State v. Edwards
| Decision Date | 16 November 2000 |
| Docket Number | 87930 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. DONALD EDWARDS, Appellant.Agenda 12-May 2000. In the Supreme Court of Illinois Opinion filed |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Supreme Court Rule 604(d) requires a defendant who wishes to appeal from a judgment entered upon a guilty plea to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court within 30 days of sentencing. 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d). In this case, petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to perfect his appeal by filing a motion to withdraw his guilty plea despite petitioner's numerous requests to do so. The circuit court dismissed the post-conviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit, and the appellate court affirmed (305 Ill. App. 3d 853). We likewise affirm.
Petitioner was charged with two counts of unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Petitioner pleaded guilty to count I, and, in exchange, the State dropped count II and recommended to the trial court that petitioner be sentenced to six years in the Department of Corrections and fined $500. The trial court accepted this fully negotiated plea agreement and sentenced petitioner according to the State's recommendation. The trial court admonished petitioner that, even though he pled guilty, he still had a right to appeal. The court informed petitioner that if he wished to appeal, he must file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea within 30 days of his conviction. Defense counsel filed neither a motion to withdraw guilty plea nor a notice of appeal.
Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se post-conviction petition in Champaign County circuit court alleging, inter alia, that he did not appeal due to the fact that his trial attorney, Diana Lenik, "engaged in illegal conduct, involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation, notwithstanding numerous requests to do so, insofar as to the appeal, and also the trial proceedings, as a whole, to the fullest extent." In his petition, petitioner avers:
The circuit court dismissed the petition, finding the claims in the petition frivolous and patently without merit. The circuit court, construing petitioner's claim regarding his counsel's failure to file an appeal as an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, held that petitioner's claim was meritless because petitioner failed to demonstrate that he had any basis for withdrawing his guilty plea. As a result, the circuit court concluded, petitioner failed to show he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the post-conviction petition, holding that petitioner failed to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel because the petition did not allege how petitioner was prejudiced or why his guilty plea should have been withdrawn. The appellate court recognized that in People v. Moore, 133 Ill. 2d 331 (1990), this court held that the prejudice prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), is not required where counsel fails to perfect defendant's appeal. Prejudice in such cases, the Moore court concluded, is presumed. Moore, 133 Ill. 2d at 339. The appellate court in this case concluded, however, that Moore is distinguishable because the defendant in Moore was convicted after a trial. Unlike the defendant in Moore, petitioner in this case does not have an automatic right to an appeal, the appellate court reasoned, because he entered a fully negotiated guilty plea. In the view of the appellate court, a defendant who pleads guilty does not need the safety net of an appeal to protect against a wrongful conviction. The appellate court noted that there are very few grounds for withdrawing a guilty plea; therefore, a defendant does not need the legal expertise of counsel to allege that his guilty plea was involuntary.
When a defendant files a post-conviction petition in a noncapital case, the circuit court first must determine independently whether the petition is frivolous and patently without merit. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996); see 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1998). The circuit court makes no factual inquiries into the petitioner's allegations at this stage of the proceedings; the court's inquiry is limited solely to the sufficiency of the allegations in the petition. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 387 (1998). To survive dismissal at this stage, a petition need only present the "gist" of a constitutional claim. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 418. Our review of a dismissal of a post-conviction petition at this stage of the proceedings is de novo. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 387-89.
Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to perfect his appeal by filing a motion to withdraw his guilty plea despite petitioner's numerous requests to do so. Under Strickland, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show (1) that counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 692, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 696, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2067.
In People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93 (1988), defense counsel filed notices of appeal after defendants pled guilty. Defense counsel, however, failed to file motions to withdraw defendants' guilty pleas. Under Supreme Court Rule 604(d), the filing of such a motion is a prerequisite for an appeal. Rule 604(d) provides in relevant part: 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).
This court held that the appropriate remedy for defense counsel's failure to perfect defendants' right to appeal lies in the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 107. We held: Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 107-08.
The State argues that petitioner's post-conviction petition was properly dismissed because petitioner did not allege any basis for the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that in People v. Moore, 133 Ill. 2d 331 (1990), this court abandoned the requirement established in Wilk that a petitioner must allege meritorious grounds for withdrawal of his guilty plea in his post-conviction petition in order to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.
In Moore, a jury convicted defendant of murder and attempted armed robbery. Defense counsel filed a timely notice of appeal, but the appellate court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution when defense counsel failed to file a docketing statement. This court reinstated defendant's appeal, reiterating the holding in Wilk that post-conviction proceedings are the appropriate remedy for counsel's failure to perfect an appeal. In Moore, however, we stated that no showing of prejudice is required where counsel failed to perfect defendant's appeal. Prejudice, we concluded, is presumed. Moore, 133 Ill. 2d at 339.
We believe that petitioner's failure to give any grounds for withdrawal of his guilty plea to his trial counsel should be considered under the first prong of Strickland. In a criminal case, a defendant's notice of appeal need not specify the grounds for his appeal. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 606(d). A notice of appeal simply describes the judgment or order, lists the name and address of defendant and his attorney, and states that defendant wishes to appeal. 134 Ill. 2d R. 606(d). Thus, the filing of a notice of appeal is a ministerial task. The filing of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, which is a prerequisite to the notice of appeal, however, is not a ministerial task. Rule 604(d) requires a defendant who files a motion to withdraw his guilty plea to specify the grounds for withdrawal of the plea. 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d) ().
In this case, petitioner merely alleges that he instructed his attorney "to file an appeal." Petitioner...
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