State v. Edgar

• Decision Date: 10 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. 91,833.,91,833.
• Citation: 127 P.3d 986
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Christy EDGAR, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

127 P.3d 986

STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Christy EDGAR, Appellant.

No. 91,833.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

February 10, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Syllabus by the Court

1. K.S.A.2004 Supp. 22-3210(d) allows for the withdrawal of a plea in the discretion of the court. If the request is made before sentencing, the plea may be withdrawn for good cause shown; if the request is made after sentencing, the plea may be withdrawn to correct manifest injustice.

2. The trial court, in exercising its discretion under K.S.A.2004 Supp. 22-3210(d), should evaluate whether (1) the defendant was represented by competent counsel, (2) the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of, and (3) the plea was fairly and understandingly made.

3. To be constitutionally valid, guilty pleas not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. A keystone of an intelligent plea is for the defendant to be informed of the nature of the charges. Additionally, the defendant must be informed of several constitutional rights that are waived when a plea of guilty is entered. Those rights include: (1) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination; (2) the right to trial by jury; and (3) the right to confront one's accusers. The record must affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pled guilty entered his or her plea understandingly and voluntarily.

4. K.S.A.2004 Supp. 22-3210(a) embodies due process requirements and adds statutory conditions precedent to a plea of guilty or nolo contendere being accepted in a felony case, requiring the court to inform the defendant of the maximum penalty which may be imposed, personally address the defendant, determine whether the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea, and satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea.

5. A failure to strictly comply with the requirements of K.S.A.2004 Supp. 22-3210(a) may be harmless error if a review of the entire record shows the guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily made.

6. The trial court's decision to deny a motion to withdraw a plea will not be disturbed absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. The defendant bears the burden of establishing such an abuse of discretion. Judicial discretion will vary depending upon the character of the question presented for determination. Generally, the trial court's decision is protected if reasonable persons could differ upon the propriety of the decision as long as the discretionary decision is made within and takes into account the applicable legal standards. An abuse of discretion may be found if the trial court's decision goes outside the framework of or fails to properly consider statutory limitations or legal standards.

7. The right to appeal is entirely statutory and not a constitutional right granted by either the Kansas or the United States Constitutions. K.S.A. 22-3602 provides that no direct appeal can be taken from a judgment of conviction after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. As a result, an accused who enters a voluntary plea of guilty waives any defects or irregularities occurring in any of the prior proceedings.

8. The requirement that a plea must be made understandingly does not mean that the trial court must list for an accused all the rulings that preceded a plea and specifically state that there is no right to appeal those rulings.

9. Pursuant to K.S.A.2004 Supp. 22-3210(a)(4), the trial court may accept the plea when the court is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea. To make this determination, the trial court must establish that all elements of the crime charged are present.

10. A factual basis for a plea may be satisfied by a complaint or information given or read to the defendant which sets forth the factual details and essential elements of the particular crime charged; by the evidence presented to the trial court by the prosecutor; by a statement of facts made by the defendant at the hearing; or by evidence admitted at the preliminary hearing if the judge accepting the defendant's plea conducted the defendant's preliminary examination.

11. K.S.A.2004 Supp. 22-3210(a)(4), which requires that the trial court accepting a plea be satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea, leaves it to the court's determination whether the evidence is sufficient to establish the elements of the crime and satisfy the court that the plea is voluntary.

12. Where a defendant is advised of the possibility of imprisonment for life, the requirement of informing the defendant of the maximum possible prison term has been met.

13. A trial court accepting a guilty plea is not required to advise a defendant regarding future parole eligibility, that he or she may not actually be granted parole upon eligibility, or that a consecutive sentence will begin to run only upon the granting of parole on the primary sentence.

Jessica R. Kunen, of Lawrence, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Paul J. Morrison, district attorney, argued the cause, and Steven J. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, and Phill Kline, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion was delivered by LUCKERT, J.:

Christy Edgar (Edgar) pled guilty to first-degree felony murder and two counts of abuse of a child. Edgar then sought to withdraw her plea before she was sentenced. The trial court denied her motion.

Edgar appeals from this ruling, arguing the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to withdraw her plea. More specifically, she argues: (1) her plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made because the court did not inform her she was waiving her right to appeal the trial court's ruling on a pretrial motion for severance of her trial; (2) the trial court violated K.S.A.2004 Supp. 22-3210(a)(4) by failing to inquire of her regarding the factual basis for the plea; and (3) the trial court violated K.S.A.2004 Supp. 22-3210(a)(2) by not adequately explaining the maximum penalty which could be imposed. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea.

Facts and Procedural History

Edgar and two codefendants, Neil Edgar and Chasity Boyd, were charged with the same crimes under separate complaints. Count I of the complaint against Edgar charged felony murder in violation of K.S.A. 21-3401 occurring during the commission of abuse of a child by inflicting cruel and inhuman corporal punishment upon Brian Edgar. Counts II and III charged child abuse in violation of K.S.A. 21-3609 arising from inflicting cruel and inhuman corporal punishment upon Martez and Christina Edgar, respectively, during the time period from May 9, 2002, to December 30, 2002.

A preliminary hearing was conducted on April 17, 2003. Edgar's adopted son, Christon, testified that Edgar and her husband, Neil, adopted Christon, Martez, and Christina, who were biological siblings, in 1997. They adopted Brian a year or two later. At the time of the hearing, Christon was 16 years old, Martez was 12, and Christina was 10. Brian was 9 years old when he died. Chasity Boyd was the Edgars' babysitter and would sometimes stay with the family.

Christon testified that on Saturday, December 28, 2002, Brian was disciplined for stealing food by being bound with duct tape "like a mummy" from his feet to his shoulders, having a sock stuffed in his mouth, and being placed in a room in the basement. The next day, the whole family spent the day at the church where his father was the pastor and his mother was the copastor and evangelist. That evening, when Christon and his father came home, Edgar, Boyd, and Brian were already there. Brian was again wrapped in tape, this time from his legs to his stomach.

Apparently, the plan was to fully tape Brian like a mummy as punishment for having stolen cookies at church. However, upon reaching Brian's stomach, Edgar and Boyd ran out of tape. Edgar and Neil went to the store and purchased more tape and then returned home. Edgar and Boyd stuffed a sock in Brian's mouth and finished taping Brian, taping over his mouth and nose leaving only enough exposed so he could breath through his nostrils. Boyd then put Brian in a small room underneath the basement stairs where he was left for the night on a sleeping bag placed on the concrete floor.

Christon was awakened early the next morning when his mother told him his father had taken Brian to the hospital because he was not breathing. The physician who attempted to treat Brian at KU Medical Center testified that medical personnel were unable to resuscitate Brian because rigor mortis had already set in, indicating he had been dead for a while. An autopsy revealed that Brian died of asphyxiation when he aspirated his own vomit because his mouth and airway were obstructed. There was adhesive material on Brian's head, and there were abrasions in various stages of healing on Brian's extremities, mostly around his wrists and ankles, which the medical examiner considered evidence of abuse.

Investigators noticed that Martez and Christina also had injuries around their wrists similar to Brian's injuries. Christina told a detective that Boyd had tied both Martez and herself with electrical ties at the direction of their mother, Christy Edgar. Another witness testified that she had previously heard Edgar tell Boyd to tie up the children and had seen them tied up.

At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, all of the defendants were bound over for trial. Subsequently, Edgar filed a motion to sever her trial from that of her codefendants. The trial court denied Edgar's motion for severance, ruling that she had failed to establish that the codefendants had antagonistic defenses or that a joint trial would result in actual prejudice.

On the first day of trial,...