State v. Edwards

Decision Date20 August 2014
Docket NumberNos. 26847,26849.,s. 26847
Citation853 N.W.2d 246
PartiesSTATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Lloyd E. EDWARDS, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

Marty J. Jackley, Attorney General, Jeffrey P. Hallem, Kelly Marnette, Assistant Attorneys General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.

Abby A. Rehorst of Rena M. Hymans, PC, Sturgis, South Dakota, Attorney for defendant and appellant.

Opinion

WILBUR, Justice.

[¶ 1.] Lloyd Edwards appeals the circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress blood evidence seized without a warrant. He also appeals the circuit court's denial of his motion to strike his 2003 driving under the influence (DUI) conviction from the part II information. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

[¶ 2.] On March 25, 2013, Officer Nathaniel Borg arrested Edwards for driving or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and driving with a revoked license. Officer Borg read the following advisement to Edwards:

DUI Advisement Card

1. I have arrested you for a violation of SDCL 32–23–1.
2. Any person who operates any vehicle in the state has consented to the withdrawal of blood or other bodily substance and chemical analysis.
3. I require that you submit to the withdrawal of your blood (blood, breath, bodily substance).
4. You have the right to an additional chemical analysis by a technician of your own choosing, at your own expense.

[¶ 3.] Officer Borg asked Edwards twice if he understood the advisement, yet Edwards did not respond. Officer Borg then transferred Edwards to the Meade County jail.

[¶ 4.] At the jail, Officer Borg explained to Edwards that blood would be drawn from him and that his refusal would result in the use of a restraint chair in order to forcibly obtain the evidence. Edwards verbally and physically refused to provide a sample of his blood to law enforcement. With the help of another officer, Officer Borg placed Edwards in a restraint chair, held a Taser to Edwards's abdomen, and threatened to use the Taser if Edwards continued to resist. A blood sample was ultimately obtained from Edwards, without the use of the Taser, while he was seated in the restraint chair.

[¶ 5.] On March 27, 2013, Edwards was indicted for driving or control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of SDCL 32–23–1(2), or alternatively, with driving or control of a vehicle while having 0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the blood in violation of SDCL 32–23–1(1). The State filed a part II information alleging that Edwards had two prior DUI convictions within the previous ten years-one conviction in 2003 and one conviction in 2012. Edwards's 2013 charge would constitute a third offense DUI.

[¶ 6.] Edwards filed a motion to strike his 2003 conviction from the part II information. Edwards claimed that his 2003 conviction could not be used to enhance his sentence because his guilty plea was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The circuit court ultimately denied Edwards's motion to strike. Findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding Edwards's motion to strike his 2003 conviction from the part II information and an order denying Edwards's motion to strike were entered on September 17, 2013.1

[¶ 7.] In addition to the motion to strike, Edwards filed a motion to suppress blood evidence seized without a warrant. An evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress was held on June 12, 2013. The circuit court ultimately denied Edwards's motion to suppress. Findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding Edwards's motion to suppress and an order denying the motion were entered on September 17, 2013.2

[¶ 8.] Edwards's jury trial began on September 18, 2013. The jury found Edwards guilty of driving or control of a vehicle while having 0.08 percent or more of alcohol in the blood pursuant to SDCL 32–23–1(1). Based on a stipulation between the parties, the circuit court entered a guilty verdict to the part II information and found the current offense to be a third offense DUI within a ten-year period. Edwards was sentenced to two years in the state penitentiary. Edwards presents two issues for our review:

Whether the circuit court erred in denying Edwards's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw.
Whether the circuit court erred in denying Edwards's motion to strike the 2003 conviction from the part II information.

Pursuant to a notice of review, the State also presents an issue for our review:

Whether the circuit court erred in failing to hold that the warrantless search conducted under South Dakota's implied consent statutes was constitutional.
DECISION
I. Whether the circuit court erred in denying Edwards's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw conducted pursuant to SDCL 32–23–10.

[¶ 9.] We note that in denying the motion to suppress, the circuit court did so pursuant to the “good faith exception to the warrant requirement.3 The circuit court's use of this “warrant exception” was in error, because no such warrant exception exists. Indeed, case law instructs that the good faith exception is an exception to the exclusionary rule. See Davis v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2429, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011) (in discussing the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the United States Supreme Court stated [e]vidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule”); State v. Sorensen, 2004 S.D. 108, ¶¶ 8–9, 688 N.W.2d 193, 196–97 (stating that [u]nder the ‘good faith’ exception [to the exclusionary rule], ‘evidence is admissible when police officers reasonably rely on a warrant that is subsequently invalidated because a judge finds there was an insufficient basis for the issuing magistrate to find probable cause’ (quoting State v. Saiz, 427 N.W.2d 825, 828 (S.D.1988) )). “Good faith” is not one of the few, “well-delineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement. See State v. Zahn, 2012 S.D. 19, ¶ 30, 812 N.W.2d 490, 499. Because we examine a circuit court's grant or denial of a motion to suppress involving an alleged violation of a constitutionally protected right anew, this error is not determinative. See State v. Smith, 2014 S.D. 50, ¶ 14, 851 N.W.2d 719, 723.

[¶ 10.] “The [circuit] court's findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, but we give no deference to the [circuit] court's conclusions of law.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Mohr, 2013 S.D. 94, ¶ 12, 841 N.W.2d 440, 444 ). And although [f]actual findings of the lower court are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, ... once those facts have been determined, ‘the application of a legal standard to those facts is a question of law reviewed de novo.’ State v. Heney, 2013 S.D. 77, ¶ 8, 839 N.W.2d 558, 561–62 (quoting State v. Hess, 2004 S.D. 60, ¶ 9, 680 N.W.2d 314, 319 ).

The Fourth Amendment and blood draws

[¶ 11.] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Likewise, Article VI, § 11 of our state constitution also guarantees our citizens the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.

[¶ 12.] “The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures requires generally the issuance of a warrant by a neutral judicial officer based on probable cause prior to the execution of a search or seizure of a person.” Smith, 2014 S.D. 50, ¶ 15, 851 N.W.2d at 724 (quoting Mohr, 2013 S.D. 94, ¶ 13, 841 N.W.2d at 444 ). “Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, apart from a few, [well-delineated] exceptions[,] Smith, 2014 S.D. 50, ¶ 15, 851 N.W.2d at 724 (first alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hirning, 1999 S.D. 53, ¶ 10, 592 N.W.2d 600, 603 ), and it is the State's burden to prove that the search at issue falls within a well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement. Hess, 2004 S.D. 60, ¶ 23, 680 N.W.2d at 324.

[¶ 13.] This principle applies to the type of search that is the subject of the present appeal, which involves a compelled, warrantless blood draw for alcohol content to be analyzed and used as evidence in a criminal investigation and prosecution. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1412, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (stating that the United States Supreme Court has “long recognized that a ‘compelled intrusio [n] into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content’ must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search” (alteration in original) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767–68, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833–34, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) )). This type of invasion involves the individual's “most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy[.] Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 1616, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985). “Reasonableness of a search depends on balancing the public's interest in preventing crime with the individual's right to be free from arbitrary and unwarranted governmental intrusions into personal privacy.” Hirning, 1999 S.D. 53, ¶ 11, 592 N.W.2d at 603.

Exceptions to warrant requirement

[¶ 14.] As it did in State v. Fierro, 2014 S.D. 62, ¶ 13, 853...

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  • People v. Harris, E060962
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 19 Febrero 2015
    ...... arresting officer read an admonition to the defendant under the Missouri implied consent law, and “explained to [the defendant] that under state law refusal to submit voluntarily to the test would lead to the immediate revocation of his driver's license .. and [his refusal] could be used ...(See, e.g., State v. Edwards......
  • State v. Foster
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    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • 26 Diciembre 2014
    ...and seizure); United States v. Lechliter, 3 F.Supp.3d 400, 408–09 (D.Md.2014) (holding same); State v. Edwards, 2014 S.D. 63, ¶ 19, 853 N.W.2d 246 (holding same).17 Foster's post-conviction motion for resentencing alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective. Nevertheless, his responses t......
  • People v. Harris, E060962
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 19 Febrero 2015
    ...that evidence obtained through pre- McNeely warrantless blood draws could not be suppressed. (See, e.g., State v. Edwards (S.D.2014) 853 N.W.2d 246, 252–254; State v. Reese (App.2014) 353 Wis.2d 266, 844 N.W.2d 396, 401–403 [applying state law precedent based on Leon and its progeny]; Unite......
  • State v. Havatone, CR–15–0387–PR
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    • 9 Marzo 2017
    ......at 579 ¶ 19, 364 P.3d at 1138 (finding good faith exception applied, pre- McNeely , when officer reasonably relied "on the evanescent nature of alcohol in [the DUI suspect's] blood in requesting [in 2012] the blood sample with no warrant"); see also State v. Edwards , 853 N.W.2d 246, 254 ¶ 19 (S.D. 2014) (finding good faith exception applied to officer's warrantless, pre- McNeely blood draw in 2013 when state's case law had held "that the dissipation of alcohol in blood was a per se exigent circumstance sufficient by itself to justify conducting a blood ......
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