State v. Drupals

Citation306 Conn. 149,49 A.3d 962
Decision Date28 August 2012
Docket NumberNo. 18697.,18697.
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Ernest M. DRUPALS.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Richard Emanuel, New Haven, for the appellant (defendant).

Rita M. Shair, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom were David I. Cohen, state's attorney, and, on the brief, Michelle Bredefeld, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH, HARPER and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.*

EVELEIGH, J.

The defendant, Ernest M. Drupals, appeals 1 from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a trial to the court, of two counts of failing to comply with the sex offender registry requirements of General Statutes § 54–251,2 stemming from his failure to notify the sex offender registry unit (unit) of his change of residence in accordance with the terms of that statute. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly determined that there was sufficient evidence to prove he violated the statute. 3 We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts as found by the trial court, and procedural history, relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On June 26, 2002, following a conviction of twenty counts of possession of child pornography in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 53a–196d, 4 and three counts of voyeurism in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 53a–189a,5 the trial court sentenced the defendantto a term of imprisonment of five years for each count, to run concurrently, execution suspended, and five years probation on each count, to run concurrently. Additionally, the trial court required the defendant to register as a sex offender for a period of ten years pursuant to § 54–251(a). Thereafter, the defendant registered with the unit, a division of the state police. The defendant initially registered his address as his mother's home in Greenwich.

The unit conducted its routine address verification process by sending the defendant an address verification form by first class mail every ninety days. The defendant reliably completed and mailed back the address verification form within the required ten day period. On October 6, 2003, the defendant notified the unit of a change of his address to 80 Palmer Street in Stamford. The defendant thereafter continued to timely return the address verification forms through December, 2007.

On December 18, 2007, the unit mailed the defendant an address verification form. On December 27, 2007, the defendant hand delivered the completed form to the unit headquarters in Middletown. At that time, the defendant verbally informed Debbie Jenny, a detective with the state police, that he would be residing at the Stamford address until the next day. The defendant inquired regarding the requirement in the address verification letter that the unit be notified of any change of address within five days of such a change. Jenny informed the defendant of his obligation to report, in writing, his residence within five business days of a change. Thereafter, the defendant sent the unit a letter dated Friday, December 28, which was time stamped as received by facsimile at the unit on Monday, December 31, at 6:48 a.m. because the unit is not open on the weekends. The letter stated: “To Whom It May Concern. This is a notice in writing that the address [in Stamford] will no longer be my residence as of [3 p.m.] on December 28, 2007. New residence address information will be submitted as required by [General Statutes §] 54–254in writing within five ... business days.” Since the unit did not have a current address for the defendant as of December 28, it listed him as noncompliant on its website. At 12:45 p.m. on December 31, 2007, the unit received another letter from the defendant by facsimile, with a return address in Annapolis, Maryland. The letter states: “This is a notice in writing of my new address. As of approximately [11 a.m.] on December 31, 2007 the Connecticut [d]epartment of [p]ublic [s]afety [s]ex [o]ffender [r]egistry [w]ebsite states I am ‘NOT IN COMPLIANCE–Failure to Confirm Address.’ However, to note, I sent notice in writing that as of [December 28, 2007] I will no longer be residing at my former address [in Stamford] and am allowed by [§ 54–254] ‘five business days' to give notice to the [unit] of my new address. Thus, I was and I am currently in compliance.”

At trial, Jenny testified that this letter was received within five business days of December 28, the date the defendant's prior notice had indicated that he would no longer be living in Stamford, but it did not affirmatively state that the return address in Annapolis, Maryland, was the defendant's new place of residence. Jenny further determined that the defendant was not listed on the Maryland sex offender registry as of December 31. Nevertheless, because the defendant had been one of the unit's most compliant registrants for more than five years and the letter did include an address, Jenny decided to “give [the defendant] the benefit of the doubt” and update the registry on December 31 to list the defendant as living out of state, in Annapolis, Maryland.

On January 4, 2008, the defendant registered with the Maryland sex offender registry, listing the same Annapolis address as his place of residence. Subsequently, Maryland police officer Kenneth R. Custer was assigned to conduct a face-to-face address verification. Custer was not able to verify the defendant's presence at the address during his unannounced weekday visits. Custer did verify that the apartment at the address was rented to the defendant's brother and spoke to the defendant by telephone. On January 10, Custer telephoned Jenny and informed her that he “did not believe that [the defendant] was living [at the registered address] and may be back in Connecticut. On January 15, 2008, Custer determined that the defendant was not living at the Maryland address and began to prepare an application for a warrant for failure to comply with Maryland's sex offender registry law. The warrant was issued on January 17, 2008.6

On January 19, Stamford police officers located the defendant at his mother's house in Greenwich. The defendant informed the officers of the following: (1) he had vacated the Stamford address in late December, 2007; (2) he had visited friends and family before arriving at his new place of residence in Annapolis, Maryland on January 2; (3) he was still residing at the Maryland residence; (4) he was just visiting his mother; and (5) he was returning to Maryland the next day with some of his possessions that had been stored at his mother's residence. After this encounter, the defendant returned to Annapolis. Subsequently, the defendant's brother was confronted by his landlord with the claim that a registered sex offender was living with him, at which point the defendant agreed to move to his own apartment.

In late January, after failing in his attempt to rent his own apartment due to his status as a registered sex offender, the defendant decided to move back to Connecticut and stay at his mother's house until he could secure housing in Maryland. On January 28, 2008, he sent notice to the Maryland registry stating that he no longer lived in Maryland. On January 30, 2008, a warrant was issued for the defendant's arrest in Connecticut for failure to register, and he was arrested at his mother's residence later that day. On January 31, 2008, the defendant notified the unit that he was living at his mother's Greenwich address.

The state charged the defendant with two counts of failure to comply with the sex offender registration requirements. In count one the state charged “that on or about December 31, 2007, in the [c]ity of Stamford ... the [d]efendant failed to notify the [commissioner of public safety] of his change of residence as required by [General Statutes] § 54–250, and in violation of ... § 54–251(a).” In count two, the state charged “that on or about January 22, 2008, in the [t]own of Greenwich ... the [d]efendant failed to notify the [commissioner of public safety] of his change of residence as required by ... § 54–250, and in violation of ... § 54–251(a).”

The defendant, who testified at trial, acknowledged that, when he moved out of the Stamford residence on December 28, he stayed with friends and relatives for a few days before moving to Maryland on January 2, 2008. He also acknowledged that, in January, he twice came back to Connecticut for overnight visits with his mother prior to his eventual return to reside in Connecticut at the end of January. The defendant further testified that, on the basis of his understanding of the statutes, he had five days in which to notify the unit of a change of residence address, and that he was not required to provide notice of temporary or transient overnight visits. The state's theory of prosecution was that, although the defendant had registered in both states, he had given false or fraudulent information because he was not living where he said he was living.

The trial court, however, did not conclude that the defendant gave false or fraudulent information. Instead, the court, relying State v. Winer, 112 Conn.App. 458, 465, 963 A.2d 89, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 903, 973 A.2d 107 (2009), held that even temporary overnight visits constitute a change of residence address that trigger notification requirements, and that the statute does not afford a registrant five days of absence from the current residence registry requirement. The trial court observed that the defendant's “interpretation of where he resides is different from that authorized by the statute concerning sex offenders.” Citing Winer, the court determined that one's “residence” “is where you are at night,” and a registrant's “obligation is to indicate where [you are] living at any time not where your official address is but where ...

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