State v. Duval County

• Decision Date: 19 April 1932
• Citation: 141 So. 173,105 Fla. 174
• Parties: STATE ex rel. LANDIS, Atty. Gen., et al. v. DUVAL COUNTY.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

141 So. 173

105 Fla. 174

STATE ex rel. LANDIS, Atty. Gen., et al. v. DUVAL COUNTY.

Florida Supreme Court

April 19, 1932

Original action in Supreme Court in the nature of quo warranto by the State, on the relation of Cary D. Landis, Attorney General and others, against Duval County, Fla.

Writ of quo warranto dismissed.

COUNSEL P. H. Odom, of Jacksonville, for relators.

Roswell King, L'Engle & Shands, and F. P. Fleming, all of Jacksonville, for respondent.

OPINION

HUTCHISON Circuit Judge.

This is an action of original jurisdiction in this court in the nature of quo warranto, brought against Duval county to prohibit it from collecting tolls on the bridge built by it across the St. Johns river at Jacksonville.

The information was filed in the name of the state by the Attorney General joined by certain individual corelators. Upon the issuance and service of the writ, the defendant demurred to the information. This hearing is on the demurrer.

From the allegations in the information admitted by the demurrer the bridge was originally constructed by Duval county under authority of chapter 7462, Special Acts of Florida, approved May 8, 1917. The construction was financed by a county bond issue of $950,000 under the provisions of said statute, and an additional issue of $250,000 under authority of chapter 8672 of the Special Acts of 1921. The bridge was completed and put in operation in 1921, and has been operated by Duval county since that time.

The county, as authorized by the original act, in order to pay the cost and maintenance of the bridge and its operation, has continuously collected tolls on all traffic across the bridge since it was opened to the public. Out of the tolls so collected, after paying operating and maintenance costs, the county has been able to pay or redeem all of the original and additional issues of its bridge bonds, aggregating $1,200,000, with the exception of $137,000, which are still outstanding and unpaid. The county also has accumulated an additional sum of $627,000 out of the tolls, which amounts to a surplus of $490,000 above all outstanding bonds.

The Legislature in 1931 (chapter 15188, approved June 4, 1931) authorized an election in Duval county to determine, first whether new approaches should be built to the bridge, and, second, whether tolls should be abolished. The election was held on November 30, 1931, and resulted in a majority vote against both proposals. The vote being against the new approaches and in favor of the tolls, the county, after paying the operating and maintenance costs of the bridge and after retiring all the remaining bridge bonds, is now required by section 5 of the Special Act of 1931 to apply the balance of all funds realized from the tolls towards the liquidation of its other bonded debt.

The county is enforcing a system of tolls on the bridge in accordance with its authority under the original construction act (chapter 7462, Act of 1917) and the subsequent Special Act of 1931 (chapter 15188). These proceedings are brought to restrain the further collection of tolls and to declare the bridge free, by challenging the power and authority of the county to collect tolls under either of the acts.

The information relates in detail the facts and circumstances purporting to show the absence of any authority or power in the county to continue its collection of the tolls, and its alleged usurpation of that power without warrant. The demurrer of the county raises the legal sufficiency of the grounds set forth in the information as a challenge of its power and authority to proceed under the statutes in the collection of the tolls.

It is contended by the relators that the collection of further tolls is not authorized under the original special act of 1917, authorizing the construction of the bridge, for the reason that the power granted by that statute was exhausted when the collection of tolls reached an amount sufficient to pay the bonds and to provide for the future repairs and maintenance of the bridge. The information relates that the county has already collected tolls sufficient to pay off all of its bridge bonds, and that it has an additional amount on hand, as a surplus or sinking fund, sufficient to take care of future maintenance and operation of the bridge. For that reason it is contended that the purposes for which the tolls were originally authorized have been fulfilled and discharged; and that the statute is now functus officio and no longer operative as legislative authority for the collection of tolls on the bridge.

Chapter 15188, enacted in 1931, it is contended, is unconstitutional and does not extend or enlarge the county's authority to collect the tolls originally authorized, but now no longer existing, under chapter 7462. The information details the facts with regard to the passage of chapter 15188, and enumerates various alleged encroachments on the State and Federal Constitutions.

The surplus fund of $490,000 held by the county, according to the contention of the relators, 'would be sufficient to pay the cost of future repairs and operations of the bridge.' From this statement of facts it is contended that, the purposes for which tolls were authorized under the Special Act of 1917 having been fulfilled and completely accomplished, the power for collecting tolls, as conferred by the act has become exhausted and at an end.

By section 6 of chapter 7462, Special Acts of 1917, the tolls were authorized, not only to liquidate the bridge bonds, but to pay for 'the operation, maintenance and repair of said bridge, and the approaches thereto.' In fact, the operation, maintenance, and repair costs of the structure are given first order or preference as enumerated charges against the funds collected from the tolls. It is also to be noted that the 'approaches' to the bridge, as well as the bridge itself, are to be maintained and repaired out of the tolls.

It is contended by the relators that 'the cost of operating and maintaining the bridge as a free bridge would not exceed the sum of $25,000.00'; and that this amount could be realized each year from the interest on the $490,000 surplus on hand. From this it is contended that the bridge has now accumulated a fixed surplus which will yield a sufficient interest return to pay for the operation and maintenance of the bridge in future years.

The relators estimate an annual interest yield of $25,000 on the net surplus of $490,000 which will be on hand after deducting and allowing for the remaining $137,000 of outstanding bonds. This amounts to an interest return of slightly over 4 per cent. annually on the surplus fund. It is not contended in the information that this return can be obtained. It is not shown how, or in what securities, the funds can be invested to yield that return. And what is of the most importance, we are not informed by what statute or authority of law the county of Duval would be warranted at this time in entering the investment field to purchase securities yielding an interest return sufficient to meet the figure estimated by the relators. Furthermore, until the bonds now outstanding are actually paid, they cannot be disregarded as a nonexisting charge against the tolls, although there may be funds on hand amply sufficient at this time to pay them. Provision for payment of the bonds is not the legal equivalent of payment. It requires no great strain of the imagination to conceive at this time of a financial disaster which would wipe out the entire existing cash surplus. And if this cash were to be invested in securities to yield better than a 4 per cent. return, as would be necessary to sustain the relators' plan of financing the operation of the bridge, it is entirely possible that the earnings of the securities, or even the securities themselves, might be lost, or seriously impaired, through financial reverses affecting the securities. It must be apparent from these observations that the relators have advanced nothing more than a theory for financing the future operation of the bridge. And the theory, as we have seen, does not purport to cover the entire operation. At most, it provides for the operation of the bridge, and makes no provision for its approaches. Furthermore, the theory is based on an estimated earning from the investment of an existing fund, where there is no law authorizing the county to make such investment, and when the investment, if made, becomes so hazardous as to affect its value and security and to destroy its function and purposes.

The Special Act of 1917 (chapter 7462) intrusts the operation and control of the bridge into the hands of the county commissioners, who are elected by the people, and who are responsible to the people for their management of the property. The county commissioners are an executive body, charged by law with the discretionary power and business judgment in the management of the bridge, the same as all other public property coming under their control. To that board the law has passed the business management and financial charge of the bridge, subject to such limitations as have been prescribed by the Legislature.

The statute, in placing the bridge under the management of the county commissioners, has vested in them the power to levy and collect tolls found to be necessary to meet the cost and expenses incident to the operation of the property. When the law charges them with the duty of operating the bridge, it places in their hands the power to raise funds through tolls to pay for the expenses incurred by them in such operation.

The relators now propose to take away from the county commissioners the source of revenue received through tolls and to force upon them a plan for financing the future...