State v. Doyle

• Decision Date: 01 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. 18852,18852
• Citation: State v. Doyle, 121 Idaho 911, 828 P.2d 1316 (Idaho 1992)
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Thomas Patrick DOYLE, Defendant-Appellant. Boise, January 1992 Term
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 1316

828 P.2d 1316

121 Idaho 911

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Thomas Patrick DOYLE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18852.

Supreme Court of Idaho,

Boise, January 1992 Term.

April 1, 1992.

Alan E. Trimming, Ada County Public Defender, Boise, for defendant-appellant.

Larry EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., Michael J. Kane, Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

BAKES, Chief Justice.

Defendant Thomas Doyle (Doyle) was charged by information with the crime of felony child custody interference pursuant to I.C. § 18-4506. Doyle filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that he committed no acts within the State of Idaho which would constitute a crime under Idaho law. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Doyle then entered a guilty plea to the charge pursuant to a conditional plea agreement reserving the right to appeal the trial court's ruling on the jurisdictional issue. We affirm.

The following facts are not in dispute. Doyle and his former wife, Cindy, had a child, Shawn Doyle, and were subsequently married in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, on May 28, 1985. The couple had differences, and Doyle moved to Vancouver, Washington. However, Cindy and Shawn continued to live in Boise, Idaho. On March 14, 1988, Doyle filed for divorce in the State of Idaho.

In April of 1988, Doyle and Cindy agreed to a temporary custody arrangement concerning Shawn. The terms of the agreement were that each parent would have custody of Shawn for two weeks, and that they would exchange custody every two weeks in Pendleton, Oregon. This agreement was approved and ordered by the Idaho court.

Doyle and Cindy exchanged custody of Shawn according to the agreement for approximately two months, and per their agreement, Cindy delivered Shawn to Doyle in Pendleton on July 2, 1988. However, on July 16, 1988, when Cindy returned to Pendleton to pick up Shawn, Doyle failed to show up and return Shawn to Cindy. On July 22, 1988, Cindy spoke on the telephone with Doyle who was at that time in Washington. However, after the call, Cindy could not locate either Doyle or Shawn for over fifteen months, until October 27, 1989.

On August 19, 1988, a complaint against Doyle was filed with the Ada County District Court for the crime of felony child custody interference and a warrant was issued for his arrest.

In September, 1988, the divorce became final, apparently by default since Doyle did not appear before the court, and Cindy was awarded sole and exclusive custody of Shawn.

In October, 1989, Doyle was arrested in Lexington, Kentucky, on a fugitive warrant for felony theft committed in the State of Iowa. Cindy was contacted by the Lexington authorities and on October 27, 1989, arrived in Lexington and took custody of Shawn.

Doyle was returned to Idaho for prosecution on the charge of felony child custody interference. He filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Doyle argued that because neither he nor Cindy nor Shawn were in Idaho when any act of withholding may have occurred, such act must have occurred in either the State of Oregon or the State of Washington. Therefore, under I.C. § 19-301, the State of Idaho was allegedly without jurisdiction to prosecute the action. ¹ The trial court denied Doyle's motion to dismiss, finding that the state did have jurisdiction under I.C. § 19-302 because the crime was consummated within Idaho. ²

Doyle then filed a motion for permission to appeal from the trial court's interlocutory order denying his motion to dismiss. This motion was also denied by the trial court. Doyle subsequently pled guilty to felony child custody interference, reserving the right to appeal the trial court's ruling on the jurisdictional issue. On July 30, 1990, Doyle was sentenced to the Idaho Department of Correction for a term of not less than one and one-half years nor more than five years, with the trial court retaining jurisdiction for 120 days. It is from this judgment that appeal is taken.

We first note our standard of review. Subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law over which we exercise free review. Hanson v. State, 121 Idaho 507, 826 P.2d 468 (1992); Gage v. Harris, 119 Idaho 451, 807 P.2d 1289 (Ct.App.1991).

At common law, a state's jurisdiction over crimes was limited by the notion that each crime had only one situs and that only the state of the situs had jurisdiction. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, Vol. I, § 2.9 at 180 (1986). Generally, if the crime is defined in such terms, the situs of the crime is the place of the act or omission, and if the definition of the crime includes a particular result, then the situs is the place of the result. Id. at 181.

However, many states have enacted statutes which extend the limits of traditional territorial jurisdiction. As noted by Professor LaFave:

Without departing from the territorial principle of jurisdiction--some conduct or result must still occur within the state--a number of states have by statute enlarged their criminal jurisdiction by making other local conduct or results (other than the one particular act or omission or result which the common law considered vital for the determination of the situs of the crime) the basis for jurisdiction. If such conduct or its effects happen within the state, that state is given jurisdiction.

Id. at 186 (footnotes omitted). Under these types of statutes, a state will have jurisdiction to prosecute a crime if any element of the crime occurred within its boundaries.

Reflecting this approach, I.C. § 18-202 sets forth Idaho's territorial jurisdiction as follows:

Territorial jurisdiction over accused persons liable to punishment.--The following persons are liable to punishment under the laws of this state:

1. All persons who commit, in whole or in part, any crime within this state.

2. All who commit larceny or robbery out of this state, and bring to, or are found with the property stolen, in this state.

3. All who, being out of this state, cause or aid, advise or encourage, another person to commit a crime within this state and are afterwards found therein.

This Court has stated that it must be inferred from the language of Subsection 1. of the above statute that "the legislature intended to punish any person who should commit any portion of a crime within this state to the same extent and in the same manner as though all of the acts which constitute the crime had been committed here." State v. Sheehan, 33 Idaho 553, 561-62, 196 P. 532, 534 (1921). See also State v. Cochran, 96 Idaho 862, 864, 538 P.2d 791, 793 (1975) ("The State having failed to prove that the alleged kidnapping occurred in Kootenai County, Idaho, jurisdiction did not exist in the State of Idaho to try this case."); State v. Chapman, 108 Idaho 841, 843, 702 P.2d 879, 881 (Ct.App.1985) ("Where the element of intent to keep or conceal the child was committed within Idaho, the defendant may be charged with kidnapping in Idaho, even though the actual concealment occurred outside the state.").

A further definition of an Idaho court's territorial jurisdiction can be found in I.C. § 19-301. This statute was amended in 1986 to include the language that "[e]vidence that a prosecutable act was committed within the state of Idaho is a jurisdictional requisite, and proof of such must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt." Although the term "prosecutable act" has not been defined by the legislature or this Court, it would appear that, to be consistent with I.C. § 18-202, "prosecutable act" means any essential element of the crime.

A third statute, I.C. § 19-302, allows a defendant to be liable for punishment within Idaho "when the commission of a public offense, commenced without the state is consummated within its boundaries...." States with statutes similar to I.C. § 19-302 have interpreted them to mean that jurisdiction will exist if the conduct performed outside the state caused a criminal result or effect within the state. ³ See Wheat v. State, 734 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Alaska Ct.App.1987) ("[T]he commission of a crime is consummated in Alaska when the crime is defined to require a result as a necessary element and when that result occurs inside the state."); State v. Duffy, 124 Ariz. 267, 603 P.2d 538 (Ct.App.1979) (Fraudulent transaction was consummated within Arizona when property was brought into Arizona as a direct result of fraudulent misrepresentations in Indiana); State v. Winckler, 260 N.W.2d 356 (S.D.1977) (The crime of assault is consummated where the desired effect takes place). A similar use of I.C. § 19-302 has been made by this Court in State v. Shaw, 96 Idaho 897, 539 P.2d 250 (1975), which found that the defendant was subject to the jurisdiction of the trial court for failure to pay child support for his children living in Idaho despite the fact that he had never been in Idaho.

However, given the language in I.C. § 18-202 and I.C. § 19-301 requiring that the crime must occur "in whole or in part" within the state, or that some "prosecutable act" must have been committed within the state, the language in I.C. § 19-302 must be interpreted to mean that the result of the crime must be an essential element of the offense before the result can be construed to have been "consummated" within Idaho. Any other interpretation would create a direct conflict between I.C. §§ 18-202, 19-301 and § 19-302. See Union Pacific R. Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 103 Idaho 808, 811, 654 P.2d 901, 904 (1982) ("Statutes which are in pari materia are to be construed together to the end that legislative intent will be effected."); State v. Paul, 118 Idaho 717, 800 P.2d 113 (Ct.App.1990).

Such an interpretation is in harmony with the general rule that "the requisite elements of the completed crime may be committed in different jurisdictions, and in such cases any state in which an essential part of the crime is committed may take jurisdiction." ⁴ 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 345 at...