State v. Drobel
| Decision Date | 10 July 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 890472-CA,890472-CA |
| Citation | 815 P.2d 724 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Hans Jurgen DROBEL, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Kristine Kay Smith and Jerome H. Mooney, Mooney & Associates, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., and David B. Thompson, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before BENCH, GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ.
Appellant Hans Jurgen Drobel appeals his conviction and sentence for three counts of aggravated robbery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978), a first degree felony. We affirm.
In the afternoon and early evening of August 11, 1986, three small stores in Salt Lake City were robbed in succession. The store cashiers described the perpetrator and method in each robbery as follows:
The robber was a middle aged gentleman, well dressed in a dark suit and tie, with a noticeable German accent. He browsed each store for a short while, and purchased a refreshment at two of them. Then, when no other customers were present, the robber approached the cashier, revealing a holstered pistol under his suit jacket, and announced that he was committing a robbery. He then took currency from the cash register.
The female cashiers at the first and third stores were told to wait some period of time before reporting the robberies, and to then give the police a false description of the robber. He told the women that if they did not comply with these instructions, he would return and shoot them, not to kill, but to cripple. The male cashier at the second store was admonished not to call the police or the robber would return to shoot him.
During the third robbery, one of the cashiers was able to summon security guards from the mall where the store was located. Police were also contacted. Leaving the mall on foot, the robber was followed by two security guards. It appears that the security guards briefly lost sight of the robber as he went around a corner. Rounding the corner themselves, the guards encountered the police, who had apprehended Drobel.
A plainclothes police detective responding to the robbery call had stopped Drobel in an alleyway roughly two blocks from the robbery scene. Drobel, a German, clad in a dark suit and tie, was jogging down the alley when apprehended. Other police officers quickly arrived, whereupon the detective removed a loaded pistol from a holster in Drobel's waistband.
In custody, Drobel was asked to empty his pockets. Taking cash from one pocket, Drobel said the money was "from the store." He claimed that cash from another pocket belonged to him. A beverage bottle handled by the robber at one of the stores was found to have Drobel's fingerprint on it. Cashiers at two of the stores were shown photo spreads from which they identified Drobel as the robber.
Drobel was charged with aggravated robbery and arraigned before Judge Sawaya of the third district court. He obtained counsel from the Salt Lake Legal Defenders' Association. Concerns about Drobel's mental condition soon arose. These concerns dealt with both Drobel's mental state at the time he allegedly committed the robberies and his competence to stand trial. In September 1986, defense counsel filed a notice of intent to rely on a defense of diminished capacity, and psychiatric evaluations were ordered by Judge Sawaya. A two and one-half year period of psychiatric evaluations and court hearings ensued, in an effort to determine whether Drobel was competent to stand trial. 1
Two psychiatrists, Breck Lebegue, M.D., and Peter Heinbecker, M.D., were initially appointed to examine Drobel, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5(2)(b) (1990). At a December 1986 hearing, Judge Sawaya was informed that the examiners did not then agree on the question of Drobel's competence to stand trial. Dr. Heinbecker had determined that he was competent. Dr. Lebegue had found Drobel not competent to proceed and recommended further evaluation. Accordingly, Judge Sawaya ordered a thirty-day evaluation at the Utah State Hospital, under Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5(2)(a) (1990).
Following the thirty-day evaluation, another hearing was held before Judge Sawaya. At the parties' stipulation, the only evidence taken at that hearing was a letter from state hospital evaluators Heinbecker, Van Austin, M.D., and Robert Howell, Ph.D. The three experts opined that
Mr. Drobel has a mental illness of the chronic schizoaffective schizophrenic type associated with paranoid delusional features. His thought processes, affect, and ability to perceive and interpret reality are each inappropriate.
We find that at this time he lacks the ability to comprehend the nature of the charges against him and the punishment specified for the offense charged and lacks the ability to meaningfully assist his counsel in his defense. 2
Based on this evidence, Judge Sawaya ordered that Drobel remain at the state hospital and receive treatment for his mental condition until competent to stand trial. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6(1) (Supp.1991).
Over a year later, in February 1988, Doctors Heinbecker, Austin, and Howell again wrote to Judge Sawaya. They informed the judge that Drobel remained incompetent to stand trial, and that his mental illness remained unimproved despite intensive counseling and medication treatment. However, they also revealed "some degree of doubt as to his diagnosis," and raised the possibility that Drobel might be "malingering, that is, feigning the symptoms of mental illness as a manipulation." Despite this doubt, the doctors recommended dismissal of the criminal charges without prejudice so that they could have Drobel civilly committed for treatment of his mental illness. 3
Judge Sawaya dismissed the charges without prejudice, and a civil commitment hearing was held in April 1988, before Judge Harding of the fourth district court. 4 The effort to civilly commit Drobel failed, apparently because the requisite element of dangerousness, Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-234(10)(b) (Supp.1991), could not be proven. 5 Informing the prosecutors in Salt Lake City of this development, Dr. Heinbecker reported that Drobel's conduct at the civil hearing had been "impressive," indicating that he was probably competent to stand trial on the criminal charges.
The criminal charges against Drobel were promptly refiled, and he remained in custody. Another hearing before Judge Sawaya followed, in August 1988. Because the state hospital doctors had not definitively informed Judge Sawaya that Drobel was competent to stand trial, another thirty-day evaluation was ordered. Following this evaluation, Doctors Austin and Howell reported that they found Drobel competent to stand trial. Dr. Howell reiterated this opinion during an October 1988 hearing before Judge Sawaya. Elaborating, Dr. Howell opined that although Drobel suffered from "a delusional disorder of the expansive grandiose type," this mental illness did not impair his understanding of the charges against him, the possible punishments, or his ability to assist counsel in his defense.
Ongoing questions about Drobel's competence to proceed prompted Judge Sawaya to order yet another evaluation from Dr. Lebegue. 6 A final competency hearing followed, in November 1988. At that hearing, Dr. Lebegue's opinion that Drobel was competent to stand trial, subject to certain reservations, was presented through representations of counsel for Drobel and the State. A letter from Dr. Lebegue to Judge Sawaya, entered into the record at the parties' agreement, explained Lebegue's opinion and recommendations.
In his letter, Dr. Lebegue, like Dr. Howell, opined that Drobel suffered from "mental illness, probably a delusional disorder of the grandiose type." This disorder was causing "significant impairment in his ability to think rationally." On the other hand, Dr. Lebegue stated that Drobel had "no mental process that interferes with his cognitive ability (his ability to understand, remember, or interpret facts)." Specifically addressing the competence issues of ability to understand the charges and punishment, and to assist counsel in his defense, Dr. Lebegue indicated that Drobel was "marginally competent to stand trial."
Dr. Lebegue cautioned that Drobel's competence could shift to incompetence during trial. Dr. Lebegue's major concern was that Drobel's delusional and irrational thinking might cause him to adopt inappropriate defense strategies. 7 Such strategies could include "firing Defense Counsel, refusing to accept Defense Counsel recommendations, insistence on testifying over Defense Counsel objections, delusional religious thinking, grandiose denunciation of ... trial process," and other behaviors. Dr. Lebegue advised the court and counsel to be alert for these behaviors, and recommended that Drobel's trial competence be reevaluated if they arose.
Based on the updated evaluations of Doctors Austin, Howell, and Lebegue, Judge Sawaya found Drobel competent to stand trial. In January 1989, Drobel was rearraigned in the third district court, this time before Judge Young. Drobel pleaded not guilty to the aggravated robbery charges. He then insisted on the right to represent himself at trial.
Both the State and defense counsel objected to Drobel's request to represent himself. Defense counsel, summarizing the repeated competence evaluations, pointed out that Drobel's request had been identified by Dr. Lebegue as a possible sign that Drobel was not competent to stand trial, much less defend himself. 8 Counsel informed the court that Drobel wished to reject the diminished capacity defense which, in counsel's view, was Drobel's strongest defense. The State argued that although Drobel was competent to stand trial, he was not competent to conduct his own defense.
Judge Young then questioned Drobel. Drobel stated that he would keep his...
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