State v. Dorr, 54409

• Decision Date: 11 March 1971
• Docket Number: No. 54409,54409
• Citation: 184 N.W.2d 673
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee. v. Danial Alan DORR, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 673

184 N.W.2d 673

STATE of Iowa, Appellee. v. Danial Alan DORR, Appellant.

No. 54409.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 11, 1971.

C. A. Frerichs, Waterloo, for appellant.

Richard Turner, Atty. Gen., Michael J. Laughlin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

LeGRAND, Justice.

Defendant was arrested on an informant's tip. A search of his car turned up a quantity of contraband drugs, leading to the criminal charge which is now the subject of this appeal. The State accuses him of having violated section 3(1), chapter 189, Acts of the 62nd General Assembly, which is now section 204A.3, The Code, 1971. Defendant claimed the arrest and subsequent search were illegal. His motion to suppress the evidence seized by the arresting officers was overruled. He thereafter entered a plea of guilty, which included the following qualification:

'Defendant does not thereby waive any error committed by the trial court in its ruling on defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence which was the product of a search without a warrant for the arrest of defendant or a search of the automobile in which defendant was riding. The entry of the pleas of guilty at this time is predicated on the fact that the evidence assailed by the defendant's motion to suppress would be introduced in the trial of the cause to which he has entered these pleas. By the entry of the pleas the defendant does not waive any of his constitutional rights which might have been violated by the court's failure to suppress the assailed evidence. The defendant intends to appeal the trial court's ruling on his motion to suppress and if successful would withdraw the pleas of guilty this date entered. These pleas are entered with the full knowledge of the Black Hawk County attorney's office and the trial court that defendant is not thereby waiving any of his constitutional rights in regard to his motion to suppress or the rulings thereon.'

Before imposition of sentence, defendant's request that he be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea was denied, and he was sentenced to a term in the Men's Reformatory at Anamosa.

As defendant's 'guilty' plea had forewarned, he now urges on us the claim that he was subjected to an illegal search and seizure at the time of his arrest and that it was error to overrule his motion to suppress the evidence thereby obtained. He also raises the constitutionality of the statute under which he was charged and further asserts the trial court abused its discretion in refusing his request for permission to withdraw his plea. We do not reach any of the errors assigned because we hold there was no valid guilty plea upon which judgment could be rendered.

Under section 777.11, The Code, our law recognizes only three pleas to a criminal charge: guilty, not guilty, or former judgment of conviction or acquittal of the defense charged. Section 777.12 provides a guilty plea on a felony charge--which this is under section 204A.10--shall be in substantially the following form: 'The defendant pleads that he is guilty of the offense charged in the indictment.' Clearly the plea entered in this case does not conform to this standard. Defendant's counsel admits as much but suggests we should approve it because it would save the time, expense, and inconvenience of a long trial. Defendant points out he has no hope of acquittal if the contested evidence is admissible. On the other hand, if it is suppressed, he says the State has no case. The trouble is, however, our law does not permit such a plea.

We have repeatedly held a guilty plea is not only a confession of guilt but is, itself, a conviction of the highest order. Such a plea waives all irregularities except that the information or indictment charges no offense and the right to challenge the plea itself, 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 424(6), page 1198; 21 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, section 495, page 483; State v. Kulish, 1967, 260 Iowa 138, 143, 148 N.W.2d 428, 432; State v. Rife, 1967, 260 Iowa 598, 602, 149 N.W.2d 846, 848; State v. Ellenburg, 1967, 260 Iowa 1224, 149 N.W.2d 122, certiorari denied, 390 U.S. 997, 88 S.Ct. 1201, 20 L.Ed.2d 96; State v. Delano, 1968, 161 N.W.2d 66, 72--73; State v. Jackson, 1970, 173 N.W.2d 567, 570, certiorari denied, 399 U.S. 931, 91 S.Ct. 2262, 26 L.Ed.2d 800. See also Anno., 20 A.L.R.3d 724--747.

Other courts have also held a guilty plea must be unconditional to valid. Hawkins v. State, 26 Wis.2d 443, 132 N.W.2d 545, 548--549; Reed v. Henderson, 1967, 6 Cir., 385 F.2d 995, 996; Roberts v. Warden, 221 Md. 576, 155 A.2d 891, 893, certiorari denied, 362 U.S. 953, 80 S.Ct. 866, 4 L.Ed.2d 871. See also discussion in McMann v. Richardson, 1970, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763.

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