State v. Edwards
| Decision Date | 23 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 35986.,35986. |
| Citation | 118 A.3d 615,158 Conn.App. 119 |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Marcello Anthony EDWARDS. |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
158 Conn.App. 119
118 A.3d 615
STATE of Connecticut
v.
Marcello Anthony EDWARDS.
No. 35986.
Appellate Court of Connecticut.
Argued Jan. 7, 2015.
Decided June 23, 2015.
Owen Firestone, certified legal intern, and Alice Osedach, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Laurie N. Feldman, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and Thomas R. Garcia, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
SHELDON, PRESCOTT and FLYNN, Js.
Opinion
SHELDON, J.
The defendant, Marcello Anthony Edwards, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered against him after a jury trial, of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–59 (a)(1) and the revocation of his probation for having violated General Statutes § 53a–32. On appeal, the defendant claims that his conviction should be reversed and that this case should be remanded for a new trial on grounds that the trial court violated his due process right to a fair trial by (1) failing to inquire, sua sponte, as to his continuing competency to stand trial despite his irrational behavior following an earlier determination of his competency; and (2) conducting critical stages of the proceedings against him in his absence, without either advising him of his right to attend such proceedings or canvassing him as to whether he wanted to waive that right. We reject both claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to the appeal. The victim, Vanessa Lindo, met the defendant when she was fifteen and he was twenty or twenty-one years old. They began dating at that time and eventually had two children together, Joshua and Sada. The defendant physically abused the victim during their relationship. On one occasion, the defendant attacked the victim while she was at work, forcing her to lock herself in the office of a coworker to escape physical harm. On another occasion, when the defendant and the victim argued, he punched her in the head, splitting her lip and rupturing her eardrum. In August, 2009, the relationship ended, and the defendant moved out of the victim's home.
On November 16, 2011, the defendant took Sada to McDonald's after school and later brought her back
to his mother's house, where he then lived. Shortly thereafter, the victim arrived to pick up Sada and take her home. Upon returning home, the victim called Joshua, who was home alone, and asked him to unlock the door to let them in the house. As the victim approached the house, however, the defendant accosted her and stabbed her repeatedly in the head, chest, arm, and thigh. When the victim cried out for help, the defendant fled. Joshua ran to the entry of the house, where he saw the
victim, lying on the ground, bleeding. He dragged his mother into the house and called 911. After the victim was taken to a hospital, Joshua texted the defendant, “You're not gonna get away with it. You're going to jail.” The defendant responded by text, “Fuck you.”
Thereafter, the defendant was arrested and charged with assault in the first degree and violation of probation. The defendant pleaded not guilty to both charges and elected a jury trial on the assault charge. On May 30, 2012, the date on which the defendant's jury selection was scheduled to begin, the court, Randolph, J., ordered that the defendant undergo a competency evaluation pursuant to General Statutes § 54–56d.1 Under
the court's order, the defendant was evaluated
by a
clinical team at the MacDougall–Walker Correctional Institution, which prepared and submitted a report stating its findings. At a subsequent hearing on the defendant's competency, held on August 1, 2012, the court, Vitale, J., heard testimony from Jane St. Laurent, a member of the clinical team, who summarized the report as follows. The defendant was “unable to discuss [his] case in a rational manner.” Whereas a typical interview lasts for at least one hour to one and one-half hours, and includes a discussion of the examinee's background, a mental status examination and a review of the pending criminal charges, the defendant “talked over” the evaluators, could not be interrupted, and walked out of the interview after approximately twenty minutes.2 On the basis of its observations, the team determined that the defendant did “not have the ability to develop a productive or collaborative relationship with an attorney.” The team thus concluded that the defendant was “not able to understand the proceedings
against him and ... not able to assist in his defense.” The team further concluded, however, that there was a substantial probability that the defendant could be restored to competency with psychiatric evaluation and treatment. It therefore recommended that he be committed for that purpose for a period of sixty days.
The court adopted the team's findings by a preponderance of the evidence, and thus found the defendant incompetent to stand trial. Consistent with the team's recommendations, the court ordered the defendant to participate in an inpatient treatment program at the Whiting Forensic Division of the Connecticut Valley Hospital (Whiting), and continued his case for sixty days for further proceedings with respect to his competency.
On September 26, 2012, after the sixty day period had ended, the court, Dewey, J., convened a hearing for the purpose of
reassessing the defendant's competency. At the commencement of the hearing, the court noted that it had received a new competency evaluation report, dated September 18, 2012, which had been authored by Harry Hernandez, a competency monitor at Whiting who had served as a member of the clinical team that had evaluated the defendant.
Hernandez testified at the hearing in a manner consistent with his report. He stated that the defendant initially was cooperative during treatment and was described by his attending physicians as “calm ... and articulate with no sign of major mood disorder or psychotic disorder.” Accordingly, the defendant's attending psychiatrist did not make any specific diagnosis of him, and no medications were administered to him during his hospitalization. Hernandez further reported, however, that the defendant later “exhibited a significant change in his motivation to attain competency. At the beginning of his hospital stay, he demonstrated
factual knowledge of the judicial processes, including roles and functions of court personnel and court proceedings, as well as the importance of working with his attorney. After several weeks his motivation decreased and he began claiming that he was not competent as he did not know roles of courtroom personnel or court proceedings. The treatment team assessed this as not credible and inconsistent with the way in which one's memory functions and as a sign of his poor motivation to obtain competence.” The team thus unanimously concluded that the defendant had the capacity to assist in his defense and was competent to stand trial.
The defendant shouted out during Hernandez' testimony, stating, “[Y]ou're lying, okay, I can't work with no attorney, you know that, okay. I can't work with no attorney, okay.” The defendant, after being warned by the court that his behavior would necessitate his removal, continued to interject. As a result, he was removed from the courtroom for the remainder of the competency hearing.3
The court ultimately found that the defendant was competent to stand trial. It found no evidence that the defendant could not work with an attorney or understand the proceedings against him. On the contrary, it found that the defendant “can do it when he chooses to ... it's a matter of choice, not of ability.”
Jury selection began on November 13, 2012. At the outset, the defendant questioned the court's authority to preside over his case.4 The defendant also refused to change out of his prison clothes, even though he had been informed by the court that prospective jurors would see him wearing them. The court then inquired
of defense counsel whether he had observed any change in the defendant's mental condition since the court had found him competent. Defense counsel responded that the defendant's condition and demeanor were unchanged since that time.
During voir dire, the defendant attempted repeatedly to discuss the merits of his case with venirepersons. At one point, he read aloud...
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...a defendant's competency is the same regardless of whether the defendant was previously found incompetent. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 158 Conn.App. 119, 134–37, 118 A.3d 615, cert. denied, 318 Conn. 906, 122 A.3d 634 (2015) ; State v. Bigelow, 120 Conn.App. 632, 638, 643–44, 994 A.2d 204,......
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Edwards v. Warden, CV134005574S
...claim. The court finds the issues for the respondent and denies the petition. I Procedural History In the criminal matter State v. Marcello Edwards, HHD-CR11-655805, in the Hartford Judicial District, petitioner, on December 11, 2012, was convicted of Assault in the first degree in violatio......
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State v. Wood
...be made aware of his right to return. See State v. Drakeford, supra, 202 Conn. at 81, 519 A.2d 1194 ; see also State v. Edwards, 158 Conn.App. 119, 142–44, 118 A.3d 615 (2015).The court was well within its discretion to send defense counsel to advise her client of his right to attend the he......
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State v. Hines
...defendant's competency is the same regardless of whether the defendant was previously found incompetent. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 158 Conn. App. 119, 134-37, 118 A.3d 615, cert. denied, 318 Conn. 906, 122 A.3d 634 (2015); State v. Bigelow, 120 Conn. App. 632, 638, 643-44, 994 A.2d 204, ......