State v. Edmunds

Decision Date24 October 1905
Citation104 N.W. 1115,20 S.D. 135
PartiesSTATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Defendant in error, v. HAIDEN C. EDMUNDS, Plaintiff in error.
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

HAIDEN C. EDMUNDS, Plaintiff in error. South Dakota Supreme Court Error to Circuit Court, Clay County, SD Hon. E. G. Smith, Judge Affirmed J. L. Jolley, French & Orvis Attorneys for plaintiff in error. Philo Hall, Attorney General, E. B. Healy, State’s Attorney H. D. Tilton, E. C. Ericson, Aubrey Lawrence, for the State. Opinion filed, Oct. 24, 1905

HANEY, J.

The defendant having been convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, the question arises whether the following indictment is sufficient to sustain such conviction:

“The grand jurors of the state of South Dakota, within and for the county of Clay, duly and legally impaneled, charged and sworn according to law, upon their oaths present: That Haiden C. Edmunds, late of said county, yeoman, on the first day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and four, at the county of Clay and state of South Dakota, did feloniously and willfully make an assault on one Willie J. Williams with a certain wooden club, which he, the said Haiden C. Edmunds, then and there had and held in his hands, and did then and there feloniously and willfully, with the said wooden club as aforesaid, strike and beat the said Willie J. Williams, and then and there, with said wooden club in the manner aforesaid, did inflict on the said Willie J. Williams, on the head of the said Willie J. Williams, one mortal bruise and wound, of which mortal bruise and wound, the said Willie J. Williams thence continually languished until the second day of July, A. D. 1904, on which last-named day the said Willie J. Williams, in said Clay county, of said mortal bruise and wound, did die, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the state of South Dakota.” In this state all the forms of pleading in criminal actions and rules by which the sufficiency of pleadings is to be determined are those prescribed by the Revised Code of Criminal Procedure. Rev. Code Cr. Proc. § 219. An indictment or information must contain. “a statement of the acts constituting the offense, in ordinary and concise language, and in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended.” Id. 221.. “Words used in a statute to define a public offense need not be strictly pursued in the iNdictment or information; but other words conveying the same meaning may be used.” Id. 228.. “No indictment or information is insufficient, nor can the trial, judgment or other proceedings thereon be affected, by reason of a defect or imperfection in matter of form, which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits.” Id. 230. The Revised Penal Code contains this declaration: “No act or omission shall be deemed criminal or punishable except as prescribed or authorized by this Code, or by some of the statutes, which it specifies as continuing in force, or such laws as do not conflict with the provisions of this Code.” Rev. Pen. Code, § 2. What, then, are the essential elements of manslaughter in the first degree as defined by the Penal Code? Does the indictment in this action contain a statement of acts constituting that offense in ordinary and concise language, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended?

So far as applicable to this case, the killing of one human being by another is manslaughter in the first degree. “when perpetrated without a design to effect death and in a heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner, or by means of a dangerous weapon, unless it is committed under such circumstances as constitute excusable or justifiable homicide.” Rev. Pen. Code, §§ 241, 254. The distinction between murder and voluntary manslaughter at common law has been stated in toe following language:

“Voluntary manslaughter is homicide intentionally committed under the influence of passion, suddenly arising from adequate cause, but neither justified nor excused by law. It is distinguished from murder solely by the absence of malice as a constituent element of the crime. It is not the...

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