State v. Dohlman

• Decision Date: 15 December 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-0581.,05-0581.
• Citation: 725 N.W.2d 428
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Robert Edwin DOHLMAN, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 428

725 N.W.2d 428

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Robert Edwin DOHLMAN, Appellant.

No. 05-0581.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

December 15, 2006.

Judith M. O'Donohoe of Elwood, O'Donohoe, Stochl, Braun & Churbuck, Charles City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, William A. Hill, Assistant Attorney General, and Mark L. Walk, County Attorney, for appellee.

WIGGINS, Justice.

In this case, we must decide whether Robert Dohlman proved he was a wrongfully imprisoned person under chapter 663A of the Iowa Code (Supp.1997).¹ The district court found Dohlman was not a wrongfully imprisoned person because he did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that he did not commit the offenses for which he was convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned or that any person, including himself, did not commit these offenses. In our review of the record, we find substantial evidence supports this finding and affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In the early morning hours of December 6, 1998, Dohlman's vehicle collided with a van driven by Jessica Sweeney. The collision caused the death of her husband and passenger, James Sweeney. The collision also caused Jessica to suffer a broken vertebra and multiple fractures in her arm.

The State charged Dohlman with homicide by vehicle, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(1); homicide by vehicle, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(2)(a); and two counts of serious injury by vehicle, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(4). A jury convicted Dohlman of all four charges and the court sentenced Dohlman to a term of imprisonment. Although Dohlman appealed his conviction, he began serving his sentence immediately because under Iowa law he was ineligible for bail. See Iowa Code § 811.1(2) (providing a defendant appealing a conviction for a class "B" felony under section 707.6A shall not be admitted to bail during the pendency of the appeal).

We transferred Dohlman's appeal to our court of appeals. It reversed his convictions finding there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Dohlman was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Dohlman, No. 01-1873, 2002 WL 31882998, at *5 (Iowa Ct.App. Dec.30, 2002). The State filed a request for further review, which we denied. After serving approximately one year and five months of his sentence, the State released Dohlman from custody.

Dohlman then filed an application for entry of order re wrongful imprisonment under chapter 663A. The district court found Dohlman did not prove under section 663A.1(2) that he did not commit the offenses for which he was convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned or that any person, including himself, did not commit these offenses. Dohlman now appeals the district court judgment holding he was not a wrongfully imprisoned person under chapter 663A.

II. Issue.

We must decide whether substantial evidence supports the district court's determination that Dohlman did not prove the requirements of section 663A.1(2) by clear and convincing evidence.

III. Scope of Review.

This court's function is not to invalidate the district court's factual findings if substantial evidence supports its findings. Fischer v. City of Sioux City, 695 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Iowa 2005). We consider evidence as substantial if a reasonable person would accept the evidence as adequate to reach the district court's conclusion. Nash Finch Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 672 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Iowa 2003). "Evidence is not insubstantial merely because we may draw different conclusions from [the evidence]; the ultimate question is whether it supports the finding actually made, not whether the evidence would support a different finding." Fischer, 695 N.W.2d at 34 (citations omitted).

Therefore, "[w]hen the challenge to the district court's ruling is lack of substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment" and "we liberally construe the district court's findings to uphold, rather than defeat, the result reached." Tim O'Neill Chevrolet, Inc. v. Forristall, 551 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Iowa 1996) (citation omitted). "However, neither the district court's conclusions of law nor its application of its legal conclusions is binding on appeal." Fischer, 695 N.W.2d at 34 (citations omitted). Our review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 6.4.

IV. Statutory Framework.

Dohlman sought a finding he was a wrongfully imprisoned person under chapter 663A of the Iowa Code. The first step in qualifying as a wrongfully imprisoned person requires an individual to meet the following criteria:

1. As used in this section, a "wrongfully imprisoned person" means an individual who meets all of the following criteria:

a. The individual was charged, by indictment or information, with the commission of a public offense classified as an aggravated misdemeanor or felony.

b. The individual did not plead guilty to the public offense charged, or to any lesser included offense, but was convicted by the court or by a jury of an offense classified as an aggravated misdemeanor or felony.

c. The individual was sentenced to incarceration for a term of imprisonment not to exceed two years if the offense was an aggravated misdemeanor or to an indeterminate term of years under chapter 902 if the offense was a felony, as a result of the conviction.

d. The individual's conviction was vacated or dismissed, or was reversed, and no further proceedings can be or will be held against the individual on any facts and circumstances alleged in the proceedings which had resulted in the conviction.

e. The individual was imprisoned solely on the basis of the conviction that was vacated, dismissed, or reversed and on which no further proceedings can be or will be had.

Iowa Code § 663A.1(1).

If these criteria are met, the court then proceeds to the second inquiry: whether that person meets the requirements of section 663A.1(2). Section 663A.1(2) provides:

2. Upon receipt of an order vacating, dismissing, or reversing the conviction and sentence in a case for which no further proceedings can be or will be held against an individual on any facts and circumstances alleged in the proceedings which resulted in the conviction, the district court shall make a determination whether there is clear and convincing evidence to establish either of the following findings:

a. That the offense for which the individual was convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned, including any lesser included offenses, was not committed by the individual.

b. That the offense for which the individual was convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned was not committed by any person, including the individual.

Id. § 663A.1(2). If the criteria of both section 663A.1(1) and section 663A.1(2) are met, the individual qualifies as a wrongfully imprisoned person. Id. § 663A.1(3)(a).

The parties agree Dohlman met the criteria of section 663A.1(1). The parties disagree as to whether Dohlman met his burden of proof under section 663A.1(2). Therefore, the resolution of this appeal depends on our construction of Iowa Code section 663A.1(2).

When confronted with the task of statutory interpretation, we have stated:

The goal of statutory construction is to determine legislative intent. We determine legislative intent from the words chosen by the legislature, not what it should or might have said. Absent a statutory definition or an established meaning in the law, words in the statute are given their ordinary and common meaning by considering the context within which they are used. Under the guise of construction, an interpreting body may not extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the meaning of a statute.

Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004) (citations omitted). Additionally, legislative intent is derived not only from the language used but also from "the statute's `subject matter, the object sought to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, underlying policies, remedies provided, and the consequences of the various interpretations.'" Cox v. State, 686 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Iowa 2004) (citations omitted). When ascertaining legislative intent, the legislative history of a statute is also instructive. State v. Schultz, 604 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa 1999); Richards v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 362 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Iowa 1985); see also Iowa Code § 4.6(3) (1997) (stating the court may consider the legislative history of an ambiguous statute in determining legislative intent).

The plain language of section 663A.1(2) requires a person to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the person did not commit the originally charged offenses or the offenses were not committed by any person, including himself. "Commit" means to do or to perform an act. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 457 (unabr. ed.2002). Thus, the plain meaning of the words used by the legislature indicates section 663A.1(2) requires proof the person did not do the offense or the facts establish an offense was not done by anyone.

The legislative history supports this plain meaning interpretation of section 663A.1(2). First, in the explanation of the bill, the committee on the judiciary stated the purpose of the bill is to provide damages to

a person who was charged with, convicted of, and sentenced to serve a term of incarceration[,] . . . and whose conviction was vacated, dismissed, or reversed either because the offense was committed by another person or the offense was a fabrication.

H.F. 674 Explanation, 77th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1997) (emphasis added).

Second, the proposed legislation had a fiscal impact, requiring a statement on the fiscal impact of the bill prior to conducting any debate on the bill. Joint Rules of the Senate and House, H.R.J. Res. 3, 77th Gen. Assemb., R. 17 (Iowa 1997). The fiscal impact statement for the bill contained the assumption that "[a]pproximately one case per year is reversed because of insufficient evidence. ...