State v. Donnell, 17850

• Decision Date: 25 March 1993
• Docket Number: No. 17850,17850
• Citation: 849 S.W.2d 733
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Mikael B. DONNELL, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 733

849 S.W.2d 733

STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Mikael B. DONNELL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17850.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division Two.

March 25, 1993.

Marcie W. Bower, Columbia, for defendant-appellant.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Hugh L. Marshall, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.

FLANIGAN, Judge.

A jury found defendant Mikael Donnell guilty of involuntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and he was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. Defendant appeals.

In addition to its formal portions, the information charged that on or about April 4, 1991, in Jasper County, Missouri, the defendant "recklessly caused the death of Timothy A. Fry by driving at an excessive rate of speed while trying to evade the Missouri State Highway Patrol."

Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. Defendant's first point is that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress certain statements made by him on April 4, 1991, to Trooper Michael Bryan of the Missouri Highway Patrol because the statements were obtained in violation of defendant's constitutional rights "in that the statements were obtained by custodial interrogation and Trooper Bryan did not advise defendant of his Miranda rights prior to obtaining the statements."

The correctness of the trial court's decision is measured by whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the findings. State v. Lanear, 805 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Mo.App.1991). This court must determine if the evidence supports the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. The weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses are questions for the trial court's resolution. Id.

The testimony of state's witness, Trooper Bryan, at the motion to suppress hearing, was essentially the same as he gave at the jury trial. Bryan testified that at 9 p.m. on April 4, 1991, he was on duty, heading west on Route HH in Jasper County. An eastbound vehicle passed him at a rate of speed which he determined by radar to be 80 miles per hour. Bryan activated his red lights and attempted to stop the vehicle. The vehicle accelerated. Bryan made a U-turn and started in pursuit. Bryan reached a speed of 105 miles per hour, but the pursued vehicle was going even faster.

During the three-mile pursuit, the pursued vehicle violated two stop signs located at intersections. Bryan testified: "I did not see the accident occur initially. The accident occurred at County Road 12 and Fir Road, which is a paved road. As we went off the paved portion, it turned into a gravel road. The vehicle I was pursuing hit the gravel portion of the road, which caused a large amount of dust. As I drove into the dust, I slowed down. I never did see the accident because it was so dusty. Once the dust cleared, I observed the vehicle overturned in the field. The two occupants of the vehicle had been thrown out. Defendant was one of those occupants. I ran over to where the two men were lying on the ground. I found Mr. Fry, who appeared to be unconscious and in a very serious condition. Defendant was lying beside him.

Bryan gave the following testimony:

Q. Did you ask Mr. Donnell anything when you approached him?

A. Yes, I asked him who was the driver, and at that time he stated, "I was driving."

Q. Did you Mirandize him prior to asking him that?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Did Mr. Donnell say anything else to you at that point in time?

A. No, he was just concerned about his friend at that time.

Q. And just to make the record clear here, Mr. Donnell was conscious; is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Was Mr. Fry, the passenger of the vehicle, was he conscious at this time?

A. No, he was not. ¹

Q. Now, did Mr. Donnell say anything else to you at that point in time?

A. No, he didn't.

Q. Now, you had occasion to talk to Mr. Donnell, I believe the next day; is that correct?

A. That's correct, at the hospital.

Bryan also testified that prior to interviewing defendant at the hospital on April 5, he gave defendant the Miranda warnings. Defendant's point focuses upon the statement elicited from him at the scene of the accident to the effect that he was driving.

In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3147, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), the court held that a person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit of the procedural safeguards enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), "regardless of the nature or severity of the offense of which he is suspected or for which he was arrested." The court held that Miranda governs the admissibility of statements made during a custodial interrogation by a suspect accused of a misdemeanor traffic offense, as well as a suspect accused of a felony traffic offense. The court also held, however, that the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a traffic stop does not constitute custodial interrogation for the purpose of the doctrine enunciated in Miranda.

In Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 10-12, 109 S.Ct. 205, 206-207, 102 L.Ed.2d 172 (1988), the court gave this summary of its holding in Berkemer:

[T]he Court concluded that the "noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not 'in custody' for the purposes of Miranda." The Court reasoned that although the stop was unquestionably a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, such traffic stops typically are brief, unlike a prolonged station house interrogation. Second, the Court emphasized that traffic stops commonly occur in the "public view," in an atmosphere far "less 'police dominated' than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself." The detained motorist's "freedom of action [was not] curtailed to 'a degree associated with formal arrest.' " Accordingly, he was not entitled to a recitation of his constitutional rights prior to arrest, and his roadside responses to questioning were admissible.

The Court said, 488 U.S. at 10, n. 1, 109 S.Ct. at 207, n. 1:

We did not announce an absolute rule for all motorist detentions, observing that lower courts must be vigilant that police do not "delay formally arresting detained motorists, and ... subject them to sustained and intimidating interrogation at the scene of their initial detention."

Also the Court said, 488 U.S. at 11, n. 2, 109 S.Ct. at 207, n. 2:

Reliance on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision Commonwealth v. Meyer, 488 Pa. 297, 412 A.2d 517 (1980), to which we referred in Berkemer, see 468 U.S., at 441, and n. 34, 104 S.Ct., at 3151, and n. 34, is inapposite. Meyer involved facts which we implied might properly remove its result from Berkemer's application to ordinary traffic stops; specifically, the motorist in Meyer could be found to have been placed in custody for purposes of Miranda safeguards because he was detained for over one-half an hour, and subjected to questioning while in the patrol car. Thus, we acknowledged Meyer's relevance to the unusual traffic stop that involves prolonged detention. We expressly disapproved, however, the attempt to extrapolate from this sensitivity to uncommon detention circumstances any general proposition that custody exists whenever motorists think that their freedom of action has been restricted, for such a rationale would eviscerate Berkemer altogether. (Emphasis added.)

Outstate cases, decided in the wake of Berkemer and arising out of facts similar to those at bar, support the trial court's ruling. People v. Bellomo, 10 Cal.App. 4th 195, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 782 (1992); DuPont v. State, 204 Ga.App. 262, 418 S.E.2d 803 (1992); State v. Seagle, 96 N.C.App. 318, 385 S.E.2d 532 (1989); State v. Esser, 166 Wis.2d 897, 480 N.W.2d 541 (1992).

In Bellomo, defendant was convicted of negligently causing bodily injury while driving under the influence of a drug. The accident involved a collision between two parked cars and a moving vehicle jointly owned by defendant and his brother, both of whom were in the front seat. The main issue at trial was whether defendant or a third man was the driver. An officer arrived at the scene. A paramedic told the officer he saw defendant leave the driver's side of the vehicle and walk across the street. The officer, in uniform, saw defendant sitting on a curb, slumped over, and asked him whether he was the driver and whether he had identification. Defendant answered he was not the driver and that he was just walking by. Defendant did not attempt to walk away and, had he done so, the officer would have restrained him. Defendant was later taken into custody. The court held that the questions about defendant's identity and whether he was driving "did not transform the accident in question into custodial interrogation" and that the trial court did not err in admitting defendant's statement to the officer.

In DuPont, defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. Shortly after midnight, an officer responded to a call concerning an automobile accident. He discovered that a Volkswagen had been driven into the rear of a parked car. The Volkswagen was unoccupied when he arrived, but defendant and another man, who was being treated by emergency rescue personnel, were standing nearby. In response to two questions from the officer, defendant stated he was the owner and driver of the car. Detecting a strong odor of alcohol emanating from defendant, the officer took him into custody. The court held that the trial court properly admitted the officer's testimony that defendant had admitted driving the car. The court said, 418 S.E.2d at 805-806:

Miranda warnings are not required when a police officer is conducting a preliminary on-the-scene investigation to determine the nature of the situation. Even if the defendant is the focus of investigation, no Miranda warning is required when the...