State v. Dulin

Citation786 S.E.2d 803,247 N.C.App. 799
Decision Date07 June 2016
Docket NumberNo. COA15–547.,COA15–547.
CourtCourt of Appeal of North Carolina (US)
Parties STATE of North Carolina v. Richard DULIN, III, Defendant.

Attorney General, Roy A. Cooper III, by Special Deputy Attorney General, Karen A. Blum, for the State.

Kimberly P. Hoppin, for defendant-appellant.

STROUD, Judge.

Richard Dulin, III ("defendant") appeals from judgments entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of possession with the intent to sell or deliver marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. We find no error in part, vacate in part, and remand.

I. Background

Around noon on 10 January 2012, Officers Shuskey and Honaker began watching a house in Winston–Salem. At 12:01 p.m., the officers observed a man working on a white truck in the carport of the house. Officer Honaker noted that at some point, the white truck left the house, but he did not record whether the man left the house. Between 12:01 p.m. and 1:38 p.m., several people traveled to and from the house, by either car, moped, bicycle, or on foot, each spending only a few minutes at the house. At 1:39 p.m., defendant left the house driving a black truck. During defendant's absence, there was no activity at the house, other than a man who briefly walked in front of it. At 3:02 p.m., defendant returned in the black truck and parked it in front of the house. At 3:09 p.m., a man on a bicycle arrived and approached defendant in front of the house. The two men shook hands "as if they were passing an item back and forth."

A few minutes later, another man walked by the police officers and noticed their presence. He walked over to defendant and pointed out their location to him. Defendant immediately began using his cell phone. Defendant then got in the truck, drove it behind the house, and then returned a minute later, parking it in front of the house again. Defendant began washing the truck while the man who had informed him of the officers' location began raking leaves in the yard.

Officers Shuskey and Honaker, along with other police officers, detained defendant and the other man while they were working in the front yard and began searching for drugs. Defendant admitted to one of the police officers that he had a "blunt" in the black truck. Officer Shuskey searched the black truck that defendant had been driving and washing and found a small bag of marijuana in the console. Another police officer searched one of the house's multiple bedrooms and found marijuana located in a picture frame behind a photograph of defendant. The police officer also found a feminine deodorant bar in the bedroom.

Officer Barker searched a different room of the house which appeared to be a common living area as it had a television, couch, bookcases, and other "general furniture items[.]" There, he found a marijuana grinder, a digital scale with residue on it, $400 in cash tucked between books on a bookshelf, packaging material, plastic bags, and some clear glass jars which had a green leafy residue and smelled of unburnt marijuana. Officer Barker testified that the digital scale was in plain view and that the marijuana grinder was on the bookshelf where he found the cash.

Another police officer searched the kitchen and found an off-white powdery substance splattered in a microwave and on razor blades lying on the kitchen counter. At trial, Amanda Battin, a forensic scientist, testified that there was cocaine residue on one of the razor blades. In their search, the police officers also found a piece of mail addressed to defendant at the house's address, as well as a photograph of defendant and another person.

Sergeant McDonald searched a part of the yard, to the right of the house, where Officers Shuskey and Honaker had observed defendant driving the truck. There, he found an uncovered "flat-bottom style fishing boat" on a trailer that was located in an open, unfenced area roughly seventy feet from the side of the house. He also observed a "freestanding swing" somewhere between the house and the boat. In plain view under the boat's steering console, he found four or five individually packaged bags of marijuana, all contained within a large foil package. At trial, Officer Honaker opined that this marijuana was packaged for sale, and Ms. Battin testified that the total amount of marijuana recovered during the search was more than one half of an ounce. Officers Shuskey and Honaker did not testify that they observed defendant near the boat, nor did they testify that they heard defendant leave the truck when he was out of their view or do anything that would indicate that he may have hidden the marijuana in the boat. The police did not check to whom the boat was registered.

On or about 4 June 2012, a grand jury indicted defendant for possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana, felony possession of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. See N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 90–95(a)(1), (3), –113.22 (2011). At trial, defendant moved to dismiss at the close of the State's evidence and at the close of all the evidence, and the trial court denied both motions. On or about 10 September 2014, a jury found defendant guilty of possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia and not guilty of possession of cocaine. On or about 11 September 2014, the trial court entered consecutive sentences of six to 17 months of imprisonment for the offense of possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana and 120 days of imprisonment for the offense of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court suspended the two sentences and placed defendant on 36 months of supervised probation, which included an active term of 120 days of imprisonment as a condition of special probation. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.

II. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant solely contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because insufficient evidence established that he actually or constructively possessed drug paraphernalia or marijuana with intent to sell or deliver.

A. Standard of Review
Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction when, viewed in the light most favorable to the State and giving the State every reasonable inference therefrom, there is substantial evidence to support a jury finding of each essential element of the offense charged, and of defendant's being the perpetrator of such offense.
Evidence is substantial if it is relevant and adequate to convince a reasonable mind to accept a conclusion. In considering a motion to dismiss, the trial court does not weigh the evidence, consider evidence unfavorable to the State, or determine any witness' credibility. Evidence is not substantial if it is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the offense or the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of it, and the motion to dismiss should be allowed even though the suspicion so aroused by the evidence is strong. This Court reviews the denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence de novo.

State v. Robledo, 193 N.C.App. 521, 524–25, 668 S.E.2d 91, 94 (2008) (citations, quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted). "In deciding whether the trial court's denial of [a] defendant's motion to dismiss violated [the] defendant's due process rights, this Court must determine whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ " State v. Penland, 343 N.C. 634, 648, 472 S.E.2d 734, 741 (1996) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979) ), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1098, 117 S.Ct. 781, 136 L.Ed.2d 725 (1997).

B. Possession of Drug Paraphernalia
A person is in "possession" of a controlled substance within the meaning of G.S. 90–95 if they have the power and intent to control it; possession need not be actual. The State is not required to prove that the defendant owned the controlled substance ... or that defendant was the only person with access to it.
... Where control of the premises is nonexclusive, however, constructive possession may not be inferred without other incriminating circumstances.

State v. Rich, 87 N.C.App. 380, 382, 361 S.E.2d 321, 323 (1987) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Incriminating circumstances relevant to constructive possession
include evidence that defendant: (1) owned other items found in proximity to the contraband; (2) was the only person who could have placed the contraband in the position where it was found; (3) acted nervously in the presence of law enforcement; (4) resided in, had some control of, or regularly visited the premises where the contraband was found; (5) was near contraband in plain view; or (6) possessed a large amount of cash.
Evidence of conduct by the defendant indicating knowledge of the controlled substance or fear of discovery is also sufficient to permit a jury to find constructive possession. Our determination of whether the State presented sufficient evidence of incriminating circumstances depends on the totality of the circumstances in each case. No single factor controls, but ordinarily the questions will be for the jury.

State v. Alston, 193 N.C.App. 712, 716, 668 S.E.2d 383, 386–87 (2008) (citations, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted), aff'd per curiam, 363 N.C. 367, 677 S.E.2d 455 (2009).

In Rich, the defendant argued that insufficient evidence established that she possessed cocaine, which the police had found in the bedroom of a house. Rich, 87 N.C.App. at 382, 361 S.E.2d at 323. The State proffered evidence that

defendant was seen on the premises the evening before [the search], that on the night of her arrest she was cooking dinner at the house when the agents arrived, that women's casual clothes and undergarments were found in the bedroom [where the cocaine was found], and that mail addressed to defendant, including an insurance
...

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4 cases
  • State v. Yisrael
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • August 15, 2017
    ...S.E.2d at 24 (citation omitted). This is true even if "the suspicion so aroused by the evidence is strong." State v. Dulin , ––– N.C. App. ––––, ––––, 786 S.E.2d 803, 807 (2016) (citation omitted). I do not find the suspicion aroused by the evidence in the present case to be strong. I reach......
  • Powell v. P2Enterprises, LLC
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • June 7, 2016
  • State v. Kirkman
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • December 20, 2016
    ...to gain consent to search when no probable cause exists to obtain a warrant." (quotation marks omitted)); State v. Dulin , ––– N.C. App. ––––, ––––, 786 S.E.2d 803, 810 (2016) ("In Grice , police officers who approached the door of the defendant's home for a knock and talk noticed some plan......
  • State v. Kirkman, COA16-407
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • December 20, 2016
    ...to gain consent to search when no probable cause exists to obtain a warrant." (quotation marks omitted)); State v. Dulin, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 786 S.E.2d 803, 810 (2016) ("In Grice, police officers who approached the door of the defendant's home for a knock and talk noticed some plants g......

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