State v. Dort, No. 34071.
Citation | 138 Conn.App. 401,51 A.3d 1186 |
Decision Date | 02 October 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 34071. |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Joel DORT. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Robert E. Byron, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Melissa Patterson, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were David I. Cohen, state's attorney, and Michelle Bredefeld, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
ROBINSON, ALVORD and MIHALAKOS, Js.
The defendant, Joel Dort, appeals from the trial court's judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–92 (a)(2)(C) and burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–101 (a)(2). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in denying defense counsel's request for a second competency examination.1 We conclude that the court erred by conducting an inadequate inquiry into the defendant's competence, and, therefore, reverse the defendant's conviction.
The jury could have reasonably found the following facts. In 2009, the defendant was discharged from his position as a computer consultant for XL Capital, an insurance and reinsurance company in Stamford. Approximately four months after the termination of his employment, the defendant entered XL Capital without proper authorization and waited for the victim, one of his supervisors, in her office. The defendant asked the victim for his job back, and she informed him that the job had been outsourced. The victim asked the defendant to leave, and when he did not, she threatened to call security. The victim reached for her telephone to call for assistance, and the defendant grabbed the telephone out of her hand and pointed a gun at her. The victim tried to escape from the defendant by stepping toward the door, and the defendant crushed the victim's hand in the doorway, grabbed the victim by the throat and slammed her head against the office wall. The victim broke free and ran out of her office. The defendant left the building and was later arrested and charged in a substitute long form information with burglary in the first degree in violation of § 53a–101 (a)(2), kidnapping in the first degree in violation of § 53a–92 (a)(2)(C) and strangulation in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–64bb (a).2
Pursuant to General Statutes § 54–56d,3 the court on November 13, 2009, ordered an examination to determine if the defendant was competent to stand trial. After the examination was completed and memorialized in a report dated December 16, 2009, the parties stipulated before the court that the defendant was competent to stand trial.4
On June 23, 2010, the court granted the defendant's motion for a speedy trial and scheduled jury selection to commence the following day. At the beginning of jury selection on June 24, 2010, defense counsel brought to the court's attention his concerns regarding the defendant's competency to stand trial, and asked for another competency examination to be performed. The defendant's counsel stated: “I have not had a recent chance to have a long discussion with my client, but I have had chances yesterday and on the telephone and this morning, and just so the court's aware, he was evaluated, competency evaluated in or about the first months after the incidents that gave rise to these charges occurred.” At that time the court noted that a § 54–56d (d) examination had been ordered. Defense counsel continued to address the court:
In response, the court noted that a report had been filed approximately seven months previously that found the defendant competent to understand the charges against him and to assist in his defense. The court followed up by stating: Counsel for the defendant responded:
In response, the court noted that defense counsel had met with his client on multiple occasions, and, yet, the first time the court heard of an issue of competency was when jury selection was to begin. Defense counsel agreed that that was a pertinent observation and then stated:
After defense counsel concluded his argument, the court stated:
After the court denied the motion, defense counsel asked if the defendant could address the court. The court responded by saying that the defendant could bring anything to the court's attention through his counsel. Defense counsel followed up by stating: “It's a request that's based on following up, based on what Your Honor said, and the request is that he be able to express that to you himself, not from counsel.” When the court questioned what defense counsel meant by that statement, defense counsel noted that the court had made a determination on the competency issue and that the defendant “believes that there's other bases for that and wishes to convey that to the court himself.” The court responded by stating that anything the defendant wanted to apprise the court of must be done through his counsel. Defense counsel did not address the issue of competency again.
The defendant was tried and found guilty of first degree burglary and first degree kidnapping. The court sentenced him to ten years imprisonment, with seven years of special parole. This appeal followed.
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State v. Dort
...court to conduct a hearing to determine whether a competency evaluation, as described in General Statutes § 54–56d (d),1 is needed. See State v. Dort, 138 Conn.App. 401, 412, 51 A.3d 1186 (2012). On appeal, the state claims that: (1) the Appellate Court improperly determined that the trial ......
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State v. Norris
...that the defendant was not competent without conducting any further inquiry into the defendant's competence. State v. Dort , 138 Conn. App. 401, 412, 51 A.3d 1186 (2012), aff'd, 315 Conn. 151, 106 A.3d 277 (2014). We specifically concluded that the court's inquiry into the defendant's compe......
- State v. Vlahos
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State v. Norris
...assertions that the defendant was not competent without conducting any further inquiry into the defendant's competence. State v. Dort, 138 Conn.App. 401, 412, 51 A.3d 1186 (2012), aff'd, 315 Conn. 151, 106 A.3d 277 (2014). We specifically concluded that the court's inquiry into the defendan......