State v. Eakins

Decision Date31 August 1995
Docket NumberNo. 61632-9,61632-9
Citation127 Wn.2d 490,902 P.2d 1236
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Ted EAKINS, Respondent.
Russell Hauge, Kitsap County Prosecutor, Brian T. Moran, Deputy, Pamela Loginsky, Deputy, Port Orchard, for petitioner

Law Offices of Michael A. Dunn, Michael Allan Dunn, Port Orchard, for respondent.

JOHNSON, Justice.

Ted Eakins was convicted of two counts

of second degree assault. He admitted pointing a loaded revolver at two people, but claimed drug and alcohol induced diminished capacity, so that he was not capable of forming specific intent to assault them. Only his specific intent was at issue at trial. The issue before us is whether his reputation for peacefulness is relevant under ER 404(a)(1) when only specific intent is at issue. The trial court refused to admit his proffered character evidence, finding it irrelevant to the issue of whether Eakins had the intent to support the assault charges. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding such evidence relevant to the issue of intent. We affirm the Court of Appeals.

FACTS

When Shelley Lindal and Ted Eakins ended their romantic relationship, Eakins became despondent. On May 25, 1990, he went to Captain K's Restaurant in Bremerton where Lindal worked as a manager. After Eakins was seated, he became increasingly agitated and demanded to see Lindal. Because he was causing a disruption, Lindal finally asked him to leave. As she walked away, he threw a coffee cup at her, hitting her in the back, then pursued her into the bar.

Lindal and other employees summoned Mark Hansen, the restaurant's kitchen manager, to the bar where he confronted Eakins. After unsuccessfully attempting to push Hansen away, Eakins drew a loaded revolver and pointed it at Hansen's head. Katherine Yaw, the bartender, testified she heard two clicks, which she recognized as the sound of a gun, then saw Eakins point the revolver at Hansen's head or upper body and tell him to back off. Hansen testified Eakins threatened to shoot him if he did not move away. Eakins then held the revolver to Lindal's head and threatened to shoot her, after which he lowered the weapon and left the restaurant. He returned a moment later and gave the gun to Lindal, who placed it behind the bar. Eakins jumped over the bar, retrieved the revolver, and again left the restaurant.

About 4 hours later, Eakins turned himself in to the police. He was charged with two counts of second degree assault while armed with a deadly weapon, in violation of RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c).

At trial, Eakins conceded he had pointed the revolver at Ms. Lindal and Mr. Hansen but presented evidence of alcohol and drug-induced diminished capacity. He testified it had become his practice each evening to take a triple dose of tranquilizers prescribed for his depression and wash them down with alcohol. Although this combination of drugs and alcohol caused him to have vivid nightmares, he said he took them to pass out and stop thinking. On the night of the assaults, Eakins said he took the drugs and alcohol and dreamed about confronting Lindal. He testified that when he realized he was not dreaming and his actions were real, he gave the revolver to Lindal and left.

At trial, David Rommen, a licensed professional therapist, testified Eakins was depressed and suffered from a personality disorder involving dependency upon Ms. Lindal, for which Eakins was taking prescribed tranquilizers. Mr. Rommen testified he was aware Eakins used alcohol with the tranquilizers, despite Rommen's advice not to mix alcohol with the tranquilizers. Mr. Rommen also testified he had been in contact with Eakins the night before the assaults and found Eakins to be incoherent, slipping in and out of consciousness, apparently in a delirium induced by drugs and alcohol. In therapy sessions with Mr. Rommen following the assaults, Eakins had difficulty remembering what happened the night of the assaults. Mr. Rommen testified he believed Eakins consumed as much as 24 ounces of alcohol on the night of the assaults.

Dr. Martin Haykin, a licensed and certified psychiatrist, testified Eakins was incapable of forming the intent to assault on the night in question, based on his depression and consumption of both alcohol and the prescription medication. He also described Eakins' behavior during the Ms. Lindal, Mr. Hansen, Ms. Yaw, and Julie Cathey (another restaurant employee) all testified Eakins appeared angry but not intoxicated or delirious the night of the assaults. Two police officers who interviewed Eakins 4 hours after the assaults testified he did not appear intoxicated and spoke clearly and coherently.

assaults as consistent with a delirium induced by drugs and alcohol.

Eakins sought to offer 15 lay character witnesses, each of whom would testify as to his peaceful nature. The trial court rejected the offered evidence, relying on State v. Lewis, 37 Wash.2d 540, 225 P.2d 428 (1950). Because Eakins admitted the charged acts, the court concluded the only issue was whether he had the requisite intent to assault and the offered character evidence was irrelevant as to that issue. Having excluded this evidence, the trial court subsequently refused to give an instruction on the lesser included offense of displaying a weapon in violation of RCW 9.41.270.

The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding reliance on Lewis was misplaced. It held intent or malice was an essential element of Eakins' offense and reputation evidence of his peaceful character was admissible under ER 404(a)(1) and ER 405(a). State v. Eakins, 73 Wash.App. 271, 278-79, 869 P.2d 83 (1994). The State petitioned for review, contending this holding conflicts with State v. Janes, 64 Wash.App. 134, 144-45, 822 P.2d 1238 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 121 Wash.2d 220, 850 P.2d 495, 22 A.L.R.5th 921 (1993). We affirm the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE

The sole issue raised in the State's petition is whether a defendant's reputation for peacefulness is relevant when the defendant has conceded the underlying acts giving

rise to charges of second degree assault while armed with a deadly weapon, in violation of RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c).

ANALYSIS

The admissibility of character evidence by a defendant is governed by ER 404(a)(1):

(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:

(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same[.]

ER 404(a)(1).

Where intent or malice is an essential element of an offense and the defendant denies having the mental state necessary to form the requisite intent, character evidence may be relevant and admissible to support an inference that the defendant lacks the necessary mental state. 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 101, at 549 (2d ed. 1994); 1A John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 56, at 1173-74 (1983). 1 The relevance of such character evidence is undiminished where, as here, intent is the only essential element in dispute. So long as character evidence offered by the defendant involves a "pertinent trait of his character", it is admissible.

We have not defined "pertinent" in the context of ER 404(a)(1). Federal courts interpreting identical language in Fed.R.Evid. 404(a)(1) have read the word "pertinent" as synonymous with "relevant". See, e.g., United States v. Santana-Camacho, 931 F.2d 966, 968 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Roberts, 887 F.2d 534, 536 (5th Cir.1989); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977). Following this interpretation, a pertinent character trait Eakins was charged with two counts of assault in the second degree while armed with a deadly weapon, in violation of RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c). 3 An essential element of second degree assault is specific intent either to cause bodily harm or to create apprehension of bodily harm. State v. Byrd, 125 Wash.2d 707, 713, 887 P.2d 396 (1995). Although Eakins conceded the acts giving rise to the charges, he maintains he lacked the requisite specific intent because of diminished capacity caused by drugs and alcohol. Diminished capacity is an affirmative defense against second degree assault, and it must be supported by evidence of a mental condition and evidence showing the mental condition impaired the defendant's ability to form the required specific intent. State v. Davis, 64 Wash.App. 511, 515-17, 827 P.2d 298 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 121 Wash.2d 1, 846 P.2d 527 (1993). Eakins offered expert testimony that he suffered from a mental condition caused by drugs and alcohol which impaired his ability to form the required specific intent. We must determine whether, under ER 404(a)(1), character evidence of Eakins' reputation for peacefulness is also relevant to determine whether he specifically intended to create apprehension of bodily harm or to cause bodily harm when he threatened Ms. Lindal and Mr. Hansen with his revolver.

is one that tends to make the existence of any material fact more or less probable than it would be without evidence of that trait. ER 401. 2

The trial court excluded Eakins' character evidence in reliance on State v. Lewis, supra, in which the defendant was convicted of manslaughter for a death resulting from a hunting accident. Lewis admitted the act but denied he Division Two in this case explicitly disagreed with Division One's decision in State v. Janes, supra, regarding the admissibility of character evidence when specific intent is the only essential element at issue. In Janes, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder and two counts of second degree assault for killing his stepfather and firing at police officers when they arrived to arrest him. Janes claimed diminished capacity and self-defense based on "battered child syndrome". Janes contended ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
50 cases
  • State v. Ellis
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • 1 Octubre 1998
    ......         Petitioner asserts that diminished capacity is a mental condition, not amounting to insanity, that causes an inability to form the requisite intent for the crime charged. 27 Citing State v. Eakins, Petitioner acknowledges that for a defendant to maintain a diminished capacity defense, the defendant must present expert testimony establishing a mental disorder that impaired the ability to form the specific intent 28 to commit the offense charged. 29 Petitioner argues that determination of ......
  • State v. Walker, No. 22003-6-III (WA 12/28/2004)
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • 28 Diciembre 2004
    ......State v. Coffelt, 33 Wn.2d 106, 108, 204 P.2d 521 (1949). One of the essential elements of second degree assault is specific intent either to cause bodily harm or to create apprehension of bodily harm. State v. Eakins, 127 Wn.2d 490, 496, 902 P.2d 1236 (1995). Specific intent `can be inferred as a logical probability from all the facts and circumstances' of a case. State v. Wilson, 125 Wn.2d 212, 217, 883 P.2d 320 (1994). Mr. Walker argues there was insufficient evidence to support the inference that he acted ......
  • State v. O'Connell, 23563-7-III.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Washington
    • 6 Febrero 2007
    ...were difficult to separate. ¶ 25 Voluntary intoxication is a subset of the general defense of diminished capacity. State v. Eakins, 127 Wash.2d 490, 498, 902 P.2d 1236 (1995). The defense is effective when the defendant can show that the crime charged has as an element a particular mental s......
  • State v. Lewis, 66977-0-I
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Washington
    • 28 Enero 2013
    ...State v. Tilton, 149 Wn.2d 775, 784, 72 P.3d 735 (2003). A defendant must produce expert testimony on the issue. State v. Eakins, 127 Wn.2d 490, 502, 902 P.2d 1236 (1995). [9] Lewis was convicted on February 9, 2011. On March 10, the parties appeared in court. The State made an oral motion ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT