State v. Doelz

Citation309 Kan. 133,432 P.3d 669
Decision Date11 January 2019
Docket NumberNo. 113,165,113,165
Parties STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Robert William DOELZ, Appellant.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Caroline M. Zuschek, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and Peter Maharry, of the same office, was on the briefs for appellant.

Todd G. Thompson, county attorney, argued the cause, and Kathryn Devlin, assistant county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Johnson, J.:

A law enforcement officer stopped the vehicle Robert Doelz was driving to investigate whether it had any connection to a recent bank robbery. After seizing a digital scale from the backseat, the officer searched the vehicle, uncovering a large amount of methamphetamine in the vehicle's gas cap area. The district court denied a motion to suppress the fruits of the vehicle search, and an initial jury trial ended with a hung jury. The retrial jury convicted Doelz of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute; the district court denied Doelz' motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the suppression motion, the district court's denial of the new trial motion, and the jury's conviction. We granted Doelz' petition for review which claims inter alia that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the district court's denial of the motion to suppress because the officer's general search of Doelz' vehicle was an unconstitutional warrantless search. We agree, reversing and remanding to the district court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On May 31, 2013, a credit union in Leavenworth, Kansas, was robbed. According to eyewitnesses, two black males committed the robbery, and they fled in a dark green Chevrolet Blazer driven by a white male. The witnesses said the getaway vehicle had standard Missouri license plates with the final three characters being "GAY." But standard Missouri license plates use both letters and numbers.

The next morning, Leavenworth Police Officer Brandon Mance saw a dark green Chevrolet Blazer with standard Missouri license plates ending in "G4Y." The vehicle was parked at a residence Mance knew to be "involved with drug activity." As he drove past the parked Blazer, Mance noted that there were three white males inside the vehicle and a black male leaning against the outside of the Blazer, talking to the backseat passenger.

Mance waited until the vehicle left the residence, followed it, and subsequently initiated a traffic stop. Doelz was driving; Floyd Eaton was the front-seat passenger; and David Schmidt was seated in the backseat. None of the occupants was black. Mance asked if they had any knowledge about the robbery that occurred the night before, and they responded that they had read about it in the newspaper. Doelz told Mance that the Blazer belonged to his girlfriend's aunt. Mance recognized Eaton and Schmidt from prior encounters; Mance associated Eaton with a residence "notorious for the use of narcotics, primarily methamphetamines," and Eaton had previously admitted to using methamphetamine.

Mance ran all three occupants' names through dispatch and discovered that Schmidt had two outstanding arrest warrants with the City of Leavenworth. In the process of arresting Schmidt, Mance saw an object on the Blazer's backseat, 4 by 4 inches, black plastic, with a lid and a clasp, that he believed contained a digital scale. Without obtaining permission to enter the vehicle or to remove the object, Mance grabbed it, opened it, and confirmed that it was a digital scale.

Mance confronted Doelz with the scale, and Doelz denied that it belonged to him. Mance then requested permission to search the vehicle, but Doelz initially resisted the request. Mance told Doelz that, based on the evidence he had already found, the officer was legally authorized to search the vehicle even without permission. At that point, Doelz responded, "If you have to, go ahead." The ensuing thorough search of the vehicle uncovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, and cash, including 28.52 grams of methamphetamine wedged in the vehicle's gas cap area.

The State charged Doelz with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and, after a preliminary hearing and arraignment, the matter was set for a jury trial. The Friday before trial, Doelz filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence recovered in the vehicle. He first argued that the investigative detention should have terminated when Mance confirmed that the vehicle occupants were white, given that the credit union robbers were described as two black males. In addition, he asserted that Mance had unlawfully seized the digital scale without a warrant, and the ensuing vehicle search—based upon the scale and without a knowing consent—was an unlawful warrantless search.

At trial the next Monday, Doelz' counsel objected to officer Mance's testimony regarding the seized evidence and, in a sidebar, stated he wished to preserve his motion to suppress for appeal. The judge overruled the objection. The district court then took up the motion to suppress at the end of the day, following voir dire, opening statements, and the State's case-in-chief. Because the district court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, it is unclear whether the judge relied exclusively on testimony at the preliminary hearing, as Doelz had suggested, or whether the judge considered the additional testimony that had just been presented at trial.

Nevertheless, the court ruled that Mance had reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop based on the description of the vehicle, and it was reasonable to extend the stop to obtain the identities of the vehicle occupants to investigate how this vehicle was involved with the robbery. Further, the court held that, when Mance saw the digital scale, his experience and training permitted him to opine that it was for an illegal use, thus providing probable cause to seize the digital scale. The court found that Mance was authorized to search the entire vehicle on two bases: Doelz' consent and the state's theory that Mance had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained illegal contraband.

The trial resulted in a hung jury after one of the jurors refused to participate in deliberations. At the retrial, after empaneling the jury, the judge explained the restrictions placed on the jurors and gave the following instruction:

"Any juror who violates these restrictions I've explained to you jeopardizes the fairness of these proceedings, and a mistrial could result, which would require the entire trial process to start over. As you can imagine, a mistrial is an expense and inconvenience to the parties, the Court, and the taxpayers."

During voir dire, the State informed the jury this was Doelz' second trial, stating:

"You're going to hear that there was actually testimony from a previous trial in this case. And the reason for that ... is because there was actually an issue with one of the jurors in that case. We had actually got to the very end of this case, and then one of the jurors decided she did not want to participate."

During trial, Doelz' counsel continually objected to the admission of the evidence of contraband recovered from Doelz' vehicle. The jury returned a verdict finding Doelz guilty of one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute.

After the jury returned a guilty verdict, Doelz filed a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Following a hearing, the district court denied Doelz' motion for a new trial.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Doelz' conviction. As part of its opinion, the panel held that the totality of circumstances supported the officer's belief that the Blazer contained contraband. One of the circumstances specifically noted was "the presence of the closed digital scale recognized by the officer as drug paraphernalia used in drug sales." State v. Doelz , No. 113,165, 2016 WL 3570515, at *6 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion). This court granted review of the Court of Appeals' decision.

LAWFULNESS OF VEHICLE SEARCH

Doelz argues Mance conducted an unconstitutional search of his vehicle in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He asserts Fourth Amendment violations occurred at multiple points during the investigation. First, Doelz concedes that the officer had reasonable suspicion to initially stop the vehicle based on the robbery eyewitnesses' description of the getaway vehicle, but he contends that the reasonable suspicion of bank robbery dissipated the moment the officer saw that all the vehicle occupants were white. At that point, Doelz argues, the detention could not be lawfully extended without reasonable suspicion of another crime, and Doelz should have been free to leave.

Next, Doelz argues the officer unlawfully seized the digital scale without a warrant and without a valid exception to the warrant requirement. Third, Doelz argues that Mance did not have probable cause, based on the totality of the circumstances, to search the entire vehicle. Finally, Doelz argued to the Court of Appeals that he did not freely and voluntarily consent to the search. We address each claim in turn.

Standard of Review

Reviewing a district court's decision on a motion to suppress requires the application of a bifurcated standard. The appellate court reviews the district court's factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence, and then the ultimate legal conclusion is reviewed using a de novo standard. In reviewing the factual findings, the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. State v. Garcia , 297 Kan. 182, 186-87, 301 P.3d 658 (2013). "Substantial competent evidence is ‘such legal and relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as being sufficient to support a conclusion.’ " Smith v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue...

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