State v. Driscoll
| Decision Date | 23 May 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-261,89-261 |
| Citation | 455 N.W.2d 916 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Timothy J. DRISCOLL, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Mark Joel Zbieroski, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Kjas T. Long, County Atty., for appellant.
James A. Bear, Preston, for appellee.
Considered by LARSON, P.J., and LAVORATO, NEUMAN, SNELL, and ANDREASEN, JJ.
We granted discretionary review to consider the State's challenge to a suppression order entered in this prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The trial court suppressed evidence of defendant Timothy Driscoll's blood-alcohol test on the ground that the police officer who invoked the implied consent procedures was not authorized to do so. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. In September 1988, Brian Sanger was hired by the Preston, Iowa police chief as a part-time law enforcement officer. Sanger is a graduate of the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy. He has also been certified by the Iowa Department of Public Safety to administer the implied consent and blood-alcohol testing procedures of Iowa Code chapter 321J (1987).
On October 29, 1988, Sanger was on duty in Preston when he observed defendant Driscoll run a stop sign. Unable to catch up with him, Sanger radioed ahead to Maquoketa police who successfully stopped Driscoll with a roadblock. After observing signs of insobriety, Sanger arrested Driscoll for operating while intoxicated and transported him to the Maquoketa police station for processing. There Sanger invoked the implied consent procedures of Iowa Code sections 321J.6 and 321J.8. Driscoll's voluntary breath test yielded a blood alcohol concentration of .203. He was charged with violating Iowa Code section 321J.2 ().
In a pretrial motion to dismiss, Driscoll argued that the breath test results should be suppressed because Sanger was not a "peace officer" authorized to invoke such procedures under sections 321J.6 and 321J.8. It seems that Sanger had not completed the psychological testing required of all law enforcement officers in this state prior to employment. See Iowa Code § 80B.11(5); 501 Iowa Admin.Code 2.2(80B). The district court ruled that this insufficiency in Sanger's qualifications invalidated the blood-alcohol test and the court ordered its suppression. The State's application for discretionary review followed.
II. Iowa law requires that OWI tests be administered at the written request of a "peace officer." Iowa Code §§ 321J.6 and 321J.8. The statutory definition of "peace officer" includes, in pertinent part,
[a] law enforcement officer who has satisfactorily completed an approved course relating to motor vehicle operators under the influence of alcoholic beverages at the Iowa law enforcement academy or a law enforcement training program approved by the department of public safety.
As previously noted, Sanger has successfully completed OWI training at the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy. The only question, therefore, is whether he otherwise qualifies as a "law enforcement officer." Iowa Code section 80B.3(3) identifies three categories of personnel who so qualify:
"Law enforcement officer" means an officer appointed by the director of the department of natural resources, a member of a police force, or other agency or department of the state, county or city regularly employed as such and who is responsible for the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of the criminal laws of this state and all individuals, as determined by the council, who by the nature of their duties may be required to perform the duties of a peace officer.
Iowa Code § 80B.3(3) (emphasis added). Chapter 80B goes on to grant the director of the training academy the authority to promulgate minimum physical and mental fitness requirements "which shall govern the initial recruitment, selection and appointment of law enforcement officers." Iowa Code § 80B.11(5). Those regulations provide, in pertinent part:
In no case shall any person be selected or appointed as a law enforcement officer unless that person has performed satisfactorily in pre-employment cognitive or personality tests, or both, prescribed by the Iowa law enforcement academy.
III. The record plainly reveals that the Preston police chief failed to comply with these regulations before hiring Sanger in September 1988. The State concedes as much. In fact, the insufficiency in Sanger's credentials led the Preston City Council to delay Sanger's formal appointment as a member of the force until he successfully completed the necessary testing in mid-November 1988. It then made his appointment retroactive to his date of hire "for pay purposes."
It is equally plain, however, that when Sanger arrested Driscoll in October 1988 and invoked the implied consent procedures, he was cloaked with all the authority his position could carry: a uniform, a badge, a firearm, and a squad car. Moreover, his status as a peace officer was acknowledged by law enforcement agencies in surrounding communities as demonstrated by the actions of the Maquoketa Police Department in their response to...
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