State v. Edwards
| Citation | 498 P.2d 48,209 Kan. 681 |
| Decision Date | 10 June 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 46623,46623 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Edna EDWARDS, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Kansas |
Syllabus by the Court
1. K.S.A.1971 Supp. 21-3205, effective July 1, 1970, which holds a person criminally responsible if he intentionally aids or abets another to commit a crime makes no change in the degree of proof of intent necessary to establish criminal responsibility.
2. The element of intnet necessary to establish and support criminal responsibility for aiding or abetting another to commit a crime may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.
3. The existence of criminal intent in aiding or abetting another to commit a crime may be presumed or inferred from circumstances surrounding the perpetration of the crime and is a fact question for jury determination.
4. Before a verdict approved by the trial court may be set aside on appeal because of insufficiency of the evidence, it must clearly appear that on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support a conviction.
5. In a conviction of aggravated battery based upon liability for the crime of another the record is examined and it is held there was sufficient substantial evidence of defendant's participation from which the requisite criminal intent might be inferred.
Lyle P. Baker, of Sowers, Sowers, Carson & Johnston, Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellant.
Reese C. Jones, Deputy County Atty., argued the cause, and Vern Miller, Atty., Gen., and Keith Sanborn, County Atty., were with him on the brief, for appellee.
Mr. Edna Edwards, Jr., was convicted of the crime of aggravated battery as defined in K.S.A.1971 Supp. 21-3414. The victim, Thomas A. Eggleston, was stabbed in the back with a paring knife by Ronald E. Martin, an associate and companion of the defendant Edwards.
Martin was convicted of aggravated robbery and of aggravated assault based upon the same acts. The events giving rise to the present charge against Edwards are set forth in State v. Martin, 208 Kan. 950, 495 P.2d 89.
In the present appeal Edwards contends that his conviction should be set aside because the evidence failed to establish an essential element of the crime of aiding and abetting. He argues that Martin committed the act for which defendant was convicted and that under K.S.A.1971 Supp. 21-3205 he is not liable for the crime of another unless there is direct proof he intentionally aided and abetted Martin in the commission of the crime. The degree of proof of criminal intent to aid and abet another in a crime is the bone of contention.
The evidence in the record indicates that the defendant Edwards, Ronald E. Martin and two women were together on the morning Thomas A. Eggleston was stabbed and robbed in his home. It appears from defendant's own testimony that he furnished the car and drove his three companions to the Eggleston home.
The two women had been to the Eggleston home two hours before. They had remained only a few minutes and then left without explanation. They reappeared at 4:30 or 5:00 o'clock that morning in the company of Edwards and Martin. Eggleston and a cab driver by the name of Sumral were the only persons in the house when the quartet arrived. The four were apparently admitted into the house by Eggleston, who was drunk at the time. On entering the house the defendant looked at the furniture and indicated by comment 'they could make a killing there.' The defendant immediately engaged the cab driver, who was a new-found friend of Eggleston, in conversation and the two withdrew from the group into another room. The cab driver tried to persuade the defendant to leave the premises but the defendant told him the girls had been insulted by Eggleston when they were at the house two hours before.
While the defendant and the cab driver were in the next room, defendant's companions were occupied with Eggleston a short distance away in the hallway. The cab driver heard a commotion and went to the hallway. He saw Eggleston lying on the floor bleeding from stab wounds. Martin and the two women were standing next to him. Thereafter the victim Eggleston saw the defendant Edwards carry away a radio. He saw one of the women carry away a jewelry box containing over $200 in cash. Other personal property belonging to Eggleston, including a television set, was found missing.
The four early morning visitors left the Eggleston home at approximately the same time. It can be inferred the Edwards car was used by the quartet in hauling the loot away. Eggleston was helped into his bedroom by the cab driver and the police were called. Additional details of the episode can be found in State v. Martin, supra.
The defendant Edwards, Ronald E. Martin and Janet L. Williams were jointly charged in two counts of an information as principals in the crimes. The first count charged the three individuals with the aggravated robbery of Thomas A. Eggleston under K.S.A.1971 Supp. 21-3427. The second count charged the three with aggravated battery against the person of Thomas A. Eggleston under K.S.A. Supp. 21-3414. Edwards was tried separately. He was acquitted on the charge of aggravated robbery but was convicted of aggravated battery. He has appealed from this conviction.
This is the first occasion that this court's attention has been specifically directed to the section of the Kansas Criminal Code (L.1969, ch. 180, effective July 1, 1970) dealing with the subject of liability for crimes of another. The code was the result of work undertaken by the Kansas Judicial Council. The council's comments on the code appear immediately following each section of the statute. K.S.A1971 Supp. 21-3205, which relates to liability for crimes of another, follows the Minnesota code according to the council's comments. This new section was intended to supersede K.S.A. 21-105 which spoke in terms of principals in the first and second degrees and accessories before the fact, even though all were laible to the same extent for a crime. See State v. Yohe, 203 Kan. 855, 457 P.2d 12 K.S.A.1971 Supp. 21-3205 reads as follows:
'(2) A person liable under subsection (1) hereof is also liable for any other crime committed in pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable by him as a probable consequence of committing or attempting to commit the crime intended.
'(3) A person liable under this section may be charged with and convicted of the crime although the person alleged to have directly committed the act constituting the crime lacked criminal capacity or has not been convicted or has been acquitted or has been convicted of some other degree of the crime or of some other crime based on the same act.'
The council in its comments indicates that, although the principles of liability set forth in the section do not refer to principals and accessories, no change in the substance of the former body of law was intended when the new section was drafted.
Defendant's main contention is that subsection (1) of this statute requires direct proof beyond a reasonable doubt of actual intention or at least forseeability on his part for Martin to commit the aggravated battery upon the person of Thomas A. Eggleston. Defendant insists that he was merely furnishing the transportation for his companions, that he was acquitted of any participation in the robbery and that it was not forseeable that his companion Martin would stab Eggleston in the back with a paring knife. The difficulty in accepting this reasoning stems from the faulty premise that his acquittal on the robbery charge somehow placed him in the position of being an innocent bystander in the whole affair.
An acquittal of defendant on the aggravated robbery charge does not prevent the use of evidence introduced which supports a conviction on the related crime of aiding and abetting Martin to commit the aggravated battery arising from the same set of facts. In an analogous situation this court has held that although a burglary charge may be void a conviction of larceny in...
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