State v. Emmanuel
Citation | 259 P.2d 845,42 Wn.2d 799 |
Decision Date | 02 July 1953 |
Docket Number | No. 32241,32241 |
Parties | STATE, v. EMMANUEL. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
Don G. Abel, Chehalis, and Lee Olwell, Rummens, Griffin & Short, and Paul R. Cressman, Seattle, for appellant.
John Panesko, Pros. Atty., Chehalis, and Alfred McBee, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
The defendant was charged by information, in three counts, with the crime of bribery in violation of RCW 9.18.020, cf. Rem.Rev.Stat. § 2321. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts. He then moved for a new trial and the motion was denied. From the judgment and sentence pronounced against him on the verdict defendant has appealed.
The prosecuting witness, J. H. England, was engaged in the logging and timber business in Winlock, Washington, During the course of his business he purchased two tracts of timber from the state of Washington. The purchase of the first tract was made on May 20, 1941, for a consideration of $5,000 and was evidenced by timber bill of sale No. 3332. The second tract was purchased on April 25, 1945, for $7,700 and was evidenced by timber bill of sale No. 3707.
As provided by statute RCW 79.12.120, cf. Rem.Rev.Stat. § 7797-33, each bill of sale required that the cutting and removal of the timber be completed within five years of the date of purchase. If this were not done, the timber would revert to the state unless, in the judgment of the commissioner of public lands, the purchaser had shown good faith in attempting to remove the timber in which case the statute authorized the commissioner to grant an extension for any period not exceeding ten years.
Mr. England had secured four successive one-year extensions with respect to the first tract. He had removed the timber from about twenty acres during this period but the remaining sixty acres had not been touched. The last extension which was to expire on May 20, 1950, was accompanied by a letter, dated April 25, 1949, signed on behalf of the commissioner by appellant as secretary. It advised Mr. England that the land office would grant him no further extensions on that tract. The time for removing the timber from the second tract was to expire April 25, 1950.
In late August or early September, 1949, it became apparent to Mr. England that he would not be able to remove the timber on either tract before the respective deadlines. He therefore made a trip to Olympia for the purpose of seeing the commissioner and discussing the possibility of securing a further extension on the first tract and an original extension on the second tract. The commissioner was out of town so Mr. England asked, 'Who is the next man in charge?' He was directed to see appellant who was a clerk in the land office and secretary to the board of land commissioners.
Mr. England then went into appellant's private office and they talked for an hour and a half or two hours. This was the first time they had ever met. Mr. England's version of their discussion was as follows:
'A. Well, the substance of the conversation was that we saw we couldn't get that timber off and that I went up there to see what could be done towards getting a further extension.
'Q. And when you told him what you wanted, what did he say? A. Well, he didn't tell me I couldn't have it, nor he didn't tell me that I could, but he did tell me--that I told him that there must be something that could be done to fix it, and he told me that considering politics that it cost money to elect a Commissioner, and that the campaign hadn't been fully cleared up, and that a contribution might be warmly accepted, and I told him that if that would help my case any, I was willing to go along with it.
'Q. At that conversation did he give you any figure relative to the status of the campaign funds? A. Well, he said it was in the neighborhood of $8,000 in the hole, and it had come in slow.
'Q. All right, and then after you told him that if it would do your case any good, you were willing to contribute, did you discuss any specific amount of money you were to contribute? A. I asked him what he though would be about right and he didn't say, and I said, 'How would $500.00 do.' and he said, 'Well, that will be all right for a starter.'
'Mr. Griffin: I move the latter part of the answer be stricken and the jury instructed to disregard it.
'The Court: It will be stricken, that last statement, and the jury will disregard it.
Appellant's testimony regarding his first meeting with Mr. England was similar to the latter's testimony except that appellant testified that, after discussing at some length the proposed sale of the timber located near Ukiah, California, Mr. England volunteered to make a contribution to the commissioner's compaign fund. Appellant testified:
'After we got through discussing it, he said, and I said, 'Yes, he does have,' and I said, So he said, 'The next time you are down our way, when you come down to pick this up, I would like to make that contribution.' I said, 'All right.' This was about the first part of October, and a few...
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Breimon v. General Motors Corp.
...adopted with respect to the statutory language 'any communication' as between attorney and client. RCW 5.60.060(2). State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wash.2d 799, 259 P.2d 845 (1953); In re Estate of Quick, 161 Wash. 537, 297 P. 198 (1931). Accordingly, an attorney who testified to the presence of a th......
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State v. Scott
...(1979): The constitutional requirement is only that the jury be instructed as to each element of the offense charged. State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wash.2d 799, 259 P.2d 845 (1953). Here the jury was so instructed. The failure of the court in the case at bench to define further one of those element......
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State v. Johnson
...basic principle of due process that jury instructions must define every element of the offense charged. See, e.g., State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wash.2d 799, 821, 259 P.2d 845 (1953); State v. Timmons, 12 Wash.App. 48, 55, 527 P.2d 1399 (1974). This is especially important in cases where an element......
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State v. Henderson
...have the jury instructed on the definition of every element of the offense charged. 3 Johnson, supra at 623-628 ; State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wn.2d 799, 821, 259 P.2d 845 (1953). Brief of Appellant, at The defendant concedes that this issue was not raised in the trial court. As he notes in footno......