State v. Esparza

• Decision Date: 27 August 2020
• Docket Number: No. A-1-CA-37917,A-1-CA-37917
• Citation: 475 P.3d 815
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan MONTELONGO ESPARZA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

475 P.3d 815

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Juan MONTELONGO ESPARZA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A-1-CA-37917

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Filing Date: August 27, 2020

Certiorari Denied, October 21, 2020, No. S-1-SC-38490

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Charles D. Agoos, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant

MEDINA, Judge.

{1} Defendant Juan Montelongo Esparza appeals his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident (no great bodily harm or death), in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-201(D) (1989). We hold that the district court committed fundamental error in failing to properly instruct the jury on Defendant's duty to remain at the scene of an accident and remand for retrial.

BACKGROUND

{2} On June 12, 2015, at approximately 3:40 p.m., a vehicle driven by Defendant collided with a vehicle driven by Freddy Marquez. Marquez was ejected from his vehicle and was severely injured. Marquez's girlfriend was also in the vehicle at the time of the accident, however, she sustained only minor injuries. Shortly after the collision several drivers stopped and unsuccessfully attempted to render aid to Marquez, who died shortly thereafter from his injuries. Based on witness testimony, emergency personnel arrived on the scene between fifteen and forty-five minutes after the collision.

{3} After the collision, a witness saw Defendant sitting in his vehicle talking on a cellphone but could not understand what Defendant was saying because Defendant was not speaking English. Defendant did not approach Marquez or his girlfriend at any time after the accident. At some point, Defendant got out of his car, began pacing back and forth, and then left the scene on foot. One witness estimated that Defendant left the scene between fifteen and twenty minutes after the accident, while another believed that Defendant left the scene forty-six minutes after the accident. In either case, Defendant left the scene before the first emergency responder arrived. When he left the accident scene, Defendant left behind his resident card which included his name, along with his vehicle registration and insurance card, in the glove compartment of his vehicle.

{4} Police located Defendant approximately two hours after the accident, four miles from the accident scene. Defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes and smelled strongly of alcohol. Defendant's blood alcohol content measured 0.04 grams per 100 milliliters of blood, approximately four hours after the accident. A forensic expert estimated that at the time of the collision Defendant had consumed the equivalent of four-and-a-half beers.

{5} The State charged Defendant with multiple crimes as a result of the accident, including homicide by vehicle (DWI), in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-101 (2004, amended 2016) ; leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injuries but not great bodily harm or death, in violation of Section 66-7-201(D) ; leaving the scene of an accident involving damage to a vehicle, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-202 (1978) ; and failure to give information and render aid, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-203 (1978). Following trial, a jury acquitted Defendant of homicide by vehicle (DWI) and failure to give information and render aid, but convicted Defendant of leaving the scene of an accident involving damage to a vehicle, in violation of Section 66-7-202, and leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injuries but not great bodily harm or death, in violation of Section 66-7-201(D). The district court sentenced Defendant to 364 days for violating Section 66-7-202(D) and vacated the lesser conviction for leaving the scene of an accident involving damage to a vehicle to avoid a double jeopardy violation. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

{6} Defendant raises two arguments on appeal. First, Defendant argues the district court committed fundamental error in instructing the jury. Second, Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We address each argument in turn.

Jury Instructions

{7} Defendant argues the district court fundamentally erred in failing to instruct the jury on the scope of his legal obligation to remain at the scene of the crime. "The propriety of the jury instructions given by the district court is a mixed question of law and fact requiring de novo review." State v. Candelaria , 2019-NMSC-004, ¶ 31, 434 P.3d 297. Defendant concedes he failed to preserve any error with respect to instructing the jury, thus we review only for fundamental error. See Rule 12-321(B)(2)(c) NMRA ; Candelaria , 2019-NMSC-004, ¶ 31, 434 P.3d 297 (reviewing purported error in jury instructions for fundamental error because it was not raised at trial). "The doctrine of fundamental error applies only under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a miscarriage of justice." State v. Barber , 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 8, 135 N.M. 621, 92 P.3d 633. "[T]he general rule is that fundamental error occurs when the trial court fails to instruct the jury on an essential element." State v. Lucero , 2017-NMSC-008, ¶ 27, 389 P.3d 1039 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "We will only affirm a case in which the trial court failed to instruct the jury on an essential element when, under the facts adduced at trial, that omitted element was undisputed and indisputable, and no rational jury could have concluded otherwise." State v. Lopez , 1996-NMSC-036, ¶ 13, 122 N.M. 63, 920 P.2d 1017 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{8} The hit-and-run statute applicable to leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injuries—such as the tragic accident in this case—provides, "The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto as possible, but shall then immediately return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 66-7-203 [.]" Section 66-7-201(A). Section 66-7-203, in turn, provides,

The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall give his name, address and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving and shall upon request exhibit his driver's license to the person struck or the driver or occupant of or person attending any vehicle collided with and shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or the making of arrangements for the carrying, of such person to a physician, surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or if such carrying is requested by the injured person.

Depending on whether the accident resulted in "great bodily harm or death" and whether the driver "knowingly fail[ed] to stop or to comply with the requirements of Section 66-7-203 [,]" the driver may be found guilty of a misdemeanor, a fourth degree felony, or a third degree felony. See § 66-7-201(B)-(D). Here, Defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor under Subsection (D) for "failing to stop or comply with the requirements of Section 66-7-203 ... where the accident does not result in great bodily harm or death[.]"

{9} There is no Uniform Jury Instruction (UJI) for the crime of leaving the scene of an accident.¹ See State v. Hertzog , 2020-NMCA-031, ¶ 9, 464 P.3d 1090 ("[T]here are no uniform jury instructions for the crimes that Section 66-7-201 defines[.]"). Accordingly, the district court "was required to give an instruction that substantially follows the language of the statute in order to be deemed sufficient." State v. Luna , 2018-NMCA-025, ¶ 21, 458 P.3d 457 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted), cert. denied , 2018-NMCERT-–––– (No. S-1-SC-36896, Mar. 16, 2018). The court instructed the jury to find Defendant guilty if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) "[D]efendant operated a vehicle involved in an accident"; (2) "[t]he accident resulted in injury to Freddy Marquez"; and (3) "[D]efendant failed to immediately stop, return[,] and remain at the scene[.]"²

{10} Defendant argues the given jury instructions were fundamentally flawed because they did not instruct the jury that Defendant only had a duty to remain at the scene of the accident "until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 66-7-203." Section 66-7-201(A). This temporal limitation on a driver's criminal liability for leaving the scene of an accident, Defendant argues, constituted an essential element that the jury was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt to convict him. We agree.

{11} While our appellate courts have previously dealt with appeals from convictions for leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injury under Section 66-7-201, it appears we have yet to definitively address whether the State must prove that a driver failed to comply with the requirements of Section 66-7-203 before leaving the scene of the accident. See, e.g. , Hertzog , 2020-NMCA-031, ¶ 10, 464 P.3d 1090 (analyzing whether the failure to instruct jury on definition of "accident" constituted reversible error and whether sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction under Section 66-7-201 ); State v. Montoya Guzman , 2004-NMCA-097, ¶ 20, 136 N.M. 253, 96 P.3d 1173 (analyzing whether sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction under Section 66-7-201 ). "In determining what is or is not an essential element of an offense, we begin with the language of the statute itself, seeking of course to give effect to the intent of the [L]egislature." State v. Swick , 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 56, 279 P.3d 747 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We fo...