State v. Dubray
Decision Date | 01 November 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 21150.,21150. |
Citation | 2000 SD 136,618 N.W.2d 728 |
Parties | STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Sheldon Charles DUBRAY, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Mark Barnett, Attorney General, Grant Gormley, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.
David J. Huss, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorney for defendant and appellant.
[¶ 1.] Sheldon Charles DuBray appeals from an order finding him in direct contempt of court. SDCL 23A-38-1. He was ordered to serve twenty-five (25) days in the Pennington County Jail. We affirm.
[¶ 2.] On August 2, 1999, Circuit Judge Kern sentenced DuBray to two years in the penitentiary for distribution of one ounce or less of marijuana with consideration. SDCL 22-42-7. DuBray "was mad" and "vented." When he pounded his hands on the wooden railing surrounding the jury box the court ordered him to cease and desist.
[¶ 3.] As DuBray turned the corner to leave the courtroom he uttered an obscenity directed at the court. The court heard that he had uttered something under his breath. The deputy escorting DuBray immediately brought him back to the courtroom where the following occurred:
According to the deputy's incident report, DuBray actually said "fuckin' bitch."
[¶ 4.] During DuBray's sentencing for criminal (direct) contempt, the trial court explained:
[¶ 5.] Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to hear DuBray's appeal?
[¶ 6.] The State contends that an appeal from an order of direct contempt is not an appeal from a final judgment of conviction and therefore not subject to appeal under SDCL 23A-32-2, which provides:
An appeal to the Supreme Court may be taken by the defendant from final judgment of conviction.
The State also claims that this Court has no jurisdiction because the appellate case was not "disposed of" within 30 days of filing the appeal pursuant to SDCL 23A-38-7, which provides:
Any person confined pursuant to § 23A-38-1 or 23A-38-2 shall be admitted to bail or released in accordance with chapter 23A-43, pending the determination of an appeal taken by him from the order of his confinement unless it affirmatively appears that the appeal is frivolous or taken for delay. Any appeal from an order of confinement under this section shall be disposed of as soon as practicable, and in no event more than thirty days from the filing of such appeal.
[¶ 7.] In 1893, this Court recognized that a final judgment in proceedings for criminal contempt could be reviewed by a writ of error under the general criminal procedure statutes. State v. Knight, 3 S.D. 509, 54 N.W. 412 (1893). In 1919, however, writs of error were abolished and appeal substituted. S.D.Rev.Code 1919, §§ 5030, 5031. Thereafter, in 1934, this Court held that a criminal contempt proceeding is a criminal proceeding, "and the adjudication is a judgment of conviction" appealable under the statute that then allowed appeals "[f]rom a final judgment of conviction." State v. American-News Co., 62 S.D. 456, 465, 253 N.W. 492, 496 (1934). This Court has continued to adhere to this precedent by allowing criminal contempt appeals pursuant to SDCL ch. 23A-32. See State v. Bullis, 315 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1982)
; Karras v. Gannon, 345 N.W.2d 854 (S.D.1984). Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to review this case.
[¶ 8.] Did the trial court err when it found DuBray in direct criminal contempt of court pursuant to SDCL 23A-38-1?
[¶ 9.] SDCL 23A-38-1 provides:
Criminal contempt may be punished summarily if a judge or magistrate judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. An order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge or magistrate judge and entered of record. Contempt prosecuted under this section shall be punishable by imprisonment of not more than thirty days in the county jail or a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or both.
[¶ 10.] DuBray contends that his actions do not rise to the level of criminal contempt because he merely whispered to himself outside of the courtroom. Consequently, he argues his actions were outside of the presence of the court, that did not either see or hear them. He also claims that the use of the term "bitch," while inappropriate, is not necessarily disparaging to women.
[¶ 11.] The act of criminal contempt is directed at the power and dignity of the court. American-News, 62 S.D. at 459, 253 N.W. at 493. It is "usually defined as words spoken or acts committed in the presence of the court or during its intermission which tend to subvert, embarrass or prevent the administration of justice and may be summarily punished by the presiding judge as [she] may deem just and necessary." Fienup v. Rentto, 74 S.D. 329, 331-32, 52 N.W.2d 486, 488 (1952). "To constitute direct contempt, the act must be within the judge's personal knowledge, although it does not necessarily have to occur inside a court or during the judicial proceeding." 17 CJS Contempt § 4 (1999). "Direct contempt occurs when contumacious acts take place in the presence of the court, ... or when the acts are committed outside the presence of the judge but are admitted in open court." In re Marriage of Marshall, 278 Ill.App.3d 1071, 215 Ill.Dec. 599, 663 N.E.2d 1113, 1120-1121 (1996).
[¶ 12.] In this case, the court saw DuBray pound the railing of the jury box, told him to cease and desist, and found this act to be contemptuous. In addition, the court heard...
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