State v. Dyous, 35670.

CourtAppellate Court of Connecticut
Citation153 Conn.App. 266,100 A.3d 1004
Decision Date30 September 2014
Docket NumberNo. 35670.,35670.
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Anthony DYOUS.

Robert E. Byron, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Michele C. Lukban, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patricia M. Froehlich, state's attorney, and Roger R. Caridad, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

LAVINE, PRESCOTT and WEST, Js.

Opinion

LAVINE, J.

The defendant, Anthony Dyous, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the state's second petition for an order of continued commitment filed pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–593 (c).1

On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the order of continued commitment to the Psychiatric Security Review Board (board) violates his right to equal protection as against mentally disordered prison inmates,2 and (2) his April 8, 2011 criminal conviction constitutes a finding by the trial court that he is sane and, therefore, the state no longer has a rationale for his commitment.” We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The criminal activity that led to the defendant's initial commitment occurred on December 28, 1983, and was described in detail in State v. Dyous, 307 Conn. 299, 302, 53 A.3d 153 (2012) (Dyous I ). We briefly recount those facts and the procedural history that inform the present appeal. The defendant had been hospitalized in a psychiatric facility three times prior to December 28, 1983, when he hijacked a bus carrying forty-seven people and threatened the driver with a bomb and nerve gas. Id., at 304, 53 A.3d 153. At the time, the defendant stated that God had asked him to deliver a message. Id. On March 22, 1985, he was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of two counts of kidnapping in the first degree, two counts of threatening in the second degree, and one count of carrying a dangerous weapon. The defendant was committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health for a period not to exceed twenty-five years. Id., at 302, 53 A.3d 153. In March, 1985, the defendant was transferred to the custody of the board pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–582. Id.

Initially, the defendant was confined to Whiting Forensic Institute (Whiting), but later was transferred to Norwich State Hospital (Norwich). Id., at 304, 53 A.3d 153. He escaped from Norwich in 1986. Id. Nine months later, he was located in Mexico, returned to Connecticut, and readmitted to Whiting. Id. Upon readmission, the defendant was grossly psychotic and experiencing auditory and visual hallucinations, as well as grandiose and persecutory delusions

. Id. While he was at Whiting, he was involved in a violent incident during which he, other patients, and staff members sustained injuries. Id.

Between 1989 and 2005, the defendant moved between Whiting, Norwich, and Connecticut Valley Hospital. Id., at 304–305, 53 A.3d 153. Between 1990 and 1992, he was granted a number of temporary leaves that were terminated when he tested positive for cocaine. Id., at 305, 53 A.3d 153. In 1996, the defendant exhibited signs of psychosis

and admitted that he had not been taking his antipsychotic medication. Id. He was admitted to Connecticut Valley Hospital, but he refused to take his medication. He later escaped. When he was found, he was returned to Whiting, where he exhibited psychotic and paranoid symptoms, and delusional thinking. Id.

He was violent and had to be placed in restraints. Id. The defendant's behavior “was characterized by chronic refusal to take medication, irritability, mood lability, grandiosity, paranoid ideation

, rule breaking, physical altercations with peers and refusal to engage meaningfully in treatment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

In October, 2003, the defendant filed an application for discharge from the custody of the board that was denied by the court, Foley, J. The defendant filed a second application for discharge from the custody of the board in March, 2007, that was denied by the court, Swords, J. On April 27, 2009, the state filed a petition for an order of the defendant's continued commitment to the board. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the petition and a supplemental motion to dismiss the petition in February, 2010. Judge Swords held a hearing on the second petition and the defendant's motions to dismiss on February 24, 2010. The court granted the state's petition for an order of continued commitment and denied the defendant's motions to dismiss. The defendant appealed from the judgment of continued commitment. Our Supreme Court affirmed that judgment in Dyous I.

On April 24, 2012, the state filed a second petition for an order of continued commitment on the ground that the defendant “remains mentally ill to the extent that his discharge [from the board's jurisdiction] would constitute a danger to himself or others.” The case was tried to the court, Boland, J., on February 28, 2013, and March 15, 2013.3 The court granted the state's second petition and recommitted the defendant to the custody of the board until March 18, 2018.

In ruling on the second petition for continued commitment, Judge Boland found that since July, 2004, the defendant has refused to provide a DNA sample as required by General Statutes § 54–102g. For eighteen months, he consistently refused to take his medication. He remained symptomatic, but not to a degree that required the involuntary administration of medication. Nonetheless, the defendant's cooperation improved and his aggressive behavior diminished so that in July, 2006, he was transferred to Dutcher Hall at Connecticut Valley Hospital and was permitted to move about the campus without an escort. In January, 2009, the defendant's anger and resentment about his ongoing hospitalization, however, resulted in a notable deterioration in his condition despite therapeutic intervention. The court found that the defendant insisted that he “could make it on his own without medication and without the oversight of the medical profession.”

Although he noted the defendant's prior history, Judge Boland gave greater weight to events that have occurred since the 2010 extension of the defendant's commitment. In March, 2010, the defendant described himself as a “P.O.W.,” who was being held in violation of human rights standards. On April 26, 2010, he assaulted another patient by hitting the patient with a radio, leading to his conviction on April 8, 2011, of assault in the third degree. Chemical tests administered at about that time revealed that for more than two years, the defendant falsely had indicated that he was taking his medication; he surreptitiously was spitting out the pills.

The court found the following events outlined in the board's report. On December 29, 2010, the defendant pushed another patient to the floor and grabbed the patient by the throat. The incident ended only when hospital police intervened. In March, 2011, a female patient complained of the defendant's behavior, which was “characterized as sexual harassment and unwelcome (but not, apparently, criminal) touching.” Between March, 2010, and June, 2012, the defendant's posture toward the medical staff was influenced by his belief that his commitment was illegal. He refused to engage in therapy or to take his medication. The staff determined that the defendant continued to be mentally ill and in need of medical attention. In June, 2012, the defendant exhibited greater cooperation and self-control, but he continued to refuse to take his medication. The results of the defendant's September 15, 2012 psychological assessment revealed that he had no current acute symptoms of bipolar disorder

, and that, within an institutional setting he has refrained from using alcohol and illegal drugs.

At the hearing on the second petition to extend the defendant's commitment, the board's report to the court was placed into evidence, and Mahboob Aslam, the defendant's treating psychiatrist, testified. The court noted Aslam's expert testimony that “interepisodal recovery while a patient remains in a highly structured environment is common; equally common ... is the predictability of a relapse when a person leaves that structure,” as the person lacks insight into his malady, and resists taking medication and continuing in therapy.

In its memorandum of decision, the court found that a clinical consensus existed that the defendant remains mentally ill and, despite his present state of relative lucidity, needs medication, which he refuses to take, and support, which he rejects. The court also found that if the defendant is to become a person who is not a danger to himself or others, he needs to take his medication and accept support. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that, at the time of the hearing, the defendant presented a danger to himself or to others such that he would be a risk of imminent physical injury to others or to himself if he were released.4 The court granted the petition and extended the defendant's commitment to the board until March 18, 2018. The defendant appealed.

I

The defendant claims that, by granting the state's second petition for his continued commitment, the court violated “his equal protection rights as against mentally disordered prison inmates who are not subject to unwilling continued confinement.”5 The defendant's claim fails, as the record is inadequate for our review.

At the hearing on the second petition to extend the defendant's commitment, following the state's presentation of evidence, the defendant presented no evidence, despite the fact that the court had continued the hearing to enable him to do so. See footnote 3 of this opinion. During his final argument, counsel for the defendant stated in part that the defendant's case presented an equitable issue, but he was not “going to phrase it in terms of equal protection because [Dyous I ] pretty much put paid to that.6 But there is an issue of fundamental...

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13 cases
  • State v. Dyous
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 23 Junio 2020
    ...board have been detailed extensively in State v. Dyous , 307 Conn. 299, 53 A.3d 153 (2012) ( Dyous I ), and State v. Dyous , 153 Conn. App. 266, 100 A.3d 1004 (2014) ( Dyous II ), appeal dismissed, 320 Conn. 176, 128 A.3d 505 (2016) (certification improvidently granted). These opinions set ......
  • L. H.-S. v. N. B.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 15 Diciembre 2021
    ...any evidence in this regard at trial,8 and, thus, the record is inadequate to review her claim. See, e.g., State v. Dyous , 153 Conn. App. 266, 277–79, 100 A.3d 1004 (2014) (equal protection claim was not reviewable under first prong of Golding because defendant did not offer any evidence a......
  • State v. Polanco
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 17 Mayo 2016
    ...the appellate tribunal will not consider the merits of the defendant's claim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dyous, 153 Conn.App. 266, 277, 100 A.3d 1004 (2014), appeal dismissed, 320 Conn. 176, 128 A.3d 505 (2016) (certification improvidently granted); see also State v. Sant......
  • Hall v. Hall
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 19 Junio 2018
    ...withdrawal of $237,643.11.5 This court may take judicial notice of filings in the Superior Court. See, e.g., State v. Dyous , 153 Conn. App. 266, 279–80, 100 A.3d 1004 (2014), appeal dismissed, 320 Conn. 176, 128 A.3d 505 (2016) (certification improvidently granted).6 On the basis of our in......
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