State v. Ernst
| Decision Date | 29 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-1623,18-1623 |
| Citation | 954 N.W.2d 50 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Anthony ERNST, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender (argued), Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Louis S. Sloven (argued), Assistant Attorney General, C.J. May III, County Attorney, and Brigit M. Barnes and Ry Allen Meyer, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined. Appel, J., filed a special concurrence.
We have long recognized that specific intent crimes are seldom proved by direct evidence of the defendant's intent, leaving the State to rely on inferences to be drawn from the surrounding circumstances to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a sufficiently culpable mental state to support a conviction. In this case, the defendant convinced the court of appeals that his conviction could not be supported on the theory that the jury improperly stacked inferences on top of other inferences to find he attempted to burglarize a garage with the intent to commit a theft. We disagree and conclude the State's evidence—and all reasonable inferences from that evidence—was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction.
Anthony Ernst's parole officer lives on a dead-end gravel road in rural Cascade with her husband. The parole officer's husband discovered the service door to their garage had been pried open while they were at work on August 21, 2017. The door was closed and locked when they left, but the door was ajar with the knob still locked when he returned home. The weather stripping around the door was damaged with what looked like pry marks near the handle and near the bottom of the door. Nothing was missing from the garage, and there was no indication anyone had entered the house through the locked interior door. The parole officer contacted police about the break-in, and an investigation followed.
Video footage from a business at the top of the dead end road showed only one vehicle drove down the road toward the parole officer's house that day that was unaccounted for by local traffic, which passed the business at 10:31 a.m. and returned approximately thirteen minutes later. Further investigation led to Ernst based on his ownership of a white police model Crown Victoria, the same type of car observed in the footage. The parole officer identified the vehicle from the video footage as belonging to Ernst based on the distinct pattern of chipped paint on the car.
Ernst was subsequently arrested and charged with burglary in the third degree with intent to commit assault and intent to commit theft. At the close of the State's evidence at trial, Ernst moved for a judgment of acquittal. The district court granted the motion in part, concluding the State failed to present sufficient evidence for a jury to find he intended to commit an assault, but it did present sufficient evidence for the jury to find he intended to commit a theft. Ernst proceeded to trial on the theft version of burglary.
The jury returned a guilty verdict on the lesser included attempted burglary charge. The district court entered judgment against Ernst and sentenced him to the maximum two-year sentence. Ernst appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The court of appeals reversed Ernst's conviction, concluding the State's only direct evidence showed Ernst in the area but the remaining circumstantial evidence was too speculative to support his conviction because it "require[d] a stacking of inferences: first the inference [Ernst] forced entry to the garage, then the inference he did so with intent to commit theft." The State applied for, and we granted, further review to address the court of appeals’ conclusion that stacked inferences could not support Ernst's conviction.
To prove Ernst was guilty of attempted burglary, the jury instructions required the State to prove he (1) attempted to enter the garage, (2) which was an occupied structure, (3) without permission or authority (4) with the specific intent to commit theft. On appeal, Ernst contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the first and fourth elements. Alternatively, he argues he is entitled to a new trial because the weight of the evidence preponderates against his conviction. Finally, Ernst claims his trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the admission of cell phone records and related testimony at trial. We address each contention in turn.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence. "We review the sufficiency of the evidence for correction of errors at law." State v. Kelso-Christy , 911 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa 2018). We consider all evidence, not just the evidence supporting the conviction, and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, "including legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence." State v. Tipton , 897 N.W.2d 653, 692 (Iowa 2017) (quoting State v. Williams , 695 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Iowa 2005) ).
In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether "the finding of guilt is supported by substantial evidence in the record." Kelso-Christy , 911 N.W.2d at 666 (quoting State v. Meyers , 799 N.W.2d 132, 138 (Iowa 2011) ). Substantial evidence "means a person may not be convicted based upon mere suspicion or conjecture." Tipton , 897 N.W.2d at 692. "Substantial evidence exists when the evidence ‘would convince a rational fact finder the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ " Kelso-Christy , 911 N.W.2d at 666 (quoting Meyers , 799 N.W.2d at 138 ).
Ernst contends the State failed to prove: (1) anyone attempted to enter the garage, (2) if someone attempted to enter the garage, that person was Ernst, and (3) if Ernst did enter the garage, he did so with the specific intent to commit theft. We conclude the State presented sufficient evidence to support Ernst's conviction.
With respect to establishing Ernst as the perpetrator of the attempted burglary, the State presented evidence that Ernst was off work on August 21 to attend a child support hearing in the afternoon. Footage from a traffic camera located one block from Ernst's Dubuque home showed Ernst left home around 8:45 a.m. and returned around 12:28 p.m. Other city traffic cameras showed Ernst coming into Dubuque at 12:20 p.m. on Highway 151. A vehicle matching Ernst's vehicle, including its distinctive chipped paint pattern, was seen on video surveillance of a business near the crime scene driving down the dead-end road toward the parole officer's house at 10:31 a.m. and driving back thirteen minutes later. It was the only unaccounted vehicle on the dead-end road that day. Ernst's probation officer identified the car from the video surveillance as belonging to Ernst. The video also revealed a driver wearing a brightly colored sleeveless shirt, similar to the shirt Ernst was seen wearing later that day at his child support hearing.
"While opportunity to commit a crime or mere presence at the scene ordinarily is not a sufficient corroborative circumstance from which to infer guilt," substantial evidence of guilt can exist when presence is considered with other evidence. State v. Schrier , 300 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Iowa 1981). Significant evidence in addition to Ernst's presence in the area supports his conviction. The State presented evidence that someone had pried open the service door, contrary to Ernst's argument that the wind or an animal caused the door to be opened. That evidence included testimony from both homeowners that the door was closed and locked when they left that morning, evidence of pry marks they testified were not previously on the weather stripping and doorframe, and evidence that the door handle was still locked although the door was ajar when the husband arrived home. Investigator Grant testified at trial, unchallenged, there had been a forced entry.
From the direct evidence that Ernst was driving the only unaccounted-for vehicle on the road that day, coupled with the circumstantial evidence that someone had pried open the service door, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Ernst was the one who pried open the door. This evidence provides substantial evidence to support the first three elements of the burglary charge—that Ernst entered the garage 1 without authorization.
The State was also required to prove Ernst entered the garage with the specific intent to commit theft. "Specific intent is seldom capable of direct proof." State v. Walker , 574 N.W.2d 280, 289 (Iowa 1998). Therefore, specific intent will often "be shown by circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence." Id.
We first note that intent to commit theft can "reasonably be inferred from the evidence of surreptitious entry and other circumstances." State v. Sangster , 299 N.W.2d 661, 663 (Iowa 1980) ; see also State v. Oetken , 613 N.W.2d 679, 686 (Iowa 2000) (en banc) (); State v. Erving , 346 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Iowa 1984) ; State v. Woodruff , 208 Iowa 236, 240, 225 N.W. 254, 255 (1929) ( ...
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