State v. Dulany

Citation781 S.W.2d 52
Decision Date14 November 1989
Docket NumberNo. 70914,70914
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ann Marie DULANY, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri

Melinda K. Pendergraph, Tim Wynes, Columbia, William J. Stewart, Bolivar, for defendant-appellant.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth L. Ziegler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.

BILLINGS, Judge.

Defendant Ann Marie Dulany was tried and convicted of two counts of capital murder, as defined by then § 565.001, RSMo 1978 (repealed July 1, 1984), and sentenced to two concurrent life sentences without eligibility for parole or probation for fifty years. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, finding insufficient evidence to support the verdict and instructional error. Transfer to this Court was granted. The Court finds the evidence sufficient and no error calling for reversal and affirms the trial court in this direct appeal. The Court also affirms the trial court's denial of post conviction relief. Affirmed.

The evidence showed defendant was a prostitute and girlfriend of Ronnie Conn. The victims, Willard and Viola Blades, of Springfield, Missouri, were Conn's aunt and uncle. Defendant admitted being present at the robbery of the Blades and that the Blades died as a result of the robbery. Mrs. Blades died from a blow to the head from an unknown blunt instrument. Mr. Blades died from smoke inhalation. Chemicals consistent with the roofing compound used to burn the victims and their house were found on defendant's clothing. Goods taken from the Blades home were sold by defendant in Texas. In addition to the physical evidence, the jury had before it two prior statements made by defendant to the police, defendant's trial testimony and the deposition of another participant, Richard Paul Schmitt.

Defendant's trial testimony, in part, was as follows: On June 15, 1984, defendant, Ronnie Conn, Paul Schmitt and Charles Schmitt left Mt. Vernon, Illinois, intending to pick up Conn's children in Lawton, Oklahoma. As they were leaving Mt. Vernon, Conn bought two cans of highly flammable roofing cement which they took with them. The four drove to Springfield, Missouri where they checked into a motel. Conn, defendant and Paul Schmitt drove by the Blades home on the evening of June 15, 1984, but did not stop because they thought no one was home. On the way to the house Conn said he was going to kill the Blades for refusing to loan him bail money in April of that year.

The following day, June 16, 1984, Conn and defendant again drove by the Blades' home. They saw Mr. Blades mowing his lawn, but did not stop. Later that evening, approximately 9:45 p.m., Conn, defendant and Paul Schmitt returned to the Blades home. This time Conn took the roofing cement with them. Before entering the house, Conn told defendant, "Whatever happens just happens." The Blades met the trio at the door and allowed them to enter. Once inside, Conn and Mr. Blades began arguing over the location of property left in Springfield by Conn's mother. Conn struck Mr. Blades, knocking him down. Conn tied Mr. Blades' hands behind his back with a rope defendant had obtained from the truck. Conn, defendant and Schmitt made a fruitless search of the house for valuables. Conn told Mr. Blades he knew he kept a safe filled with large amounts of money and a gun collection in the house, and if Mr. Blades did not tell Conn where they were, Conn would kill him.

The three continued to search the house. Mr. Blades told Conn the location of two guns, one in the bedroom which Conn retrieved and one under the couch in the living room, which defendant located. Mr. and Mrs. Blades were then seated on a couch where defendant held a gun on them while Conn and Schmitt continued the search. When no money or guns were found, Conn went to the truck and returned carrying the two cans of roofing cement. Mr. and Mrs. Blades were taken into the bedroom and made to lie on the bed. Their hands and feet were bound, then both were bound to each other.

Defendant said Paul Schmitt was in the dining room when the Blades were taken to the bedroom. He then went outside to the truck and did not re-enter the house. She stated Conn had her search for material to gag Mrs. Blades but stopped when Conn said he did not need it. She then took two sacks containing some of the Blades' possessions to the truck. She said that when she returned Conn was "throwing this black stuff all over them and all over the bed." Conn told her to wait until he finished spreading the roofing cement from the bed to the kitchen door. She admitted carrying the empty cans to the truck and shortly thereafter the three departed. Conn, defendant and Paul Schmitt picked up Clarence Schmitt from the motel and traveled to Lawton, Oklahoma. The Schmitts returned to Illinois in the truck. Conn and defendant picked up Conn's children and traveled to Mexico and Texas before returning to Illinois.

Approximately 11:45 p.m., a couple driving by noticed a glow in the trees. They discovered the northwest corner of the Blades' home in flames. The bodies of the Blades were burned beyond recognition by the time the firemen could get to them.

Defendant's first point of error asserts reversible error for the submission of Jury Instructions No. 6 and 10 for capital murder in the disjunctive form. Both instructions combined the use of MAI-CR 2d 2.12 and 15.01. Instruction No. 6 was submitted as follows:

A person is responsible for her own conduct and she is also responsible for the conduct of another person in committing an offense if she acts with him with the common purpose of committing that offense, or if, for the purpose of committing that offense, she aids or encourages the other person in committing it.

As to Count I, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:

First that on or about the 16th day of June, 1984, in the County of Greene, State of Missouri, Ronnie Lee Conn or Ann Marie Dulany caused the death of Viola M. Blades by striking her, and

Second, that Ronnie Lee Conn or Ann Marie Dulany intended to take the life of Viola M. Blades, and

Third, that Ronnie Lee Conn or Ann Marie Dulany knew that Ronnie Lee Conn or Ann Marie Dulany was practically certain to cause the death of Viola M. Blades, and

Fourth, that Ronnie Lee Conn and Ann Marie Dulany considered taking the life of Viola M. Blades and reflected upon this matter coolly and fully before doing so,

then you are instructed that the offense of the capital murder of Viola M. Blades has occurred, and if you further find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:

Fifth, that with the purpose of promoting or furthering the commission of capital murder of Viola M. Blades, the defendant Ann Marie Dulany acted together with or aided Ronnie Lee Conn in committing that offense,

then you will find the defendant guilty of capital murder.

However, if you do not find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of the propositions submitted in this instruction, you must find the defendant not guilty of that offense.

Instruction No. 10 is identical to Instruction No. 6 except that it applies to Willard Blades and the cause of death is by burning rather than striking.

Defendant contends the disjunctive use of "Ronnie Lee Conn or Ann Marie Dulany" in paragraphs first, second, and third allowed the jury to find defendant guilty of capital murder if the jury believed only defendant committed the acts of burning and hitting the victims. In order to determine proper submission under the accomplice liability theory, the Notes on Use of MAI-CR 2d are helpful. Note 6(c) to MAI-CR 2d 2.12 states:

Where the evidence is not clear or conflicts as to which person (in a group including the defendant) engaged in the conduct constituting the offense.... ascribe the elements of the offense to the defendant or the other person or persons.

Use the alternative "acted together with or aided" in the paragraph following "then you are instructed that the offense of [name of the offense ] has occurred ..."

Thus, if the evidence is unclear as to which person committed the acts the disjunctive use is proper since the jury could find that either person committed the act. Potter v. State, 742 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Mo.App.1987). The purpose of the disjunctive instruction is to give the jury the opportunity to consider evidence that is unclear.

Defendant asserts there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that only defendant committed the acts. This contention mirrors her second point, lack of the evidence to convict her of capital murder. The Court will address both together.

On review, the Court accepts as true all of the evidence favorable to the state, including all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence, and disregards all evidence and inferences to the contrary. State v. Strickland, 609 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Mo.banc 1980). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror might have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kelly, 539 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Mo.banc 1976); State v. Chunn, 701 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Mo.App.1985). Viewed in this light, the Court finds sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict and finding the disjunctive jury instructions were correct.

Defendant admitted holding a gun on the victims, getting rope from the truck to bind them and carrying out the empty cans of roofing cement which had been poured over the helpless couple and set ablaze. She admitted leaving Missouri immediately after these events, which is admissible to show a consciousness of guilt contrary to any theory of innocence. State v. Rodden, 728 S.W.2d 212, 219 (Mo.banc 1987). Defendant confessed to the police twice, each time...

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    ...there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror might have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Dulany, 781 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo. banc 1989). On review, this Court accepts as true all evidence favorable to the State, including all favorable inferences drawn......
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