State v. Echols

• Decision Date: 03 February 1993
• Docket Number: No. 91-1446-CR,91-1446-CR
• Citation: 175 Wis.2d 653,499 N.W.2d 631
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Veronica F. ECHOLS, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. . Oral Argument
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 631

499 N.W.2d 631

175 Wis.2d 653

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Veronica F. ECHOLS, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

No. 91-1446-CR.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oral Argument Feb. 3, 1993.

Opinion Filed May 6, 1993.

For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by William C. Wolford, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, Atty. Gen.

WILCOX, Justice.

This is a review under sec. (Rule) 809.62, Stats., of an unpublished court of appeals decision affirming a judgment of conviction and an order denying the defendant's post-conviction motions. The defendant was convicted of attempted first degree intentional homicide, party to a crime, in violation of sections 940.01(1), 939.05 and 939.32, Stats. (1989-90), for the attempted murder of her husband, Melvin Echols. Circuit Judge, Robert W. Landry, sentenced the defendant to the maximum twenty years in prison. The defendant raises the following issues for review:

(1) Did the trial court improperly pressure the jury into reaching a verdict by the use of a time constraint?

(2) Did the trial court err by failing to make historical findings of fact on the record to support its denial of the defendant's motion to suppress an incriminating statement she gave to the police?

(3) Did the trial court commit reversible error by failing to allow the defendant to effectively cross-examine Detective Barber?

(4) Did the trial court improperly deny the defendant's motion for a continuance?

(5) Did the trial court err in pronouncing sentence without placing sufficient legal and factual reasons on the record?

We affirm the court of appeals on each of these issues.

Sometime prior to August 14, 1989, the defendant, Veronica Echols, conspired with her son, Terrence Echols a/k/a Terrence Murray, and his friend, Marcus D. Laster, to commit the murder of her husband, Melvin Echols. The defendant offered Marcus Laster $2,500 to kill her husband so she could reap the benefits of his life insurance policy and escape from an alleged abusive relationship.

On the evening of August 14, 1989, Terrence Murray, Marcus Laster and another juvenile went to the home of Melvin Echols. After speaking briefly with Melvin Echols who was sitting in the living room, the three boys went to the basement or the back porch of the house. Shortly thereafter, Marcus Laster re-entered the living room and shot Melvin Echols three times. Melvin Echols survived the shooting and testified that Marcus Laster attempted to shoot him a fourth time, but the gun misfired and Laster fled the scene. The defendant, Veronica Echols, was arrested on August 15, 1989, and charged with party to a crime of attempted first degree intentional homicide.

A jury found the defendant guilty of the crime charged and Circuit Judge, Robert W. Landry, entered a judgment of conviction. Judge Landry sentenced the defendant to the maximum twenty years in prison. Judge Landry denied the defendant's post-conviction motions. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction and the circuit court order denying the defendant's post-conviction motions. We accepted the defendant's petition for review. We now affirm the court of appeals.

I.

The first issue is whether the trial court improperly pressured the jury into reaching a verdict by the use of time constraints. The defendant argues that the trial court coerced the jury into returning a verdict by placing a time constraint of twenty minutes on their deliberations. We conclude that the trial court did not coerce the jury verdict.

This case was sent to the jury at approximately 1:30 p.m. on Friday, March 30, 1990. At 5:00 p.m. the jury returned and reported that they had not reached a verdict, but were very close to doing so. The trial court stated that it would adjourn the case until the next morning at 9:00 a.m. One of the jurors then stated that she had non-refundable airline tickets for 10:25 a.m. the next morning for a job interview and asked whether deliberations could begin earlier. The court stated that it was willing to begin deliberations at 7:30 a.m. the next morning. The juror then asked if the jury could finish that night since they were close to a verdict. Defense counsel suggested that the jury be allowed to deliberate for one more hour. The court stated that it could not do that. The court decided to give the jury another twenty minutes to consider the matter. The court's instructions to the jury made it very clear that the jury should not feel pressured to reach a verdict in that time. The court stated:

THE COURT: All right. Now, I'm going to ask you to do what you choose to do. I want to make it very clear, I want to make it very positive and clear that I'm going to let you go back into the jury room and decide what you want to do. Now, I'm going to give you 20 minutes time in which to do this. I don't want [sic] to use that 20 minutes to do anything impetuous just for the purposes of avoiding any further coming back tomorrow or taking a verdict in some other fashion.

If you can reach a verdict conscientiously and be satisfied that each one of you is operating in--consistent with the evidence, the Court's instructions and your own conscience, I'll permit you to do that, but I want to make it very clear to you that I don't want anybody to feel that this is in any way forcing you into an impetuous decision that is not your free and voluntary choice with all the deliberation that the importance of this case deserves. You're excused.

After more than twenty-five minutes, the jury returned with a guilty verdict.

The defendant argues that the trial court coerced the jury into reaching a verdict within a certain time period by placing any holdout jurors in the position of agreeing to a verdict or causing a fellow juror to miss her plane trip for a job interview. We reject this argument based on our review of the record and relevant case law.

This court long ago stated that "a verdict cannot stand when the jury have been subjected to any statements or directions naturally tending to coerce or threaten them to agreement either way, or to agreement at all, unless it be clearly shown that no influence was thereby exerted." Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 201, 106 N.W. 536 (1906). More recently, the United States Supreme Court stated, "Our review of petitioner's contention that the jury was improperly coerced requires that we consider the supplemental charge given by the trial court 'in its context and under all circumstances.' " Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 237, 108 S.Ct. 546, 550, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). Applying these tests to the present case, we do not believe that in its context and under all circumstances the trial court's instruction to the jury naturally tended to coerce or threaten the jury to agreement.

Prior cases in which this court found that a trial court's instructions coerced a jury verdict involved situations where the jurors faced bodily discomfort and unhealthy conditions if they failed to reach a verdict quickly. See Brown, 127 Wis. 193, 106 N.W. 536 (Two holdout jurors were made seriously ill by cigar smoke of fellow jurors and were informed that they would be locked in the jury room for the night unless they reached a verdict quickly); Mead v. City of Richland Center, 237 Wis. 537, 297 N.W. 419 (1941) (Trial court intimated to the jury that the majority of the jurors were probably correct and that they would be kept in a cold room all night unless they all agreed to a verdict). The instant case does not involve such egregious circumstances.

Our review of the record shows that the trial court did not impose a time limit for a verdict, but told the jury it would have twenty minutes that night to decide what it wanted to do. The jury was informed that it would have time the following day to resume deliberations and the trial court told the jury that deliberations could begin at 7:30 a.m. to accommodate the one juror's travel plans. The trial court's instruction to the jury must be viewed in light of the fact that the foreperson informed the trial court that, "We're very close to a verdict." There was no indication that the jury was deadlocked or that there were any holdout jurors. When the jury returned after twenty-five minutes, the foreperson stated, "Your Honor, we were very close. We have reached a unanimous decision." Further, the trial court instructed the jury not to do anything impetuous. In its context and under all circumstances, the trial court's instruction to the jury did not naturally tend to coerce a verdict.

The defendant asserts that the fact that the jury returned with a verdict within twenty-five minutes of resuming deliberations is evidence of the coercive effect of the trial court's instruction to the jury. We disagree. They jury informed the trial court that they were very close to a verdict. We cannot draw an inference of coercion from the fact that the jury returned with a verdict shortly after receiving a supplemental instruction. See United States v. Dawkins, 562 F.2d 567, 570 (8th Cir.1977). Further, defense counsel's failure to object to the trial court's instruction to the jury, indicates that the potential for coercion was not apparent at the time. ¹ Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 240, 108 S.Ct. at 552.

Important in our conclusion that the guilty verdict was not the product of jury coercion is the fact that the jury was polled right after the announcement of the verdict and all of the jurors individually announced their vote of guilty. In State v. Wojtalewicz, 127 Wis.2d 344, 348, 379 N.W.2d 338 (Ct.App.1985), the court described that the purpose of polling the jury is to test the uncoerced unanimity of the verdict by requiring each juror to answer for himself or herself, thus creating individual responsibility, eliminating any uncertainty as to the announced verdict. Polling the jury allows jurors an opportunity to change their minds about a verdict to which they have...