State v. Elite Staffing, Inc.

• Docket Number: Docket No. 128763
• Decision Date: 25 March 2024
• Citation: 238 N.E.3d 1084
• Parties: The STATE of Illinois EX REL. Kwame RAOUL, Attorney General, Appellee, v. ELITE STAFFING, INC., et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

238 N.E.3d 1084

2024 IL 128763

The STATE of Illinois EX REL. Kwame RAOUL, Attorney General, Appellee,

v.ELITE STAFFING, INC., et al., Appellants.

(Docket No. 128763)

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed January 19, 2024

Rehearing Denied March 25, 2024

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. Raymond Mitchell, Judge, presiding.

Amy B. Manning, Angelo M. Russo, and Sarah A. Zielinski, of McGuireWoods LLP, and John R. Hayes, of Amundsen Davis, LLC, both of Chicago, Jeffrey A. Risch, of Amundsen Davis, LLC, of St. Charles, and David J. Fish, Kimberly Hilton, and John Kunze, of Fish Potter Bolanos P.C., of Naperville, for appellants.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Christopher M.R. Turner, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

Patrick Morales-Doyle, of Thompson Coburn LLP, of Chicago, for amici curiaeStaffing Services Association of Illinois et al.

Allison M. Gorsuch, of United States Department of Justice, of Chicago, for amicus curiae United States of America.

Kevin Herrera, Ada Sandoval, and Mark Birhanu, of Raise the Floor Alliance, of Chicago, for amici curiae National Legal Advocacy Network et al.

OPINION

JUSTICE NEVILLEdelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The State of Illinois filed a complaint in which it alleged Elite Staffing, Inc.; Metro Staff, Inc.; and Midway Staffing, Inc.(collectively, the staffing agencies), violated the Illinois Antitrust Act. 740 ILCS 10/3(West 2018).The staffing agencies filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, claiming that the act did not apply to the charged conduct.The circuit court of Cook County denied the motion but certified for interlocutory review two questions about the reach of the act:

"1.Whether the definition of ‘Service’ under Section 4 of the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 ILCS 10/4, which states that Service ‘shall not be deemed to include labor which is performed by natural persons as employees of others,’ applies to the Illinois Antitrust Act as a whole and thus excludes all labor services from the Illinois Antitrust Act’s coverage.

2.Whether the per se rule under Section 3(1) of the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 ILCS 10/3(1), which states that it applies to conspiracies among ‘competitor[s],’ extends to alleged horizontal agreements facilitated by a vertical noncompetitor."

The appellate court answered the second question, but instead of answering question 1, it answered a different question:

"whether the exclusion of individual labor from the definition of ‘service’ in section 4 of the [Illinois Antitrust Act] also excludes the labor-related services provided by temporary staffing agencies and therefore exempts such agencies from [its] coverage."2022 IL App (1st) 210840, ¶ 11, 463 Ill.Dec. 544, 210 N.E.3d 188.

¶ 2We granted the staffing agencies’ petition for leave to appeal from the appellate court decision.Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (a)(eff. Oct. 1, 2021).

¶ 3We hold that the Illinois Antitrust Act does not exempt from antitrust scrutiny all agreements between competitors to hold down wages and to limit employment opportunities for their employees.We vacate the appellate court’s answer to the question it formulated, answer the circuit court’s first certified question, do not address the second certified question because the parties have not sought our review of that question and its answer, and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5The State alleged in its complaint that Colony Display (Colony) hired the staffing agencies to supply the temporary workers it needed.Colony, which installs fixtures and displays for home improvement and retail businesses, relies heavily on temporary workers, who form the majority of Colony’s workforce.2022 IL App (1st) 210840, ¶ 3, 463 Ill.Dec. 544, 210 N.E.3d 188.At Colony’s request, the State alleged, the staffing agencies agreed to fix the wages for their employees who worked for Colony at below-market rates, and they agreed not to hire each other’s employees.Id.¶¶ 5-6.Colony helped the staffing agencies enforce their agreement.Id.The State claimed the alleged conduct constituted an agreement between competitors to fix the price paid for services and therefore that it had violated section 3(1)(a) of the Illinois Antitrust Act(740 ILCS 10/3(1)(West 2018)).2022 IL App (1st) 210840, ¶ 12, 463 Ill.Dec. 544, 210 N.E.3d 188.The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure(735 ILCS 5/2-615(West 2018)), claiming that the complaint did not state a cause of action because the Illinois Antitrust Act provides that services otherwise subject to the act"shall not be deemed to include labor which is performed by natural persons as employees of others"(740 ILCS 10/4(West 2018)).2022 IL App (1st) 210840, ¶ 7, 463 Ill.Dec. 544, 210 N.E.3d 188.

¶ 6The circuit court denied the motion but certified for interlocutory review the following issue:

"Whether the definition of "Service" under Section 4 of the Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 ILCS 10/4, which states that Service "shall not be deemed to include labor which is performed by natural persons as employees of others," applies to the Illinois Antitrust Act as a whole and thus excludes all labor services from the Illinois Antitrust Act’s coverage.’ "Id.¶ 1.

¶ 7The parties have not asked this court to address in this appeal the second question the circuit court certified for interlocutory review.Seeid.

¶ 8 A. Appellate Court

¶ 9The appellate court found first that the question as phrased relied on an incorrect assumption that, if the definition of "service" applied to the Illinois Antitrust Act as a whole, it exempts all labor services from the act’s coverage.Id. ¶ 11.The appellate court restated the question and addressed instead the issue of "whether the exclusion of individual labor from the definition of ‘service’ in section 4 of the [Illinois Antitrust Act] also excludes the labor-related services provided by temporary staffing agencies and therefore exempts such agencies from [its] coverage."Id.

¶ 10The appellate court found that the legislature narrowed the definition of service "to allow individuals to engage in otherwise anticompetitive behavior regarding their own labor by participating in collective bargaining and related conduct."Id.¶ 15.The appellate court found the exemption of section 4 did not extend to services provided by staffing agencies.The court held:

"[T]o the extent that the alleged unlawful conduct concerns restraints that they place on their own services (i.e., recruiting, hiring, and managing temporary employees) and do not concern restraints on a natural person’s individual labor, temporary staffing agencies like the Agency Defendants in this case are subject to the Act’s provisions and, in particular, section 3’s prohibitions on anticompetitive restraints on services."Id.¶ 23.

¶ 11This court granted the agencies’ petition for leave to appeal.Ill.S. Ct. R. 315(a)(eff. Oct. 1, 2021).We accepted briefs amici curiae from (1) the United States Department of Justice in support of the State’s position; (2) Raise the Floor Alliance, National Legal Advocacy Network, and National Employment Law Project in support of the State’s position; and (3)Staffing Services Association of Illinois and American Staffing Association in support of the staffing agencies’ position.Ill. S. Ct. R. 345(eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 12 II.ANALYSIS

[1, 2]¶ 13 Rule 315 gives this court jurisdiction over the appeal.Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a)(eff. Oct. 1, 2021);Moore v. Chicago Park District, 2012 IL 112788, ¶ 7, 365 Ill.Dec. 547, 978 N.E.2d 1050.Illinois courts usually limit review under Rule 308(Ill. S. Ct. R. 308(eff. Oct. 1, 2019)) to answering the certified question, unless the question rests on an erroneous legal assumption.De Bouse v. Bayer AG, 235 Ill. 2d 544, 550, 557, 337 Ill.Dec. 186, 922 N.E.2d 309(2009).

¶ 14 Both parties ask this court to answer the question certified by the circuit court rather than the question the appellate court answered.We do not interpret the circuit court’s question as incorrectly assuming that, if the definition of service applies to the Illinois Antitrust Act as a whole, the act necessarily excludes all labor services from its coverage.Rather, we find that the question the circuit court certified asked the appellate court to decide whether the Illinois Antitrust Act excludes from its coverage all agreements concerning labor services.We will answer the circuit court’s certified question.

[3, 4]¶ 15 On certified question review, this court should address only issues of law and not the application of the law to the particular facts of the case.Rozsavolgyi v. City of Aurora, 2017 IL 121048, ¶ 21, 421 Ill.Dec. 881, 102 N.E.3d 162.We review de novo rulings on the interpretation of a statute.Midwest Sanitary Service, Inc. v. Sandberg, Phoenix & Von Gontard, P.C., 2022 IL 127327, ¶ 19, 463 Ill.Dec. 887, 211 N.E.3d 448.

[5–8]¶ 16We apply familiar principles of statutory interpretation."The most fundamental rule in statutory construction is to give effect to the legislative intent."Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill. 2d 213, 235, 309 Ill.Dec. 310, 864 N.E.2d 176(2007)."The statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning, is generally the most reliable indicator of that legislative intent, but a literal reading must fail if it yields absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results."Cassidy v. China Vitamins, LLC, 2018 IL 122873, ¶ 17, 427 Ill.Dec. 892, 120 N.E.3d 959.

"Words and phrases should not be considered in isolation; rather, they must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions and the statute as a whole.[Citations.]In addition to the statutory language, the court may consider the purpose behind the law and the evils sought to be remedied, as

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