State v. Eby
| Decision Date | 17 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 25325.,25325. |
| Citation | 37 P.3d 625,136 Idaho 534 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Daniel Lee EBY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
John M. Adams, Chief Kootenai County Public Defender; J. Bradford Chapman, Deputy Public Defender, Coeur d'Alene, for appellant. J. Bradford Chapman argued.
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Alison A. Stieglitz, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Alison A. Stieglitz argued.
Following a jury trial, Daniel Eby was convicted of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit robbery, and attempted robbery. On appeal, Eby asserts that the district court erred by refusing to suppress Eby's incriminating statements made to police, admitting hearsay evidence at trial, and refusing to give a jury instruction requested by Eby. He also contends that his attempted robbery conviction should be vacated because it merges into the first degree murder conviction.
According to the State's evidence, the victim, Mel Evenson, was murdered late in the night of March 25 or early the next morning. On that night, Daniel Eby, Jeremy Schmitz, Cliff Hicks and Evenson were working on cars in a garage belonging to Gerald Smith. Inside the adjacent residence were Smith and several other individuals. While in the garage, Evenson was repeatedly struck in the head with a baseball bat and with a large wrench. His clothing was removed and was then burned in a wood stove in the garage. Evenson's body was wrapped in a tarp and placed in the bed of his own truck. The body was then covered with flattened cardboard boxes, and the truck was abandoned in the countryside.
Approximately one month later, law enforcement officers found Evenson's body. An autopsy revealed that he had died of multiple cranial cerebral injuries due to blunt force impacts to his head. Further investigation led law enforcement officers to the garage where they discovered blood on the wood stove and on a motorcycle. Persons who had been present at Gerald Smith's residence on the night of Evenson's death were questioned by police. Ultimately, Eby was charged with first degree murder, conspiracy to commit robbery and attempted robbery. It was the prosecution's theory that, on the evening in question, Eby, Schmitz and Hicks believed that Evenson was carrying a substantial amount of narcotics and cash because he had just returned from an out-of-town drug transaction, and the three decided to kill Evenson in order to steal his money and drugs. A jury found Eby guilty of all of the charges. The district court imposed a unified life sentence with a twenty-five-year minimum term of imprisonment for first degree murder, and determinate fifteen-year sentences for attempted robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery, with the sentences to be served concurrently.
On appeal, Eby raises four issues. He argues that the district court erred in (1) denying the motion to suppress Eby's incriminating statements made when detectives continued to interrogate Eby after he indicated that he had an attorney; (2) allowing a detective to testify about Schmitz's confession which implicated Eby in the crimes; (3) refusing Eby's request for a jury instruction on a threats and menaces defense; and (4) entering a conviction for attempted robbery which, Eby argues, must be merged into the first degree murder conviction.
Before Eby was arrested or charged in this case, he was twice questioned by law enforcement officers about the Evenson murder. Both times, Eby voluntarily went to the police station for an interview at an officer's request. Before the questioning, officers advised Eby of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel, as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and Eby signed a waiver of these rights. During the first interview, while the officers were explaining their investigation and theory of the case, Eby stated, "I've got an attorney." The officers did not ask Eby to clarify this statement, but continued with their explanation. Later, during questioning, Eby made incriminating statements about his involvement in the murder. During the second interview, Eby made similar statements. After each interview, he was allowed to leave the police station. Sometime later, Eby was arrested. He filed a motion to suppress his self-incriminating statements, asserting that his comment, "I've got an attorney," was an invocation of his right to have counsel present during the questioning. The district court denied the motion, holding that Eby was not in custody when the statements were made and therefore Miranda rights did not attach. On appeal, Eby asserts that the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion.
Under Miranda and its progeny, when a person who is being subjected to custodial interrogation states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present or the suspect himself reinitiates the conversation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602,16 L.Ed.2d 694. We conclude that Eby's suppression motion was properly denied for two reasons. First, Eby has not shown error in the district court's determination that he was not "in custody" when he voluntarily submitted to police questioning.
Second, regardless of whether Eby was "in custody" for Miranda purposes, his oblique reference to his attorney was not an invocation of the right to counsel that obligated the officers to terminate their interrogation. The Miranda restraint on police questioning does not arise unless the request for counsel is clear and unambiguous. In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), the Supreme Court explained:
Id. at 458, 114 S.Ct. at 2355 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
In his appellate argument, Eby relies upon this Court's pre-Davis decision in State v. Moulds, 105 Idaho 880, 673 P.2d 1074 (Ct.App.1983), where we held that when a suspect makes an equivocal request for counsel, police must suspend questioning other than to clarify the request, and that interrogation may resume only if the suspect clarifies that he does not want counsel or the suspect himself reinitiates the dialogue with police. Id. at 888, 673 P.2d at 1082. Eby's argument fails to recognize that our Moulds decision was effectively overruled by Davis, which rejected any requirement that law enforcement officers presented with an ambiguous request for counsel must stop to ask clarifying questions. The Davis decision states:
Of course, when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement it will often be good police practice for the interviewing officers to clarify whether or not he actually wants an attorney .... Clarifying questions help protect the rights of the suspect by ensuring that he gets an attorney if he wants one, and will minimize the chance of a confession being suppressed due to subsequent judicial second-guessing as to the meaning of the suspect's statement regarding counsel. But we decline to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions. If the suspect's statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him.
Id. at 460, 114 S.Ct. at 2356.
Eby's statement, "I've got an attorney," was not an unambiguous request for counsel. Therefore, even if Eby had been in custody, the detectives were not precluded from continuing the interrogation. The district court's denial of Eby's motion to suppress the statements is affirmed.
Before Eby's case went to trial, Schmitz and Hicks also had been arrested for the murder. Schmitz ultimately confessed and pleaded guilty to second degree murder. In his confession, Schmitz said that Eby had initially beaten Evenson with a baseball bat and that Schmitz then hit Evenson with the bat as well. At Eby's trial, Schmitz was called as a witness for the State, but he refused to testify despite an order from the trial court directing him to do so. The State then sought to introduce the substance of Schmitz's confession through the testimony of a detective who had interviewed him. Over Eby's objection, the court allowed this hearsay testimony on the basis that Schmitz's confession fell within the hearsay exception for statements against interest under Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). The district court concluded that evidence admitted under this hearsay exception did not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Eby contends on appeal, as he did below, that the admission of this testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the accused in a criminal prosecution the right to confront adverse witnesses. "The central concern...
To continue reading
Request your trial