State v. Ervin
Citation | 333 S.C. 351,510 S.E.2d 220 |
Decision Date | 16 November 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 2902.,2902. |
Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Willie James ERVIN, Appellant. |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Deputy Chief Attorney Joseph L. Savitz, III, of South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott and Assistant Attorney General Caroline Callison Tiffin, all of Columbia; and Solicitor W. Townes Jones, IV, of Greenwood, for Respondent. ANDERSON, Judge:
Willie James Ervin was convicted of kidnapping and assault with intent to commit first degree criminal sexual conduct. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for both convictions, to be served concurrently. Ervin appeals only his conviction for assault with intent to commit first degree criminal sexual conduct. We reverse.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ervin's indictment provided:
That Willie James Ervin did in Greenwood County on or about the 10th day of July 1996, wilfully and unlawfully assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct in attempting to accomplish sexual battery upon the person of Donna Babb.
The only applicable code section appearing on the indictment was S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-656 (1985). At Ervin's trial, the judge amended the indictment to charge attempted criminal sexual conduct in the first degree; however, he charged the jury on the offense of "assault with the intent to commit criminal sexual conduct in the first degree." Ervin did not object at trial to the amendment of the indictment.
LAW/ANALYSIS
Ervin argues the amendment of his indictment and the submission to the jury of "assault with the intent to commit criminal sexual conduct in the first degree" deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. We agree.
To ascertain whether the amendment changed the nature of the offense with which Ervin was charged, we must first look to determine what, if any, offense was charged in the original indictment.
South Carolina Code Ann. § 16-3-656 (1985) was typed on the indictment. Section 16-3-656 provides: "Assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct described in the above sections shall be punishable as if the criminal sexual conduct was committed." (emphasis added). The phrase "above sections" refers to § 16-3-652, Criminal sexual conduct in the first degree; § 16-3-653, Criminal sexual conduct in the second degree; § 16-3-654, Criminal sexual conduct in the third degree; and § 16-3-655, Criminal sexual conduct with minors. These offenses contain different elements and specify different punishments.
Criminal sexual conduct in the first degree requires a sexual battery accomplished with aggravated force or under circumstances where the victim of the sexual battery is also the victim of forcible confinement, kidnapping, robbery, extortion, burglary, housebreaking, or any other similar offense or act. See § 16-3-652(1)(a)—(b). A violation of § 16-3-652 is punishable by imprisonment for up to thirty years. See § 16-3-652(2).
Criminal sexual conduct in the second degree is properly charged when aggravated coercion is used to accomplish the sexual battery. See § 16-3-653(1). It is punishable by imprisonment for up to twenty years. See § 16-3-653(2).
Criminal sexual conduct in the third degree specifies the actor must use force or coercion without aggravating circumstances to accomplish the sexual battery. See § 16-3-654(1)(a). Third degree criminal sexual conduct also occurs if the actor engages in sexual battery with the victim and the actor knows or has reason to know the victim is "mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless and aggravated force or aggravated coercion was not used to accomplish sexual battery." S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-654(1)(b). Violations of this section are punishable by up to ten years imprisonment. See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-654(2). Criminal sexual conduct with minors is divided into two degrees. See § 16-3-655(1)-(3). First degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor occurs if the actor engages in sexual battery with a victim less than eleven years of age. See § 16-3-655(1). Second degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor occurs if the actor engages in sexual battery with (a) a victim who is fourteen years of age or less but who is at least eleven years of age or (b) a victim who is at least fourteen years of age but who is less than sixteen years of age and the actor is in a position of familial, custodial, or official authority to coerce the victim to submit or is older than the victim. See § 16-3-655(2)-(3).
An indictment survives legal scrutiny if the offense is stated with sufficient certainty and particularity to enable the court to know what judgment to pronounce, and the defendant to know what he is called upon to answer and whether he may plead an acquittal or conviction thereon. Carter v. State, 329 S.C. 355, 495 S.E.2d 773 (1998). Under South Carolina Code Ann. § 17-19-20 (1985), an indictment passes legal muster if it "charges the crime substantially in the language of the common law or of the statute prohibiting the crime or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood and, if the offense be a statutory offense, that the offense be alleged to be contrary to the statute in such case made and provided." Accord State v. Tabory, 262 S.C. 136, 202 S.E.2d 852 (1974)
( ); State v. Jacobs, 238 S.C. 234, 119 S.E.2d 735 (1961) ( ); State v. McIntire, 221 S.C. 504, 71 S.E.2d 410 (1952) ( ); State v. Perry, 87 S.C. 535, 70 S.E. 304 (1911) ( ).
Ervin's original indictment did not properly allege the elements of assault with intent to commit first degree criminal sexual conduct. Elementally, the offense of assault with intent to commit first degree criminal sexual conduct is analyzed:
Reviewing the language of the original indictment, we come to the ineluctable conclusion it does not aver all elements of assault with intent to commit first degree criminal sexual conduct. The fatal flaw in the original indictment as to the offense of assault with intent to commit first degree criminal sexual conduct is the absolute omission of any allegation relating to the commission of sexual battery with aggravated force or under circumstances where the victim of the sexual battery is also the victim of forcible confinement, kidnapping, robbery, extortion, burglary, housebreaking, or any other similar offense or act. Having reached the conclusion Ervin's original indictment only charged him with a lesser offense, assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct in the third degree, it is clear the trial court's amendment of the indictment to assault with intent to commit first degree criminal sexual conduct changed the nature of the offense with which Ervin was charged.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed a conviction based on facts similar to the case sub judice in State v. Riddle, 301 S.C. 211, 391 S.E.2d 253 (1990). The trial court permitted an amendment to Riddle's indictment during the course of his trial. Initially, Riddle was indicted for assault with intent to commit third degree criminal sexual conduct. At the close of evidence, the indictment was amended to charge assault with intent to commit first degree criminal sexual conduct. On appeal, the Supreme Court explained:
Riddle, 301 S.C. at 212, 391 S.E.2d at 253 (emphasis in original).
Hope v. State, 328 S.C. 78, 492 S.E.2d 76 (1997), is a revisit to the amendment issue. At Hope's trial, the judge allowed the State to amend Hope's indictment from assault with intent to commit third degree criminal sexual conduct to assault with intent to commit first degree criminal sexual conduct. The Hope Court found the amendment clearly changed the nature of the offense.
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