State v. Ellis (Ex parte State)
| Decision Date | 30 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | 1121390. |
| Citation | 165 So.3d 576 |
| Parties | Ex parte State of Alabama. (In re STATE of Alabama v. Andre Lamon ELLIS). |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Tom Anderson, dist. atty., and Chris M. Kaminski, asst. dist. atty., 12th Judicial Circuit, for petitioner.
J. Carlton Taylor, Montgomery, for respondent.
The State of Alabama petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Jeffrey W. Kelley of the Pike Circuit Court to vacate his May 17, 2013, order granting Andre Lamon Ellis's motion for a new trial. We deny the petition.
On March 26, 2012, M.B. was allegedly raped in her residence located in Hunter's Mountain Mobile Estates. M.B. identified Ellis in a police photographic lineup as the perpetrator. Although there was no forensic or physical evidence linking Ellis to the alleged rape, a video from a security camera located at Hunter's Mountain on that day showed Ellis's vehicle entering Hunter's Mountain at 4:41 p.m. and leaving at 4:46 p.m. Ellis, in fact, lived in Hunter's Mountain. Following the alleged rape, M.B. went to the hospital with vaginal injuries requiring multiple surgeries. M.B. initially reported to her doctor that she had fallen on a “door stop” in her bathroom but later stated that she had been raped.
On January 18, 2013, Ellis was convicted of rape in the first degree regarding Q.C.,1 rape in the first degree regarding M.B., and burglary in the second degree regarding the residence of M.B. Ellis was sentenced to 85 years in prison. On March 25, 2013, Ellis moved for a new trial, alleging, among other things, that the State had failed to disclose crucial evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The trial court ordered the State to disclose in camera certain evidence and, after conducting a hearing, entered an order dated May 17, 2013, granting Ellis's motion for a new trial based on the State's failure to turn over evidence in violation of Rule 16, Ala. R.Crim. P., and in violation of the principles of law set forth in Brady v. Maryland. The State filed a motion for reconsideration, on which the trial court did not rule.
On June 24, 2013, the 38th day after the trial court ordered a new trial, the State filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Court of Criminal Appeals pursuant to Rule 21, Ala. R.App. P. In its petition, the State sought a writ directing the trial court to set aside its order granting Ellis's motion for a new trial. The State had relied on Rule 4(b)(1), Ala. R.App. P., to determine that it had 42 days from the date of the order to file its petition.
On August 20, 2013, the Court of Criminal Appeals entered an order dismissing the State's petition after concluding that it was not filed within a presumptively reasonable time and that the State had failed to include a “statement of circumstances constituting good cause” as to why the petition had been filed outside the presumptively reasonable time. See Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R.App. P. The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the presumptively reasonable time for the State to file its petition was seven days from the date of the trial court's ruling that was subject to the petition. See Rule 15.7, Ala. R.Crim. P. The State did not file an application for rehearing with the Court of Criminal Appeals. State v. Ellis (No. CR–12–1514, Aug. 20, 2013), ––– So.3d –––– (Ala.Crim.App.2013) (table).
On August 30, 2013, the State filed its petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court pursuant to Rule 21(e), Ala. R.App. P., seeking de novo review of the Court of Criminal Appeals' dismissal of its original petition, as well as a writ directing the trial judge to vacate its order granting Ellis's motion for a new trial. The State included in its petition a mandatory statement of circumstances constituting good cause for this Court's consideration. This Court issued an order dismissing the State's petition as untimely.
On January 27, 2014, the State filed an application for a rehearing complaining that this Court's order dismissing its petition for a writ of mandamus failed to “address whether the State's petition was untimely filed with the Supreme Court or if the State's original Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals was untimely.” Specifically, the State argued that its original petition filed with the Court of Criminal Appeals was not untimely because, it claimed, it did not seek review of a pretrial order pursuant to Rule 15.7, Ala. R.Crim. P., but rather sought relief from a posttrial order granting Ellis's motion for a new trial.
On March 31, 2014, this Court granted the State's application for a rehearing, and on June 9, 2014, we ordered the parties to file answers and briefs. We also ordered the parties to include in their briefs a discussion as to “whether [this] Court is vested with jurisdiction and whether the proper time standard for submitting [the State's petition to the Court of Criminal Appeals] is pursuant to Rule 4(b), Ala. R.App. P., or Rule 15.7(b), Ala. R.Crim. P.”
Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R.App. P., provides that “[t]he presumptively reasonable time for filing a petition [for a writ of mandamus] seeking review of an order of a trial court or of a lower appellate court shall be the same as the time for taking an appeal.” The State maintains that, in dismissing its original petition for a writ of mandamus as untimely, the Court of Criminal Appeals assumed that the State was taking an appeal from a pretrial order pursuant to Rule 15.7(b), Ala. R.Crim. P., and that the court therefore improperly held that the 7–day period in Rule 15.7 for filing its petition applied instead of the 42–day period in Rule 4(b), Ala. R.App. P. We agree.
Rule 15.7, Ala. R.Crim. P., governs pretrial appeals by the State; it provides, in pertinent part:
”
(Emphasis added.)
Rule 15.7(b) provides that the State's notice of appeal from such a pretrial order shall be filed “within seven (7) days after the order has been entered, but in any case before the defendant has been placed in jeopardy under established rules of law.” It is clear that the State in this case was not taking an appeal from a pretrial order “suppressing a confession or admission or other evidence”; “dismissing an indictment, information, or complaint”; “or quashing an arrest or search warrant”—any of which would require the State to certify that the order appealed from, if not reversed, would be fatal to the prosecution of the charge. Rather, the State was seeking review of a posttrial order granting a new trial following a jury verdict; accordingly, the State could not have certified that the “order, if not reversed on appeal,” would be fatal to the prosecution of the charge. Because the State did not seek review of a pre trial order, but rather of a post trial order, we conclude that the State's mandamus petition in the Court of Criminal Appeals, filed on the 38th day after the trial court's ruling, was filed within a reasonable time pursuant to Rule 21, Ala. R.App. P., and Rule 4(b), Ala. R.App. P. Therefore, its petition for a writ of mandamus filed in this Court within 14 days of the denial of the State's petition by the Court of Criminal Appeals is timely.
Rule 4(b), Ala. R.App. P., contemplates appeals by the State when authorized by statute or rule:
“When an appeal by the state as of right is authorized by statute or rule, the notice of appeal shall be filed in the trial court within 42 days (6 weeks) after the decision, order, or judgment appealed from; except that any pre-trial appeal by the state shall be taken within the time allowed by [Rule 15.7, Ala. R.Crim. P.].”2
(Emphasis added.) The State does not dispute that it has no right to appeal from an order granting a new trial.
The State maintains that, in the absence of a right to appeal, a writ of mandamus is the appropriate vehicle by which to challenge the trial court's ruling granting a new trial. Specifically, the State asserts that this Court should grant mandamus review because, it says, in granting a new trial in this case the trial court exceeded its discretion and usurped the factfinding province of the jury. In Ex parte Nice, 407 So.2d 874, 879 (Ala.1981), this Court held that “[m]andamus cannot be used as a substitute for appeal, when no appeal is authorized by law or court rule, but mandamus can be used to prevent a gross disruption in the administration of criminal justice.” (Emphasis omitted.) This Court in...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Martin
... ... " Ex parte Weeks , 611 So.2d 259, 261 (Ala. 1992)." State v. Harwell , 85 So.3d 481, 483 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Smith , 23 So.3d 1172, ... " Moore , 969 So.2d at 18284." State v. Hall , 991 So.2d 775, 77880 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007). See also State v. Ellis , 165 So.3d 576, 590 (Ala. 2014) ("Rule 16, Ala. R. Crim. P., which provides for discovery in criminal cases, expressly authorizes a trial court to ... ...
-
Carruth v. Hamm
...the prosecution has withheld favorable evidence can be asserted in a motion for new trial without a prior objection. See State v. Ellis, 165 So.3d 576, 578 (Ala. 2014); Savage v. State, 600 So.2d 405, 407 (Ala.Crim.App.1992). However, Carruth has not alleged any facts to support this claim ......
-
Wynn v. State
... ... Specifically, Wynn argues that, according to the Alabama Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Rhone , 900 So.2d 455 (Ala.2004), the only grounds that will support the denial of a motion to amend a postconviction petition are "actual prejudice" ... Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), violation has been satisfied." See State v. Ellis , 165 So.3d 576, 586 (Ala.2014). In his proposed amendment, Wynn first asserted that the State suppressed exculpatory witness statements from Michael ... ...
-
State v. L.D.B. (Ex parte State)
... ... Accordingly, the presumptively reasonable time for the State to file its petition is seven days from the date of Judge Simpson's order granting youthful-offender status to L.D.B. Cf. State v. Ellis , 165 So.3d 576 (Ala. 2014). Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P., provides that a petition filed outside the presumptively reasonable time shall include a statement of circumstances constituting good cause for this Court to consider the petition, notwithstanding that it was filed beyond the ... ...