State v. Evans

Citation760 NE 2d 909,144 Ohio App.3d 539
Decision Date13 July 2001
Docket NumberNo. C-000565.,C-000565.
PartiesThe STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. EVANS, Appellee.
CourtUnited States Court of Appeals (Ohio)

144 Ohio App.3d 539
760 NE 2d 909

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant,
v.
EVANS, Appellee.
*

No. C-000565.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, First District, Hamilton County.

Decided July 13, 2001.


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Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and William E. Breyer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

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Robert R. Hastings, Jr., for appellee.

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PAINTER, Judge.

The trial court, after initially overruling a motion to suppress, reconsidered and, based on our decision in State v. Holt,1 suppressed one written and two oral statements made by the defendant-appellee, Julius Evans. We affirm the trial court's suppression of two of the statements because they were a product of coercion. But we hold that the remaining oral statement was not subject to suppression for that reason and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Assault Becomes Murder

The relevant facts are not disputed. In late 1998, Evans, who was then fifteen years old, was charged with felonious assault. The charge was initially dismissed without prejudice because the state could not positively identify the attacker. Evans, when questioned by the police about the assault, had declined to comment, and the victim had subsequently died from the injuries sustained in the attack without regaining consciousness. According to the officer heading the investigation, though the police were unable to proceed against Evans, he remained the prime suspect in what had become a murder investigation.

II. Evans Confined for Unrelated Offense

In the interim, Evans was charged with an unrelated aggravated assault. He admitted his culpability for that assault and was adjudicated delinquent by the juvenile court. The court ordered Evans to be confined and to receive therapy at Hillcrest School, a residential treatment center for juvenile offenders. Hillcrest is operated by the juvenile court, and the residential treatment counselors who assumed responsibility for the care and therapy of the juveniles are employees of the court.

III. Evans Makes Three Statements

During Evans's first two weeks in custody at Hillcrest, he made two oral statements and one written statement to the residential treatment counselors. All three incriminated him in the initial aggravated assault that had become a murder. Largely on the strength of these three statements, Evans was charged with murder.

The circumstances under which Evans made the three incriminatory statements determine the outcome of this appeal. It is undisputed that Evans was ordered to Hillcrest by the juvenile court for confinement and therapy and that

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Hillcrest's counselors were employees of the court. One residential treatment counselor even stated that she considered herself to be a law enforcement officer, though other counselors did not so describe themselves

There is also no dispute that Evans's stay at Hillcrest was involuntary. Had Evans chosen to leave Hillcrest without permission, the police would have been called, Evans would have been picked up, and he would have been returned to juvenile court to answer for a violation of the court's commitment order.

Similarly, there is no dispute that Evans was required to participate in therapy. Had Evans failed to participate, he could have been found in violation of the court order that he do so, and he would have risked transfer to a far more restrictive facility operated by the Department of Youth Services. But, initially, Evans's failure to participate meant that he would have been unable to join in group activities, and that he could not have gone home on the weekends, as other residents were eligible to do. The record is clear that, according to the staff at Hillcrest, some residents initially resisted the therapeutic indoctrination procedures, but that all juvenile residents eventually succumbed to the pressure and participated.

When Evans arrived at Hillcrest, his indoctrination to therapy required that he complete a "commitment offense paper." Evans was told to write about all the crimes that he had committed, whether or not they related to the crimes for which he had been sent to Hillcrest, and whether or not he had ever been adjudicated delinquent by the court for them. Apparently, the instructions for the paper typically included a statement that the policy of Hillcrest was to seek an account of past offenses for purposes of therapy, not prosecution. But Evans's particular instruction form, from which several pages are now missing, apparently did not include this preamble. None of the staff recalled orally advising Evans that his paper was for therapy rather than for prosecution. Nor did any member of the staff recall warning Evans that he had a right not to incriminate himself.

Hillcrest authorities deemed Evans's first attempt to complete the "commitment offense paper" unacceptable because "incomplete." The staff required that he try again. To assist him in being more thorough, a counselor provided Evans with a list of fourteen charges that had at one time been brought against him, and he was specifically told to write separately about each of them. The last of these fourteen charges was the initial aggravated assault that had become a murder. Evans submitted his more detailed "commitment offense paper" a week and a half later. What he wrote about the fourteenth charge was essentially a confession to murder.

Once Evans's "commitment offense paper" had been completed to the satisfaction of the staff, Evans was required to present the paper orally in a group-acceptance

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session before his counselors and his peers. This subsequent indoctrinational step was similarly a condition of Evans's court-ordered therapy, and completion of the step was required before he could become eligible for home visits and further group participation. Evans's oral recitation of his paper was also a confession to his involvement in the death of the victim

Finally, after Evans had submitted his revised "commitment offense paper" to the staff but the day before he presented the paper to his group, Evans was transported to the hospital to receive treatment for a medical condition. Evans rode to the hospital in a car driven by his counselor. The counselor asked Evans how someone so young had accumulated such an extensive record. Evans replied with an explanation that included further incriminating statements about his involvement in the murder.

The following week, Hillcrest's supervisor for the residential treatment counselors heard about Evans's series of confessions. He decided to report the details to Hillcrest's resident social worker, who in turn called the police. As a result of the subsequent investigation, Evans was charged with murder. Evans's three statements were crucial to the state's case against him.

Evans moved to suppress all three statements that he had made while in custody at Hillcrest. The trial court originally denied the motion to suppress, stating that Evans's three separate confessions were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances and that there had been no custodial interrogation that would have required that Evans receive Miranda warnings. Then, upon further consideration and a review of our decision in State v. Holt,2 the court reversed itself and granted Evans's motion to suppress all three statements. The court ruled that Evans's statements were the product of a custodial interrogation by law enforcement officials and were therefore inadmissible because Evans had received no Miranda warnings.

The state now appeals and raises as its single assignment of error the suppression of Evans's confessions, even though he admittedly had not received Miranda warnings before he made the incriminating statements. We agree that Miranda warnings were not required under the circumstances, not because he was not in custody, but because the questioners were not law enforcement officials or their agents.

But we also hold that two of Evans's statements were nevertheless the result of coercion by the state and were therefore properly suppressed. The third statement, which was made while Evans was being transported to the hospital,

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was not coerced. That statement was voluntarily given in response to a vague inquiry and should not have been suppressed

Our review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is a two-step inquiry. First, the trial court's findings of fact are given deference and reviewed only for clear error.3 Then, we engage in a de novo review, without deference to the trial court's conclusions, as to whether those properly supported facts meet the applicable legal standards.4 Because the relevant facts are not in dispute, we focus on whether those facts required the suppression of Evans's statements.

IV. Our Decision Is Limited to Constitutional Issues

Before we begin our analysis, we stress that the parties' arguments and our decision today are based solely on the constitutional questions raised. Evans limited his motion below to constitutional issues, and our review is consequently restricted. There are, however, two additional challenges that frequently appear in similar cases.

Evans has not asserted that his statements were protected by the testimonial privilege that prohibits a counselor from testifying about confidential communications received in the course of the professional relationship.5 Nor does the record demonstrate whether the federal statutes pertaining to the confidentiality of...

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31 cases
  • State v. Brown, No. 96,862.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • May 16, 2008
    ...against self-incrimination may be asserted at a later time to suppress the statements made under State compulsion. See State v. Evans, 144 Ohio App.3d 539, 550-51, 760 N.E.2d 909 The State argues that the Court of Appeals failed to recognize that the privilege was not self-executing in the ......
  • Commonwealth of Pa. v. Brown
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Pennsylvania
    • March 11, 2011
    ...be asserted at a later time to suppress the statements made under State compulsion.” Brown, 182 P.3d at 1210 (citing State v. Evans, 144 Ohio App.3d 539, 760 N.E.2d 909 (2001)). [26 A.3d 514] Here, the trial court did not punish Appellant for invoking or stating a desire to invoke his right......
  • In re M.H.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • December 3, 2020
    ...of that case—that the state actor and passive recipient of Connelly's confession happened to be a police officer. See State v. Evans , 144 Ohio App.3d 539, 561-562, 760 N.E.2d 909 (1st Dist.2001) (reaching this conclusion). Had the passive recipient of Connelly's confession been the city's ......
  • State v. Swanigan, 88
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • February 18, 2005
    ...the taint from the earlier prewarning confession has been removed from the subsequent postwarning confession."); State v. Evans, 144 Ohio App. 3d 539, 760 N.E.2d 909 (2001); State v. Juarez, 120 N.M. 499, 903 P.2d 241 (Ct. App. United States v. Jenkins is directly on point. There, the court......
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