State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev.

• Court: Nevada Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: By the Court, STIGLICH, J.
• Citation: State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 521 P.3d 1215 (Nev. 2022)
• Decision Date: 30 December 2022
• Docket Number: 84134
• Parties: The STATE of Nevada, Petitioner, v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF CLARK; and The Honorable Tierra Danielle Jones, District Judge, Respondents, and John Eugene Doane, Real Party in Interest.

521 P.3d 1215

The STATE of Nevada, Petitioner,

v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of the State of Nevada, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF CLARK; and The Honorable Tierra Danielle Jones, District Judge, Respondents,andJohn Eugene Doane, Real Party in Interest.

No. 84134

Supreme Court of Nevada.

Filed December 30, 2022

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Taleen Pandukht, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Petitioner.

Darin F. Imlay, Public Defender, and David Lopez-Negrete, Deputy Public Defender, Clark County, for Real Party in Interest.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, HARDESTY, C.J., STIGLICH and HERNDON, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, STIGLICH, J.:

This original petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition concerns the admissibility of evidence of a defendant's separate sexual offense to show the defendant's propensity to commit a presently charged sexual offense under NRS 48.045(3). Although prior bad acts generally cannot be admitted to show a defendant's inclination to commit crimes, NRS 48.045(3) provides an exception to this general rule: evidence of separate sexual offenses can be admitted to show a defendant's propensity to commit sexual offenses. Recognizing the highly probative yet prejudicial nature of such evidence, in Franks v. State, we outlined procedural safeguards a district court must follow prior to admitting evidence of a separate sexual offense under NRS 48.045(3), including the weighing of the evidence's probative value against its prejudicial effect. 135 Nev. 1, 432 P.3d 752 (2019).

We now further clarify the mechanics of NRS 48.045(3). First, NRS 48.045(3) is applicable whenever a criminal defendant is charged with a sexual offense. Thus, the district court should consider only the charging document, and not the facts or evidence underlying the charge, in making its initial determination as to whether NRS 48.045(3) is implicated in the case. Second, we reiterate that the district court must ensure that Franks ’ procedural safeguards are followed before determining whether to admit evidence of a prior sexual offense under NRS 48.045(3).

In refusing to admit evidence of a prior conviction for a sexual offense in the instant case, the district court looked beyond the charges the defendant faced to determine that the State's evidence did not establish that a sexual offense occurred in the current prosecution. We conclude that this was a clearly erroneous application of the law and therefore a manifest abuse of discretion. The district court also found the evidence inadmissible because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. We conclude that this too was a manifest abuse of discretion, as the other sexual offense was more probative than prejudicial under the factors adopted in Franks, Accordingly, we grant the State's petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that we order the district court (1) to vacate its orders denying the State's motion to admit evidence of prior crimes and the State's motion to reconsider and (2) to enter an order granting the State's motion to admit evidence of prior crimes.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Real party in interest, John Eugene Doane, was charged by way of indictment with murder under alternative theories of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing and felony murder occurring during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a sexual assault. The charges stem from a cold case involving a 14-year-old victim who was discovered murdered in the desert in 1978. Evidence suggested that the victim was struck with an object and strangled to death. Although no evidence of sexual assault was apparent from the victim's autopsy, the victim's underwear had been removed from her body and contained semen. In 2019, the semen on the underwear was tested for DNA, and the DNA profile was matched to Doane, who was in prison in Nevada for crimes committed in 1979.

Before trial, the State filed a motion to admit Doane's 1979 conviction for sexual assault causing substantial bodily harm with the use of a deadly weapon. The facts underlying that conviction were that Doane offered a 14-year-old girl a ride to school, but after she got into his car, he threatened her and proceeded to drive her to the desert, where he repeatedly sexually assaulted her, struck her with a rock, and strangled her until she was unconscious, leaving her with substantial permanent injuries. The State asserted that the 1979 offense was relevant and highly probative, as it and the instant offense both involved sexual acts against teen girls and occurred within three months of each other. The defense opposed the motion, arguing that the 1979 offense was qualitatively different from the charged offense and substantially more prejudicial than probative.

The district court denied the State's motion, determining that the State did not charge Doane with a crime constituting a "sexual offense" in the instant case and, therefore, NRS 48.045(3) did not apply. The State filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the felony-murder theory charged in this case, which was predicated on the perpetration or attempted perpetration of sexual assault, is a "sexual offense" as defined by NRS 48.045(3) and NRS 179D.097(1)(b). The district court denied the motion for reconsideration. In its written order, the district court determined that the facts did not support the State's theory that a sexual assault occurred in this case. The district court further stated that it had analyzed the 1979 offense under NRS 48.045(3) and Franks, had weighed the relevant considerations, and concluded that admitting the evidence "to further the State's theory [would] result[ ] in unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs its probative value." The State filed the instant petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court's denial of its motion and motion for reconsideration.¹

DISCUSSION

The State's petition challenges the district court's orders denying the State's motion to admit Doane's prior conviction for propensity purposes pursuant to NRS 48.045(3) and the State's motion to reconsider. The State argues that its felony-murder theory, which is based on the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a sexual assault, clearly qualifies as a sexual offense and thus NRS 48.045(3) applies. The State asserts that the district court improperly considered the evidence underlying the charge, rather than the nature of the charge itself, in finding that this case does not involve a sexual offense. Additionally, the State argues that the district court erred in concluding that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the other bad act evidence under Franks. After first addressing a few preliminary considerations, we address each of the State's arguments in turn.

We exercise our discretion to consider this writ

The State argues that writ relief is warranted because it cannot appeal from a final judgment in a criminal case and therefore lacks a remedy at law to challenge the district court's evidentiary ruling. Doane does not argue that the State has an alternative remedy at law for challenging the district court's ruling.

"A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, NRS 34.160, or to control a manifest abuse or arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion." State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 931, 267 P.3d 777, 779 (2011). A writ will not issue if the petitioner has "a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." NRS 34.170. Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy, and it is within the sole discretion of this court to entertain a writ petition. State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Taylor), 116 Nev. 374, 379, 997 P.2d 126, 130 (2000).

NRS 177.015, which outlines the availability of an appeal for a party aggrieved in a criminal action, does not provide for an appeal from a district court order denying the State's motion to admit evidence of a prior sexual offense, nor does it permit the State to appeal from an eventual jury verdict. This court has previously exercised its discretion to entertain a mandamus petition where the State could not appeal the challenged district court decision in a criminal case. See, e.g., Taylor, 116 Nev. at 379-80, 997 P.2d at 130. Likewise, here, the State cannot appeal the district court's determination, and it therefore lacks a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. See NRS 34.170. Furthermore, the interplay between NRS 48.045(3) and the procedural safeguards set forth in Franks is an issue of statewide significance that requires clarification. See State v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court (Martinez), 137 Nev. 37, 38, 481 P.3d 848, 850 (2021) (citing the presentation of "an unsettled legal issue of statewide significance" as a reason to undertake merits-based writ review). Accordingly, we conclude that the State's petition warrants consideration.

Standard of review

A district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is discretionary. Armstrong, 127 Nev. at 931, 267 P.3d at 780. Where a discretionary act is challenged, this court may issue a writ of mandamus to control a district court's decision that this court deems to be a manifest abuse, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of the district court's discretion. Id. at 931, 267 P.3d at 779. "A manifest abuse of discretion is ‘[a] clearly erroneous interpretation of the law or a clearly erroneous application of a law or rule.’ " Id. at 932, 267 P.3d at 780 (alteration in original) (quoting Steward v. McDonald, 330 Ark. 837, 958 S.W.2d 297, 300 (1997) ).

The district court manifestly abused its discretion in ruling that Doane's prior conviction was inadmissible under NRS 48.045(3)

We now turn to the crux of this writ petition. We note at the outset that the district court's orders are not the...