State v. Dye, 49S00-0002-PD-112.
| Citation | 784 N.E.2d 469 |
| Decision Date | 06 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 49S00-0002-PD-112.,49S00-0002-PD-112. |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant, v. Walter DYE, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Timothy W. Beam, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender of Indiana, Laura L. Volk, Deputy Public Defender, Kathleen Cleary, Deputy Public Defender, Barbara S. Blackman, Special Assistant to the Public Defender, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
On Appeal from Post-Conviction Relief
DICKSON, Justice.
Walter Dye was convicted of three counts of murder and the jury recommended the death penalty. Following a subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to death. We affirmed his convictions and sentence on appeal. Dye v. State, 717 N.E.2d 5, 22 (Ind.1999). The defendant thereafter petitioned for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court rejected most of his claims except that of juror misconduct. As to this latter claim the post-conviction court vacated both the defendant's death sentence and his convictions. The post-conviction court concluded that a juror's omissions and false responses on her jury questionnaires and during voir dire amounted to gross misconduct that probably harmed the defendant, denying him a fair trial. The State appeals this determination, and Dye cross-appeals the post-conviction court's rejection of his other claims. We affirm the post-conviction court.
Either the State or the defendant may appeal a post-conviction decision, and in either case our standard of review is governed by Indiana Trial Rule 52(A):
On appeal of claims tried by the court without a jury or with an advisory jury, at law or in equity, the court on appeal shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The State's appeal is determined using the "clearly erroneous" standard. It is a review for sufficiency of the evidence, and we neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses but consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment. Moore v. State, 771 N.E.2d 46, 50 (Ind.2002). We reverse only on a showing of "clear error"—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Spranger v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1117, 1119 (Ind.1995). In reviewing the State's claim that the post-conviction court erroneously granted relief to the defendant, "the inquiry is essentially whether there is any way the trial court could have reached its decision." Id. at 1120 (emphasis in original).
The State contends that the post-conviction court clearly erred in concluding that a new trial was required by its findings that Jackie Gunn, a juror during both the guilt phase and penalty phase of the defendant's trial, concealed her and her family's criminal histories, her history as a victim of a crime, and her disposition to impose the death penalty. The State argues that the inaccuracies in Gunn's questionnaire answers were unintentional, her victimization was dissimilar and remote, and that she repeatedly affirmed that she could be a fair juror and would decide the case on the evidence presented.
The prospective jurors were sent two questionnaires in advance of trial, which Gunn received and completed. In one, the prospective jurors were requested to answer various questions including the following:
Petitioner's Exhibit 11(A) (Gunn Questionnaire). In another questionnaire, the prospective jurors were asked:
In answering the questionnaires, Jackie Gunn answered each of the above questions negatively, indicating that neither she nor any members of her family had ever appeared as a witness or been in court for any other reason, or been the victim of, witness to, or charged with a crime. She also stated in her juror questionnaire that she did not feel the death penalty should be mandatory for any type of crime, but would vote automatically for the death penalty if a person were found guilty of intentional murder.
During voir dire, the trial court asked the prospective jurors if they believed everyone who commits murder should be given the death penalty, and Gunn did not respond. Trial Record at 863-65. Also during voir dire, defense counsel asked: Id. at 1639. Mrs. Gunn responded, "I had a brother in prison, and he's deceased now." Id. When asked, she said that she had never visited her brother, who had been incarcerated in California. Id. She was not asked nor did she volunteer any further details. Gunn was seated on the jury.
At the post-conviction review hearing, however, Gunn testified that her brother had been convicted of two homicides in California, was sentenced to death, and died while incarcerated. P.C.R. Tr. at 17-18. Members of her family testified on his behalf during the penalty phase of his capital case. Gunn testified that she believed her brother deserved the death penalty because a person should receive the death penalty for killing someone. Id. at 18. In her testimony, she explained that she did not mention her brother or his death sentence in her questionnaire because "at the time I didn't think it was anybody's business." Id. at 22. Two of Gunn's siblings had been arrested, but she did not mention that in her questionnaire because, "I didn't think about none of them." Id. She did not disclose her own conviction for operating while intoxicated because she "didn't even think about it." Id. When she was two or three years old she was raped by an uncle, a fact that she revealed in her post-conviction testimony but did not disclose on her questionnaire because she "tried to forget it." Id. Her uncle was never charged for the offense. Gunn admitted in her post-conviction testimony that she thought about the rape during the defendant's trial. Id. at 20.
The State argues that because the defendant failed to establish that Gunn intentionally withheld the information regarding her and her family's criminal histories, her omissions do not amount to gross misconduct and probable harm. Furthermore, the State urges that Gunn's failure to disclose that she had been raped as a young child was not gross misconduct because Gunn also stated that she would be able to be an impartial juror and appropriately evaluate the evidence, and because any bias Gunn might have had because of being raped "is too remote and attenuated to sustain a reasonable degree of probability that she was biased." Br. of Appellant at 10. The State also claims that Gunn's failure to respond to the court's questions in voir dire regarding the automatic imposition of the death penalty does not amount to gross misconduct because the defendant waived consideration of the issue by failing to challenge Gunn for cause based on her inconsistent responses. The State also asserts that there is no evidence that at the time of the defendant's trial she was an "automatic death penalty juror." Id. Finally, the State argues that there is a considerable societal interest in the finality of criminal proceedings, and that the integrity of the jury system requires us to reverse the post-conviction court's judgment. Id.
The United States Supreme Court articulated a particularized test for determining whether a new trial is required due to juror deceit during voir dire or on jury questionnaires in McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984). The two-part test states that in order to obtain a new trial, the defendant "must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question ... and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause." Id. at 556, 104 S.Ct. at 850, 78 L.Ed.2d at 671. The juror's incorrect response in McDonough was an honest mistake, but the test applies equally to deliberate concealment and to innocent non-disclosure. See, e.g., Zerka v. Green, 49 F.3d 1181, 1185 (6th Cir.1995)
; United States v. Langford, 990 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir.1993); Artis v. Hitachi Zosen Clearing, Inc., 967 F.2d 1132, 1141-42 (7th Cir. 1992). McDonough was a civil case, but it has been applied on federal habeas review. See Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 362-63 (4th Cir.1998).
In Warner v. State, 773 N.E.2d 239 (Ind. 2002), we confronted a claim that juror misconduct in a criminal case warranted a new trial and noted:
Generally, proof that a juror was biased against the defendant or lied during voir dire entitles a defendant to a new trial. A defendant seeking a new trial because of juror misconduct must show gross misconduct that probably harmed the defendant. We review the trial judge's determination on these points for abuse of discretion.
Id. at 246 (included citations omitted); see also Allen v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158, 1164 (Ind.2001)
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