State v. Driskell

• Decision Date: 14 April 1906
• Citation: 12 Idaho 245,85 P. 499
• Parties: STATE, Appellant, v. ERNEST DRISKELL, Respondent
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

85 P. 499

12 Idaho 245

STATE, Appellant, v. ERNEST DRISKELL, Respondent

Supreme Court of Idaho

April 14, 1906

NEW TRIAL, CRIMINAL CASE-MOTION FOR, SUSTAINED IN TRIAL COURT.

1. Where respondent was convicted of the statutory crime of rape, and it is shown that the evidence was conflicting on material questions involved in the trial, and the trial judge sustains a motion for a new trial without stating whether his order was based upon the insufficiency of the evidence or errors of law occurring at the trial, this court will not reverse such order unless error is manifest from the record.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from the District Court of the Second Judicial District for Latah County. Hon. E. C. Steele, Judge.

Defendant was prosecuted for the crime of statutory rape, was convicted, and, after sentence, was granted a new trial. State appeals. Order granting new trial affirmed.

Order granting a new trial sustained.

Wm. E Stillinger, Prosecuting Attorney of Latah County, and J. J Guheen, Attorney General, for Appellant.

Wm. M Morgan, and Albert L. Morgan, Attorneys for Respondent.

Counsel cite no authorities on point decided.

STOCKSLAGER C. J. Sullivan, J., AILSHIE, J., concurring.

OPINION

STOCKSLAGER, C. J.

The prosecuting attorney of Latah county filed an information against respondent charging him with the crime of statutory rape on the person of one Grace Clark. A trial was had and a verdict returned by the jury, finding him guilty as charged in the information. Within the time agreed upon by the prosecuting attorney and counsel for respondent, a bill of exceptions was settled and allowed by the court, and thereafter a motion in arrest of judgment was filed, to wit: "Comes now the above-named defendant, and moves the court to arrest the judgment in the above-entitled cause, and that no judgment be pronounced against the defendant on the verdict hereinbefore rendered, for the reason that the information in said cause does not state facts sufficient to constitute a crime against the laws of the state of Idaho." This motion was filed on the twenty-second day of January, 1906, overruled by the court, and defendant sentenced to five years' imprisonment in the state penitentiary; on the same day counsel for respondent there moved for a new trial on the following alleged errors: "1. That the court misdirected the jury in matters of law arising during the course of the trial. 2. That the verdict is contrary to both the law and the evidence."

On the twenty-ninth day of January, 1906, the court made the following order: "This cause coming on to be heard before me this twenty-ninth day of January, 1906, the defendant having heretofore, in open court, regularly made his application and motion for a new trial, within the time heretofore allowed by the court for that purpose; the time for the presentation of that motion and application being agreed to by the respective counsel for the state and the defendant, and the court having heard the arguments of the respective counsel for and against said application and motion, and having examined all the records and papers appertaining, and being fully advised in the premises both as to the law and the facts, it is hereby ordered that the said application and motion of the defendant for a new trial be, and the same is hereby granted and allowed." It is from this order that the state appeals.

We are not informed by the order of the learned trial judge on which ground or whether on both set out in respondent's motion he granted the new trial. It is conceded by the attorney general, also the county attorney of Latah county, who took the appeal and made the only oral argument in the case, that orders granting new trials are largely within the discretion of the trial court. The rule is so well settled that it needs neither discussion nor citation of authorities. It is apparent from the record that in the opinion of the court the information was sufficient to charge the crime of rape, as a demurrer alleging various reasons why it was insufficient had been overruled by the court. It would hardly seem reasonable that the motion was sustained on account of the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, as this question had been passed upon by the jury; hence we conclude that the court was convinced that an error prejudicial to the rights of the defendant in the instructions given to the jury or refusal to give the requests of counsel for defendant, the admission of evidence on behalf of the prosecution or rejection of evidence offered by defendant, or some one or more of these reasons, prompted the court in...