State v. Donahue, (SC 16143)

• Decision Date: 21 December 1999
• Docket Number: (SC 16143)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JEFFREY L. DONAHUE

251 Conn. 636

742 A.2d 775

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JEFFREY L. DONAHUE

(SC 16143)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 21, 1999.

Officially released December 21, 1999.

McDonald, C. J., and Berdon, Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Peters and Callahan, JS. Kevin C. Connors, for the appellant (defendant).

Robert M. Spector, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Mark S. Solak, state's attorney, and Roger Caridad, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

NORCOTT, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the Appellate Court, in affirming the judgment of the trial court, properly concluded that the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify stopping the defendant's vehicle and detaining him. We conclude that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court's determination concerning the existence of the requisite reasonable and articulable suspicion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The defendant, Jeffrey L. Donahue, pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a.¹ The trial court had denied in part and granted in part the defendant's motion to suppress evidence of his statements to the police and the results of the field sobriety tests the police had conducted prior to his arrest.² In its denial of the defendant's motion, the trial court, Schuman, J., held that the defendant had been stopped by the arresting officer pursuant to a reasonable suspicion justifying the stop and that, therefore, the resulting statements and field tests were admissible. Following the defendant's conditional plea of nolo contendere pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a,³ the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction and sentenced the defendant to a term of six months imprisonment, execution suspended, and six months conditional discharge. The trial court also suspended the defendant's license, imposed a fine and ordered community service and counseling. The execution of the sentence was stayed to allow the defendant the opportunity to appeal.

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly had denied his motion to suppress. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Donahue, 53 Conn. App. 497, 502, 729 A.2d 255 (1999). This certified appeal followed.⁴

On appeal, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. He claims that the police did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify his detention. The state claims that the police did have a reasonable and articulable suspicion, and that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress.

The Appellate Court determined that the following facts were undisputed. "On December 10, 1997, Sergeant Todd Lynch of the Connecticut state police was on routine patrol on Club Road in Windham. As a shift supervisor, Lynch normally would not be on street patrol. This area, however, had experienced a dramatic increase in criminal activity in the previous four to six weeks, which he was attempting to counteract with his help on patrol. Specifically, Lynch was patrolling a cemetery next to a public housing project located on Club Road where drug dealing and prostitution often took place. Individuals would often park their vehicles at the commercial establishments along Club Road and then walk through the cemetery into the housing project to engage in these illegal activities.

"As Lynch was leaving the cemetery at approximately 1:50 a.m., he noticed a vehicle operated by the defendant turn abruptly from Club Road into the vacant parking lot of the French Club, a private social club that had closed for the evening. The defendant had a passenger with him in the car. As the defendant parked his vehicle and kept the engine running ... Lynch drove his vehicle across the street toward the defendant's vehicle. By the time Lynch actually entered the French Club parking lot, the defendant had positioned his vehicle so that it was facing the exit of the parking lot. Lynch then made a U-turn in the parking lot so that he could approach the defendant's vehicle from behind and activated his red, yellow and blue flashers, but not his light bar. Before exiting his vehicle, Lynch radioed the defendant's license plate number to the Colchester barracks to find out whether the defendant's vehicle was stolen and if there were any outstanding warrants for its registered owner. Lynch learned that the vehicle was neither reported stolen, nor were there any outstanding warrants.

"Upon receiving this information, Lynch exited his vehicle and approached the defendant's vehicle to ask the defendant for his license and registration. The defendant rolled down his window when he saw Lynch at his driver's side window. At that point, Lynch detected alcohol on the defendant's breath and, after the defendant failed a field sobriety test, Lynch arrested him for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of § 14-227a." Id., 498-99.

At trial, the defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained after his initial detention on the ground that such detention had been unlawful. The defendant claimed that Lynch lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop his vehicle and that the ensuing detention, therefore, violated his rights pursuant to the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution,⁵ and article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution. ⁶ The trial court ruled that "there's a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot when given the vicinity, the time of night the defendant pulls into the dirt parking lot of a club that is closed. And there's no other businesses in the area that could have been opened at that time. So I find that there was [a] reasonable suspicion to justify the stop at that time." Accordingly, the trial court denied the defendant's motion in part.⁷

The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that "[t]he defendant's actions ... were particularly consistent with the type of suspicious activity that often preceded ... crime in this area. Under these circumstances, Lynch had an objective basis to suspect that the defendant may have been involved in the crimes .... The facts of this case support the determination that a reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to justify the stop of the defendant's vehicle." Id., 501.

Before this court, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify stopping his vehicle. The state argues in response that Lynch's investigatory stop of the defendant was justified based upon the fact that the defendant was driving his lawfully registered vehicle in a commercial area that recently had seen an increase in criminal activities, especially drug dealing, prostitution, larceny and vandalism, and that "individuals would often park their vehicles at establishments along Club Road and walk across the cemetery into the adjacent public housing project to engage in drug dealing and prostitution." We agree with the defendant that the facts of this case do not reveal a reasonable and articulable basis for a police stop.

As a threshold matter, we set forth the standard by which we review the Appellate Court's ruling. "[W]e undertake a two-part analysis. First, we ascertain whether the trial court's underlying factual findings were clearly erroneous. State v. Torres, 197 Conn. 620, 625, 500 A.2d 1299 (1985); Pandolphe's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221, 435 A.2d 24 (1980).... Second, in light of the facts found by the trial court, we determine whether the Appellate Court was correct in concluding that the police officer [had] a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity on which to base his initial investigative approach to the defendant's car. The trial court's conclusions must stand unless they are legally and logically inconsistent with the facts. State v. Torres, supra, [625]; State v. Lasher, 190 Conn. 259, 267, 460 A.2d 970 (1983)." (Citation omitted; internal quotations marks omitted.) State v. Cofield, 220 Conn. 38, 44, 595 A.2d 1349 (1991). We conclude that the Appellate Court's conclusion that Lynch had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity is legally and logically inconsistent with the facts before us.

I

Although the issue of whether Lynch's detention of the defendant constituted a "seizure" is not a certified issue before this court, the state asserts, as an alternative ground for affirming the decision of the Appellate Court, that Lynch's stop of the defendant was not a seizure. Indeed, the state cites State v. Hill, 237 Conn. 81, 87, 675 A.2d 866 (1996), for this court's definition of "seizure." "[A] person [is defined] as seized under our state constitution when by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.... In determining whether a seizure has occurred, so as to invoke the protections of our state constitution ... a court is to consider whether in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The trial court ruled that Lynch's detention of the defendant did constitute a seizure and the Appellate Court did not disturb that finding.⁸

The state's argument is difficult to sustain in light of its counsel's concession, at oral argument before this court, that under the circumstances in the present case, he—or any other reasonable person—would not have felt free to leave after Lynch pulled up behind the defendant's car and activated the vehicle's...