calendar assignment, see N.M.Crim.App. 207, stated that the parties should brief the question of Mary Walters' authority to preside. Briefs have been filed. We hold that Mary Walters had no authority to preside as judge in this case.
The petition was filed in January, 1977; the child was arraigned before Judge Ryan in February, 1977. Judge Ryan ruled on various motions on March 7, 1977. Trial was scheduled before Judge Ryan on March 16, 1977 but was continued at the request of the child's counsel. On March 14, and 21, 1977 Judge Ryan continued the hearing on additional motions. The order of continuance on March 21, 1977 recites a trial date of March 23, 1977.
The parties stipulated:
Judicial power can only be conferred upon a person by the authority of the law. State v. Trimble, 317 Mo. 751, 297 S.W. 378 (1927); see Lewis v. Harris, 238 N.C. 642, 78 S.E.2d 715 (1953).
Mary Walters attempted to exercise the power of a Children's Court judge. In this case, the Children's Court was a division of the district court. Sections 13-14-3(C) and 13-14-4, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 3, pt. 1); see Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968). Thus, Mary Walters attempted to exercise the power of a district court judge.
New Mexico Constitution, Article VI, § 15 states:
In connection with the above-quoted constitutional provision, State v. McGhee, 41 N.M. 103, 64 P.2d 825 (1937) states:
See Moruzzi v. Federal Life & Casualty Co., 42 N.M. 35, 75 P.2d 320 (1938), 115 A.L.R. 407 (1938). "District judges alone are authorized to preside in the trial of causes in the district court except as provided by section 15 of article 6 of the Constitution . . . ." State v. McGhee, supra.
The child asserts that Mary Walters was a de facto district judge. The three requisites for a de facto officer are: State v. Blancett, 24 N.M. 433, 174 P. 207 (1918), dismissed, 252 U.S. 574, 40 S.Ct. 395, 64 L.Ed. 723 (1920).
Under this definition, Mary Walters was not a de facto district judge. Paragraph 16 of the stipulation shows that she was not "holding" the office of district judge and was not in possession of such office. Paragraph 8 of the stipulation shows that she was sitting pro tempore. A person sitting as judge pro tempore "does not assume to have any title to the office." National Bank of Washington v. McCrillis, 15 Wash.2d 345, 130 P.2d 901 (1942). Acting pro tempore, Mary Walters was to hear only this particular case. "The temporary character of the authority of a judge pro tem and the fact that only the parties litigant are concerned with his right to act, in our opinion destroy the basis for the normal rules concerning de facto judges." National Bank of Washington, supra.
The child asserts that Mary Walters was a judge pro tempore. She was a judge pro tempore only if she came within the provision of N.M.Const., Art. VI, § 15. State v. McGhee, supra. Not being a district judge, the only basis for her being a judge pro tempore is the last sentence of the constitutional provision which reads: "If any judge shall be disqualified from hearing any cause in the district, the parties to such cause, or their attorneys of record may select some member of the bar to hear and determine said cause, and act as judge pro tempore therein." (Our emphasis.)
The right of the parties to agree on a member of the bar to sit as judge pro tempore comes into existence only "because of the disqualification of the trial judge". State v. McGhee, supra. Paragraph 4 of the stipulation states that Judge Ryan removed himself "without disqualification".
The child asserts that "disqualified" in N.M.Const., Art. VI, § 15 should be given an expansive meaning; that disqualification can result for a variety of reasons other than those specified in N.M.Const., Art. VI, § 18 or § 21-5-8, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 4). See also §§ 13-14-27(D) and 13-14-33(F), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl. Vol. 3, pt. 1). We assume, but do not decide, that "disqualified" means any valid reason why a judge should not hear the case. Giving an expanded meaning to "disqualified" does not aid the child. Whatever the meaning of "disqualified", it is stipulated that Judge Ryan removed himself "without disqualification".
The child asserts that Judge Ryan's action in removing himself "should be considered as a disqualification" within the meaning of N.M.Const., Art. VI, § 15. The child asserts that New Mexico reports are replete with cases where the judge has withdrawn "without the slightest hint of the underlying reason, and without exception the appellate opinions refer to the act of withdrawal as disqualification." In Midwest Royalties v. Simmons, 61 N.M. 399, 301 P.2d 334 (1956) the district judge announced in open court that he was disqualified. In State v. Encinias, 53 N.M. 343, 208 P.2d 155 (1949) the district judge entered an order disqualifying himself. In Chavez v. Baca, 47 N.M. 471, 144 P.2d 175 (1943) one district judge was disqualified by the affidavit of a party; another district judge entered an order disqualifying himself. In State v. Lujan, 45 N.M. 103, 111 P.2d 541 (1941) the local district judge entered an order disqualifying himself.
In each of the cases relied on by the child, the district judge was disqualified to act; these cases do not support the argument that a withdrawal, without more, is a disqualification. The answer to the child's argument is that it is stipulated that Judge Ryan withdrew from the case "without disqualification". With this stipulation, we cannot hold that a withdrawal without disqualification is to be treated as a disqualification.
Compere v. Girand, 42 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.Civ.App.1931) states that in the absence of an indication to the contrary, the Texas appellate court would presume that the regular judge was disqualified. We do not consider whether such a presumption exists in New Mexico. Here there is an indication to the contrary the stipulation that Judge Ryan removed himself without disqualification.
Judge Ryan not being disqualified, the parties had no right to agree upon Mary Walters to hear the case and Mary Walters was not a judge pro tempore under N.M.Const., Art. VI, § 15.
The child points out that the parties agreed that Mary Walters should sit as a judge pro tempore. It is stipulated that no issue as to jurisdiction was raised by the parties. The parties litigated, before Mary Walters, the matter which the State has appealed. In these circumstances, the child asserts "that the State has waived . . . any objection it might have to her qualifications to act as judge in this cause."
A jurisdictional essential necessary to the validity of every judgment is the power or authority to decide the particular matter presented. Heckathorn v. Heckathorn, 77 N.M. 369, 423 P.2d 410...
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