State v. Edghill
| Decision Date | 10 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 40477.,40477. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Teddy Lynn EDGHILL, Defendant–Appellant. |
S. Criss James, Soda Springs, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Daphne J. Huang, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Daphne J. Huang argued.
Teddy Lynn Edghill appeals from the district court's order denying his I.C.R. 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for resentencing with respect to the suspension of Edghill's driver's license.
In 1997, Edghill was driving a jeep with several children riding on the front bumper. At one point, Edghill required that the children get inside the jeep and drove to a store. Upon returning from the store, Edghill stopped the jeep and allowed the children to get out and again ride on the front bumper. One of the children either jumped or fell off. Edghill ran over the child with the jeep and the child died a short time later from the injuries sustained in the accident. Edghill was charged with vehicular manslaughter. I.C. § 18–4006(3)(a). He pled guilty and was sentenced to a unified six-year term of incarceration, with a minimum period of confinement of three years. The district court also suspended Edghill's driver's license for life. The district court retained jurisdiction and, at the expiration of the retained jurisdiction period, suspended execution of Edghill's sentence and placed him on probation for four years. However, the lifetime driver's license suspension remained in effect.
Edghill filed an I.C.R. 35 motion, contending that the lifetime suspension of his driver's license was illegal. Edghill also requested leniency in his sentence, seeking a withheld judgment. Following a hearing on Edghill's motion, the district court entered an order denying the request for a withheld judgment. However, the district court took Edghill's motion, insofar as it pertained to the legality of the lifetime suspension of his driver's license, under advisement. On December 22, 1998, the district court issued a separate order finding that the lifetime suspension of Edghill's driver's license was not an illegal sentence. In this order, entitled "Order Amending Judgment Conviction" the distrct court amended the judgment by specifincally adding a provision that it would consider a petition to allow Edghill to apply for a driver's license after the expiration of ten years from the date of the original judgment.
Edghill appealed the district court's order denying his I.C.R. 35 motion. This Court affirmed, holding a lifetime driver's license suspension pursuant to a violation of I.C. § 18–4007(3)(d) was not an illegal sentence. State v. Edghill, 134 Idaho 218, 221, 999 P.2d 255, 258 (Ct.App.2000). After a period of time, Edghill brought various motions seeking relief from his lifetime license suspension consistent with the order amending judgment entered December 22, 1998. In response to one of these motions, the district court afforded Edghill a ninety-day conditional driving permit, which allowed Edghill to drive an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) in a limited capacity. When this conditional permit expired, Edghill again petitioned the district court and was again granted a conditional driving permit to operate an ATV, this time for a period of one year. When the one-year permit expired, Edghill again petitioned the district court and was granted a two-year conditional permit to operate his ATV.
In January 2012, Edghill filed another motion to reinstate his driving privileges.1 The district court denied Edghill's motion and did not grant him any type of conditional driving permit. The district court also ruled the provision of the sentence allowing Edghill to continually petition for driving privileges after ten years was illegal and struck that portion of his sentence.2 The district court left in place the portion of the sentence suspending Edghill's license for life.3 Edghill then filed another I.C.R. 35 motion, claiming the driver's license suspension was illegal. The district court denied the motion and further explained its previous ruling—that a portion of the sentence allowing reinstatement of driving privileges in the district court's discretion after ten years was illegal and needed to be stricken. Edghill appeals from the denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion.
Edghill argues that the modification of his sentence, deleting the opportunity to apply for driving privileges after ten years, is illegal because it constitutes a harsher sentence than the one originally imposed. He also argues that he should be resentenced by the district court with regard to the driver's license suspension.4 The state contends Edghill's argument is barred by invited error and res judicata.
The state argues Edghill is estopped from arguing the district court abused its discretion in striking the illegal portion of his sentence because the alleged error was induced by Edghill's own conduct. The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct.App.1993). One may not complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in. State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985) ; State v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 605, 961 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Ct.App.1998). In short, invited errors are not reversible. State v. Gittins, 129 Idaho 54, 58, 921 P.2d 754, 758 (Ct.App.1996). This doctrine applies to sentencing decisions as well as rulings made during trial. State v. Griffith, 110 Idaho 613, 614, 716 P.2d 1385, 1386 (Ct.App.1986).
Here, the specific relief Edghill sought is not what was granted by the district court. The procedural history of this case indicates the district court sua sponte decided the provision of Edghill's sentence allowing him to reapply for a driver's license was illegal. The district court made this determination after a hearing on a motion for another conditional driving permit. Thus, the doctrine of invited error does not apply in this case.
The state also argues that the doctrine of res judicata applies to preclude Edghill from arguing that his lifetime license suspension is illegal. The doctrine of res judicata bars relitigation of issues that have been previously decided in an action between the same litigants. See State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d 481, 482 (2000) ; State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 210–11, 766 P.2d 678, 680–81 (1988). The issue of whether an action is barred by res judicata is a question of law over which we exercise free review. Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 863, 11 P.3d at 482. In Edghill's direct appeal, he argued that the sentencing provision suspending his driver's license for life was illegal. This Court determined that such suspension was permitted under the applicable statute. To the extent Edghill raises this same argument on appeal from the denial of his I.C.R. 35 motion, it is barred by res judicata. However, the question whether the 2012 modification of the license suspension is illegal was not before this Court in Edghill's earlier appeal, and that issue is not foreclosed.
Edghill argues that, after the district court determined that part of Edghill's sentence was illegal, he should have been resentenced regarding the license suspension instead of the district court excising the portion that provided an opportunity for reinstatement after ten years. In State v. Money, 109 Idaho 757, 710 P.2d 667 (Ct.App.1985), this Court faced a scenario in which the district court initially imposed an illegal sentence. Money was convicted of second degree murder and received an indeterminate twelve-year term, together with a consecutive indeterminate two-year period for the use of a firearm. However, the pertinent statute required a minimum enhancement of three years. Upon its own motion, the district court corrected the sentence by increasing the enhancement period from two years to three years. On appeal, Money argued that he was denied due process when the district court corrected his sentence outside of his presence and that the corrected sentence was invalid. This Court then explained the applicable standard when correcting an illegal sentence:
A trial court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. See I.C.R. 35 ; State v. Mendenhall, 106 Idaho 388, 679 P.2d 665 (Ct.App.1984). Further, when correcting an illegal sentence a trial court is not bound by the terms of the original sentence. Rather, a trial court may resentence to any punishment permitted for the offense under the provisions of the applicable statutes. State v. Lindquist, 99 Idaho 766, 589 P.2d 101 (1979) ; State v. Hoisington, 105 Idaho 660, 671 P.2d 1362 (Ct.App.1983). If the original sentence imposed is determined to be void, a defendant's sentence may be enhanced to comply with the requirements of the law. State v. Aguilar, 98 N.M. 510, 650 P.2d 32 (Ct.App.1982).
Money, 109 Idaho at 759, 710 P.2d at 669. The Court stated that Money's original sentence was invalid and, therefore, sentence was not imposed until the district court corrected the judgment. Thus, the Court held Money was denied due process, as a defendant must be personally present when sentence is pronounced for a felony. I.C. § 19–2503 ; I.C.R. 43(a). The Court further stated that, when a district court corrects a sentence, it should consider the whole sentence, not merely one segment of the whole. Money, 109 Idaho at 760, 710 P.2d at 670. The district court's order in this case demonstrates it failed to consider Edghill's whole sentence (as it pertained to the license suspension) because it incorrectly concluded it lacked the authority to do so.
Likewise, in Lopez v. State, 108 Idaho 394, 700 P.2d 16 (1985), the district court corrected an illegal...
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State v. Villavicencio
...illegality. Therefore, this broad statement in Money is dicta.The most recent opinion in this line of authority is State v. Edghill, 155 Idaho 846, 317 P.3d 743 (Ct.App.2014). There, as part of the defendant's sentence for vehicular manslaughter, the trial court suspended his driver's licen......