State v. Drake, No. 55879
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | Heard before MOORE; LeGRAND |
| Citation | 219 N.W.2d 492 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Ardie George DRAKE, Jr., Appellant. |
| Docket Number | No. 55879 |
| Decision Date | 26 June 1974 |
Page 492
v.
Ardie George DRAKE, Jr., Appellant.
Page 493
R. Bruce Haupert, Iowa City, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., and David M. Dryer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Carl J. Goetz, Jr., County Atty., for appellee.
Heard before MOORE, C.J., and RAWLINGS, LeGRAND, UHLENHOPP and HARRIS, JJ.
LeGRAND, Justice.
Defendant was convicted of statutory rape committed against Patricia Ann Treiber under that provision of § 698.1, The Code, which makes it a crime for a male over the age of 25 years to 'carnally know and abuse' a female under the age of 17 years. At the time of the offense charged, he was 29 years of age and the prosecutrix was 16. Defendant appeals from judgment sentencing him to serve a term of 20 years in the penitentiary at Fort Madison. We affirm the trial court.
Defendant's appeal raises the following issues: (1) Error in allowing evidence concerning force and violence exerted upon both prosecutrix and her companion, Sue Reed, at the time of the alleged offense; (2) failure to instruct the jury on the included offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor; and (3) failure to sustain defendant's motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial on the ground that § 698.1, The Code, is unconstitutional.
I. We consider first the evidentiary question raised by defendant's complaint testimony concerning force and violence should have been excluded and that its admission was prejudicial to him.
When trial began, defendant stood charged with two counts of rape. One alleged the offense was committed by force and against Miss Treiber's will. The other asserted simply that the 29-year-old defendant had sexual intercourse with the 16-year-old prosecutrix. The statute makes this a crime regardless of consent. During trial, the forcible rape count was dismissed, and the cause proceeded only on the claim defendant was guilty of statutory rape.
Both prior and subsequent to the dismissal of the forcible rape charge, evidence was received concerning the use of force and violence by defendant at the time of the alleged offense. We relate enough of this evidence to show its nature and the basis of the objection made. In doing so we point out much of the most damaging evidence went in without objection, although
Page 494
we do not resolve the problem on that basis.Prosecutrix and a friend, Sue Reed, met defendant and another man, Mike McLaughlin, in an Iowa City tavern late on the evening preceding the crime. At approximately 2:00 A.M., after considerable drinking, the four set out for West Branch in defendant's Volkswagen to visit a friend there. Upon arrival they found his residence dark and decided not to disturb him. They then started back for Iowa City. En route, defendant ordered McLaughlin out of the car, menacing him with a gun which he had previously displayed to the girls while in the tavern. After McLaughlin left, defendant ordered both girls to disrobe, at the same time brandishing the gun and threatening them with physical harm if they refused. He then assaulted Miss Reed. Having accomplished this task, he ordered the girls to dress and resumed the trip toward Iowa City. Soon, however, he ordered prosecutrix to undress again and had sexual intercourse with her.
After the assault upon prosecutrix, defendant ordered both girls from the car, again threatening them with harm if they reported the events of the night. They hitchhiked home and promptly sought help from the Iowa City police.
We have abbreviated the testimony since our only purpose in detailing it at all is for consideration of defendant's objection that it was irrelevant, inflammatory and prejudicial. We do not agree.
It is true, as defendant points out, that force and violence are immaterial in proving statutory rape. The only elements of that crime are the age of the defendant, the age of the prosecutrix, and the act of sexual intercourse.
Nevertheless, the circumstances surrounding the commission of a crime may ordinarily be shown, even if such evidence would otherwise be inadmissible. We recently reiterated this principle in State v. Lyons, 210 N.W.2d 543, 546 (Iowa 1973), were we quoted this approvingly from State v. Holoubek, 246 Iowa 109, 113, 66 N.W.2d 861, 863 (1954):
'The rule in such cases appears to be that where the acts are all so closely related in point of time and place, and so intimately associated with each other that they form a continuous transaction, the whole transaction may be shown, * * *.'
The state is always entitled to show what actually happened at the time of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gray v. Com., Record No. 062659.
...committing the same act and determined that no equal protection violation exists.12 The Supreme Court of Iowa in State v. Drake, 219 N.W.2d 492 (1974) analyzed an equal protection claim analogous to Gray's concerning an Iowa statute which fixed the crime of statutory rape to encompass those......
-
State v. Rivera, 7025
...551 P.2d 703 (1976); State v. Elmore, 24 Or.App. 651, 546 P.2d 1117 (1976); In re W.E.P., 318 A.2d 286 (D.C.App.1974); State v. Drake, 219 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1974); In re J.D.G., 498 S.W.2d 786 (Mo.1973). Contra, Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950, 98......
-
Phagan v. State, S97A0161
...maturity and judgment to be held responsible for conduct which might be excusable in a younger person." See also State v. Drake, 219 N.W.2d 492, 496 (Iowa 1974), where the Supreme Court of Iowa upheld its statute against constitutional challenge. We find the rationale of these two courts pe......
-
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty., 79-1344
...In re W.E.P., 318 A.2d 286, 289-290 (D.C.1974); Barnes v. State, 244 Ga. 302, 303-304, 260 S.E.2d 40, 41-42 (1979); State v. Drake, 219 N.W.2d 492, 495-496 (Iowa 1974); State v. Bell, 377 So.2d 303 (La.1979); State v. Rundlett, 391 A.2d 815 (Me.1978); Green v. State, 270 So.2d 695 (Miss.197......
-
Gray v. Com., Record No. 062659.
...committing the same act and determined that no equal protection violation exists.12 The Supreme Court of Iowa in State v. Drake, 219 N.W.2d 492 (1974) analyzed an equal protection claim analogous to Gray's concerning an Iowa statute which fixed the crime of statutory rape to encompass those......
-
State v. Rivera, No. 7025
...551 P.2d 703 (1976); State v. Elmore, 24 Or.App. 651, 546 P.2d 1117 (1976); In re W.E.P., 318 A.2d 286 (D.C.App.1974); State v. Drake, 219 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1974); In re J.D.G., 498 S.W.2d 786 (Mo.1973). Contra, Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950, 98......
-
Phagan v. State, No. S97A0161
...maturity and judgment to be held responsible for conduct which might be excusable in a younger person." See also State v. Drake, 219 N.W.2d 492, 496 (Iowa 1974), where the Supreme Court of Iowa upheld its statute against constitutional challenge. We find the rationale of these two courts pe......
-
Owens v. State, No. 129
...The statute is not concerned with presumptions or inferences. Rather it flatly prohibits the act defendant committed." State v. Drake, 219 N.W.2d 492, 496 (Iowa 1974). See also State v. Hill, 170 N.J.Super. 485, 406 A.2d 1334, 1336 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1979) ("Presumption does not play any......