State v. Downs
| Decision Date | 16 July 1932 |
| Docket Number | 23658. |
| Citation | 13 P.2d 1,168 Wash. 664 |
| Parties | STATE v. DOWNS et al. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Robert M. Jones, Judge.
Lee Downs and another were convicted of burglary in the second degree, and they appeal.
Affirmed.
Henry Clay Agnew, of Seattle, for appellants.
Robert M. Burgunder and William J. Wilkins, both of Seattle, for the State.
Appellants were convicted in the court below of the crime of burglary in the second degree, and from judgments and sentences upon such conviction have appealed to this court.
The evidence on behalf of the state shows that some time after 11 o'clock on the night of April 10, 1931, the premises of the Franklin Dairy in Seattle were entered and burglarized. The door of the safe had been knocked off and a considerable amount of money, checks, and other valuable papers taken therefrom. The burglary was first discovered by an employee of the company at about 5:30 o'clock the following morning, and within a very short time reported to the Seattle police department. Meantime, about 2 o'clock on the morning or April 11, which was about three hours after the dairy premises were closed with the safe intact, two police officers in a prowler car discovered appellants parked in an automobile along a side road running off Columbian Way in the portion of the city known as Beacon Hill and within two miles of the dairy. Appellants had a dim light burning in the car, checks and money were spread all over the back seat, and they were counting the money. Appellant Downs had a .38 caliber revolver, fully loaded and cocked, in a holster slung under his arm. When the officers surprised them, Downs made a movement with his right hand toward the gun. One loaded clip for the revolver was in his pocket. Phillips had $15.68, mostly in change, in his side pocket. Downs had $82.17, and about $101.95 was in a cigar box and scattered about the back seat of the car. Phillips first gave an assumed name, but later admitted his name when the same was found on cards in his pocket. Appellants stated to the officers when they were arrested that they had found this property. Downs said they had been in Tacoma the night of April 10, and had not stopped there, but had driven back to Seattle, stopped in a restaurant on Pike street, and while in that restaurant heard some 'yeggs' telling about a cache they had planted. He refused to state the name of the restaurant. He would make no statement to the officers as to where the gun had been obtained. During the trial of the case, both appellants testified that they overhead a conversation while in the restaurant at Tacoma about the location of a cache where this loot was stored. Downs testified that one of the men was 'Jimmy Mack something,' and he had met him at a certain café in Seattle some time previously; that, after hearing that conversation, appellants drove back immediately to Seattle delivered their passengers, drove then to the south end of the city on Beacon Hill, and had just found the loot, together with the loaded revolver, when the officers arrested them.
Appellants offered to prove by Detective Lieutenant Borneman who had testified on behalf of the state, and was recalled as a witness for the defense, that there was a man known as 'Madison Jimmy,' whose occupation was that of a safe burglar, who was in town April 10, and that they had a picture of him at police headquarters which, if produced, would be identified by Downs as the man whom he saw in the restaurant. An objection by the state to this offer of proof was sustained by the court.
Appellants assign as error that the court erred in excluding the offered testimony of the witness Borneman and of appellant Downs that the picture, if produced, was the picture of the man who was in the Tacoma restaurant.
Appellants in support of their contention, quote 16 C.J. § 1085, p. 559, to the specific point that (briefly) 'accused may show that another committed the crime, and where the state relies on circumstantial evidence to connect accused with the crime, he may, by the same character of testimony, prove that others committed it. * * * that any evidence is admissible to show the fact that another person committed the offense; and in some jurisdictions it is held that accused may prove the confession of another who was in such a position that he could...
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Personal Restraint of Lord, Matter of
...facts or circumstances which tend clearly to point to someone other than the defendant as the guilty party. See also State v. Downs, 168 Wash. 664, 667, 13 P.2d 1 (1932); State v. Kwan, 174 Wash. 528, 533, 25 P.2d 104 (1933). Lord does not explain how any of the above evidence tends to poin......
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State v. Ortuno-Perez
...law rule to a specific and focused application of well established principles of materiality and probative value.¶18 In State v. Downs, 168 Wash. 664, 13 P.2d 1 (1932), our Supreme Court acknowledged the common law rule. The issue in Downs was whether the trial court improperly excluded evi......
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State v. Jones
...is irrelevant to exculpate the accused.” Thomas, 150 Wash.2d at 857, 83 P.3d 970. Our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Downs, 168 Wash. 664, 13 P.2d 1 (1932), is instructive. There, the court upheld the exclusion of evidence that a well-known burglar was in Seattle on the night of a bur......
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State v. Wade
...to connect’ someone other than the defendant with the crime.” Franklin, 180 Wash.2d at 382, 325 P.3d 159 (quoting State v. Downs, 168 Wash. 664, 667, 13 P.2d 1 (1932) ). “[T]he probative value must be based on whether the evidence has a logical connection to the crime—not based on the stren......