State v. Edwards, No. 2005AP1022-CR (WI 3/7/2006)
| Decision Date | 07 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2005AP1022-CR.,2005AP1022-CR. |
| Parties | State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Terrance Lovell Edwards, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: JEFFREY A. CONEN, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J., Curley and Kessler, JJ.
Terrance Lovell Edwards, pro se, appeals from a judgment of conviction after he plead guilty to the charge of armed robbery contrary to WIS. STAT. § 943.32(2) (2003-04)1 and an order denying motions for postconviction relief. Edwards raises six instances of error, which he claims warrant vacating his conviction. Because all of Edwards's claims lack merit, we affirm.
¶2 We summarize and paraphrase the facts that were stipulated to by Edwards and the State. On February 19, 2003, at 10:00 a.m. at a branch of the M&I Bank located at 2120 West Wisconsin Avenue in the City and County of Milwaukee, Edwards approached the teller window of employee, Larita Smith. Edwards handed her a note. The note stated: "I have a gun, don't be stupid, give me all of the one hundreds, fifties and twenties." Smith counted out seven one hundred dollar bills and gave them to Edwards. She gave him the money because she was afraid of the message in the note. She believed that Edwards was serious and that he had a weapon. Edwards then left the bank with the money. A security guard unsuccessfully tried to stop Edwards as he left the bank.
¶3 A short time later after a chase, Edwards was apprehended by police officers. As he was stopped, police officers observed him drop the one hundred dollar bills. The police brought Edwards back to the bank where he was identified by employees of the bank. The police recovered the threatening note, which was later determined to contain Edwards's fingerprints. He later admitted committing the offense at the M&I Bank. After his plea of guilty, Edwards, on four different occasions, brought motions claiming error. They were all denied and now Edwards appeals. Additional historical facts will be set forth as we examine the various claims of error raised by Edwards.
¶4 In reviewing Edwards's challenges to his conviction, we shall examine them in the chronological order normally occurring in the initiation, prosecution, and conduct of a criminal proceeding.
¶5 Edwards first claims, in essence, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over his person because the complaint issued against him was invalid. We deem the issue raised by Edwards to be one of law. It is fundamental to our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that "a police officer may arrest without [a] warrant one believed by the officer, upon reasonable cause, to have been guilty of a felony ...." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925). Our supreme court has declared that "a complaint supported by probable cause serves as `the jurisdictional requirement for holding a defendant for a preliminary examination or other proceedings.'" State ex rel. Zdanczewicz v. Snyder, 131 Wis. 2d 147, 151-52, 388 N.W.2d 612 (1986) (citation omitted). Subsequently, the court ruled "the existence of a valid complaint supported by probable cause defeated any claim by the defendant that the circuit court lost personal jurisdiction over him due to an illegal arrest." State v. Moats, 156 Wis. 2d 74, 89-90, 457 N.W.2d 299 (1990).
¶6 A criminal complaint is deemed issued when, by a written endorsement, it is approved for filing by a district attorney or any of his or her deputies or assistants. WIS. STAT. §§ 968.02(1) and 967.03. WISCONSIN STAT § 971.31(6) provides that if a case is dismissed because of a defect in the criminal complaint, the court may order that the defendant be held in custody for not more than seventy-two hours pending the issuance or filing of a new complaint.
¶7 As indicated above, Edwards was apprehended within minutes of the robbery in close proximity to the bank. He matched the physical description of the bank robber and was found to have in his control the same denomination of bills that the robber took from the bank.
¶8 The record reflects that although the original complaint was dismissed because of a defect, a new complaint was issued one day later, satisfying the calls of WIS. STAT. § 971.31(6). The reissued complaint set forth the charges against Edwards, and why the investigation was focused upon Edwards. The complaint was properly dated and signed by the complaining witness and an assistant district attorney. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Edwards.
¶9 Second, Edwards claims he was denied his statutory right to a timely preliminary hearing. We are not persuaded.
¶10 "There is no federal or state constitutional right to a preliminary hearing in Wisconsin." State v. Gillespie, 2005 WI App 35, ¶4, 278 Wis. 2d 630, 693 N.W.2d 320. "[T]he right to a preliminary examination is solely a statutory right." State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 394, 359 N.W.2d 151 (1984). WISCONSIN STAT. § 970.03(2) provides:
The preliminary examination shall be commenced within 20 days after the initial appearance of the defendant if the defendant has been released from custody or within 10 days if the defendant is in custody and bail has been fixed in excess of $500. On stipulation of the parties or on motion and for cause, the court may extend such time.
¶11 Failure to hold a preliminary hearing within the statutory time limits results in a loss of personal jurisdiction. Because the right to a preliminary hearing is solely a statutory right, the statutory scheme must govern. If a defendant, while in custody, pursues a procedure that subverts one of the primary purposes of WIS. STAT. § 970.03(2), he or she will not be heard to claim foul. See State v. Horton, 151 Wis. 2d 250, 256, 445 N.W.2d 46 (Ct. App. 1989).
¶12 Of further important policy concern in our state is the necessity to assure that every defendant in a criminal proceeding is competent throughout. The court shall proceed with a competency proceeding "whenever there is reason to doubt a defendant's competency to proceed." WIS. STAT. § 971.14(1)(a). Once such doubt exists, the court is required to appoint one or more examiners to perform a competency examination. WIS. STAT. § 971.14(2).
¶13 On March 7, 2003, at Edwards's initial appearance, his counsel requested a competency evaluation. As a result, the proceedings were suspended and a doctor's examination report was ordered. Once the exam was completed, counsel for Edwards challenged the conclusions of the report and requested a hearing. On April 8, 2003, after a hearing, the court found Edwards competent to proceed. The court then set a preliminary hearing at the earliest possible date, April 22, 2003. Edward's counsel then withdrew, which caused further delay to appoint new counsel. Finally, the court scheduled a preliminary hearing on May 8, 2003. When Edwards appeared for the hearing, he waived his right to have it held.
¶14 There are two reasons Edwards was not denied his right to a timely preliminary hearing. First, he needed to have his competency tested, which is not in the scheme of WIS. STAT. § 970.03(2). Once that occurred, there is no mandatory date upon which a preliminary hearing must be held. Second, he waived his right to the preliminary hearing the very day it was to occur after the competency determination and the changes of counsel had delayed it. "[W]hen a defendant waives a preliminary hearing, he or she waives any inquiry into the offense charged in the complaint ...." State v. Michels, 141 Wis. 2d 81, 89, 414 N.W.2d 311 (Ct. App. 1987). Thus, this claim of error fails.
¶15 Third, Edwards claims he was denied his right to a speedy trial. We are not persuaded.
¶16 The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under article I, section 7, of the Wisconsin Constitution. Under the state and federal constitutions "`the right to a speedy trial arises with the initial step of the criminal prosecution, i.e., the complaint and warrant.'" State v. Ziegenhagen, 73 Wis. 2d 656, 664, 245 N.W.2d 656 (1976) (quoting State ex rel. Fredenberg v. Bryne, 20 Wis. 2d 504, 508, 123 N.W.2d 305 (1963)). The remedy for the denial of a speedy trial is a dismissal of the conviction with prejudice. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439-40 (1973).
¶17 To determine whether an accused was denied his or her right to receive a speedy trial, we use the balancing test the United States Supreme Court established in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). In Day v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 236, 244, 212 N.W.2d 489 (1973), the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the Barker test. In Barker, the Court identified four factors to be used in a speedy trial inquiry: "Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." 407 U.S. at 530. Barker requires that we first determine whether the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial. Id. If it is, then we must balance the four Barker factors under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 530-31. If it is not presumptively prejudicial, there was no violation of the speedy trial right and we need not proceed to the balancing of the four factors. Id. at 530.
¶18 The United States Supreme Court has noted that: "Depending on the nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally found post-accusation delay `presumptively prejudicial' at least as it approaches one year." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992) (citations omitted). Our Wisconsin Supreme Court has similarly determined that a twelve-month delay between a preliminary exam and trial was presumptively prejudicial. See Green v. State, 75...
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