State v. Dye

• Decision Date: 05 February 1914
• Docket Number: 2484
• Citation: 44 Utah 190,138 P. 1193
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. DYE

138 P. 1193

44 Utah 190

STATE v. DYE

No. 2484

Supreme Court of Utah

February 5, 1914

APPEAL from District Court, Third District; Hon. Fred C. Loofbourow Judge.

Idellus M. Dye was convicted of first degree murder. He appeals.

AFFIRMED.

Soren X. Christensen for appellant.

A. R Barnes, Attorney-General, and E. v. Higgins, and G. A Iverson, Assistant Attorneys-General, for the State.

McCARTY, C. J. STRAUP and FRICK, JJ., concur.

OPINION

McCARTY, C. J.

The defendant was convicted in the district court of Salt Lake County of the crime of murder in the first degree. From the judgment imposing the death penalty, defendant has appealed to this court.

No bill of exceptions was prepared and settled in the case; hence the appeal is on the judgment roll alone. The alleged errors assigned and discussed by defendant relate to certain of the court's instructions to the jury. The alleged error most grievously complained of by counsel for defendant is that the court, in defining to the jury the different degrees of homicide, failed to inform them of "the punishment appropriate to each." The court in its charge, carefully and somewhat elaborately explained to the jury the different degrees of homicide as defined and fixed by the statute. After fully charging them as to first degree murder, the court, among other things, instructed the jury that:

"The offense of murder in the second degree, and of voluntary manslaughter, and of involuntary manslaughter, are necessarily included in the offense charged in the information, and under the laws of this state the defendant may be convicted of either of such offenses so included, and you are instructed that murder in the second degree is lower in degree than murder in the first degree, and that voluntary manslaughter is lower in degree than murder in the second degree, and that involuntary manslaughter is lower in degree than voluntary manslaughter, and if, in this case, you are satisfied from all the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed a public offense, and there is in your mind a reasonable doubt as to which of two or more degrees he is guilty, you can convict him of the lowest of such degrees only."

The court also charged the jury in the language of the statute as follows:

"Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, or, upon the recommendation of the jury, may be imprisoned at hard labor in the state prison for life, in the discretion of the court."

The jury were thus advised that the penalty for first degree murder is death unless in their verdict they recommended that the defendant be imprisoned in the state prison at hard labor for life; and that the court upon such recommendation, but not otherwise, could, in its discretion, impose a sentence of life imprisonment. The jury, notwithstanding they were thus fully instructed regarding the different degrees of homicide and that if they found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree the court, upon their recommendation, but not otherwise, could impose a sentence of life imprisonment nevertheless returned a verdict of first degree murder without such a recommendation. The defendant therefore, in view of the fact that...