State v. Effler

• Citation: 769 N.W.2d 880
• Decision Date: 17 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 06-1417.,06-1417.
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. James Carson EFFLER, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

769 N.W.2d 880

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. James Carson EFFLER, Appellant.

No. 06-1417.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 17, 2009.

Angela L. Campbell of Dickey & Campbell Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Jeff Noble and Frank Severino, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.

TERNUS, Chief Justice.

The State convicted James Effler of first-degree kidnapping for taking a two-year-old girl to the men's bathroom of the Des Moines Central Library and sexually abusing her. Effler appealed his conviction, claiming the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements made during an interrogation after he had requested counsel. He also asserts he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to challenge the statements under the Iowa Constitution. The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed, and we granted further review.

After reviewing the record and considering the arguments presented, the justices are equally divided on the issue of whether the motion to suppress should have been granted.¹ The Iowa Code provides: "When the supreme court is equally divided in opinion, the judgment of the court below shall stand affirmed, but the decision of the supreme court is of no further force or authority." Iowa Code § 602.4107 (2009). Because the court of appeals reversed the district court, we are faced with contrary decisions by the lower courts. Therefore, we must construe section 602.4107 to determine whether "the judgment of the court below" that is affirmed by operation of law is the decision of the court of appeals or that of the district court.

To resolve this question, we are required to determine the legislature's intent. IBP, Inc. v. Harker, 633 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 2001). That intent is reflected in the words chosen by the legislature. State v. Stone, 764 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Iowa 2009). We give words their ordinary meaning, unless the legislature has defined a term or the words have an established meaning in law. Id. In determining legislative intent, we consider a statute in its entirety, Schadendorf v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 757 N.W.2d 330, 337 (Iowa 2008), and together with other related statutes and rules, State v. Kostman, 585 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 1998).

We begin with an analysis of the statutory language. The legislature identified the object of automatic affirmance as a "judgment" of the court below. A review of our rules of civil procedure reveals the following definition of "judgment": "Every final adjudication of any of the rights of the parties in an action is a judgment." Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.951; accord Black's Law Dictionary 858 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "judgment" as "[a] court's final determination of the rights and obligations of the parties in a case," and "includes an equitable decree and any order from which an appeal lies"). Viewing this definition in context and together with related rules convinces us that the term "judgment" has reference to the decision of a district court, not of the court of appeals.

As noted the quoted definition of "judgment" appears in the rules of civil procedure. There is no corresponding definition in the rules of appellate procedure indicating an appellate decision is also a "judgment." An official comment to rule of civil procedure 1.951 discusses the issue of when a "judgment" is appealable, again indicating the term refers to a district court judgment. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.951 official cmt. Although the word "judgment" also appears in the appellate rules, the term is used to refer to decisions of district courts. See, e.g., Iowa R.App. P. 6.101(1) (b) (2009) ("A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the filing of the final order or judgment."); id. r. 6.905(2)(b)(4) ("The appendix shall contain ... [a] file-stamped copy of the judgment, order, or decision in question."). In addition, appellate courts do not enter a judgment on appeal; the supreme court and court of appeals remand cases for entry of judgment by the district court. See, e.g., State v. Cowles, 757 N.W.2d 614, 615 (Iowa 2008) (remanding criminal case "for entry of a judgment reinstating the mandatory minimum sentence"); Hook v. Lippolt, 755 N.W.2d 514, 517 (Iowa 2008) (remanding civil case "for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants"); Sheeder v. Boyette, 764 N.W.2d 778, 779 n. 2 (Iowa Ct.App.2009) (remanding civil case for entry of a default judgment); State v. Nickens, 644 N.W.2d 38, 43 (Iowa Ct.App.2002) (remanding criminal case "for entry of judgment of acquittal"). If a term used in a statute has a well-settled legal meaning, we assume the legislature was aware of this meaning when it enacted the statute. Miller v. Marshall County, 641 N.W.2d 742, 748 (Iowa 2002). Therefore, the legislature's use of the word "judgment" clearly evidences an intent that the district court's decision be automatically affirmed, not that of the court of appeals.

Our conclusion is entirely consistent with our deflective appellate structure, which supports the conclusion that the reference to "lower court" in section 602.4107 refers to the district court, not the court of appeals. The Iowa Constitution established the supreme court and its jurisdiction. Iowa Const. art. V, §§ 1, 4. The legislature established the court of appeals. Iowa Code § 602.5101. Under the deflective system of review established by the legislature, the court of appeals' jurisdiction

is limited to those matters for which an appeal or review proceeding properly has been brought before the supreme court, and for which the supreme court pursuant to section 602.4102 has entered an order transferring the matter to the court of appeals.

Id. § 602.5103(3). Once a transfer has been made, the supreme court no longer has jurisdiction of the matter, unless a party seeks further review of the court of appeals decision. Id. § 602.4102(2), (4).

After the court of appeals decides a case transferred to it by the supreme court, a party may ask the supreme court for further review. Id. § 602.4102(4). The filing of the application for further review stays the judgment of the district court and the mandate of the court of appeals pending the action of the supreme court. Id. § 602.5106(2). If the supreme court does not grant further review, the court of appeals decision is final. Id. If the supreme court grants the application for further review, the supreme court once again obtains jurisdiction over the matter. Id. § 602.4102(2), (4).

When a case comes back to the supreme court on further review, our court reviews the district court decision, not that of the court of appeals. This focus on further review does not mean that we automatically vacate decisions of the court of appeals when further review is taken. To the contrary, efficient use of judicial resources will sometimes prompt our court to rely on the disposition made by the court of appeals on some issues and address only those issues that merit additional consideration. Moreover, if upon our review of the district court decision we come to the same conclusion as the court of appeals, we often choose to affirm the court of appeals decision with respect to those issues upon which there is agreement. These actions should not, however, confuse others regarding the object of our review, which remains the district court decision. An additional significant aspect of our review procedure is the fact that, when we remand a case, the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings, not to the court of appeals. Consequently, based on the deflective appellate structure adopted by the legislature, we are firmly convinced the phrase "judgment of the court below" as used in section 602.4107 refers to the district court decision, the decision the supreme court is reviewing when it grants an application for further review.

We conclude section 602.4107 requires that, when the supreme court is equally divided on an issue upon which the district court and court of appeals differ, the decision of the district court is affirmed by operation of law. Accordingly, in the case before us, the decision of the court of appeals is vacated, and the judgment of the district court is affirmed by operation of law pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.4107.

AFFIRMED BY OPERATION OF LAW.

STREIT, Justice.

I would affirm the district court's ruling the confession was valid. This case is simple. Effler said that he wanted a lawyer "if I go to jail." Since he did not go to jail before he confessed, he was not deprived of his request for counsel. Effler's request for counsel was conditional and ambiguous under the standard set forth in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362, 371 (1994), and, therefore, he did not unequivocally invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.

I. Background Facts.

On our de novo review of the record, we find the following facts. On the morning of October 4, 2005, Melissa Martin was babysitting J.M., a two-year-old girl, for the first time. Martin took J.M. to the Des Moines Central Library. Martin stood at a fifteen-minute internet station, and J.M. stood beside her leg. A few minutes later, Martin noticed J.M. was no longer there and began calling out her name. One of the librarians began a search for the child and remembered seeing Effler handing a toy to a toddler girl. The librarian suggested checking the men's bathroom. Martin and the librarian rushed over to the men's bathroom. The librarian tried to open it with her key, but it was locked from inside. They started pounding on the door calling the child's name. They heard two "bloodcurdling" screams followed by silence. The librarian asked her staff to call the maintenance man, who pried the lock open with a screwdriver. Inside the bathroom, they found a shirtless Effler kneeling next to J.M., who was...