State v. Evans, No. COA08-293 (N.C. App. 10/21/2008), COA08-293
| Decision Date | 21 October 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. COA08-293,COA08-293 |
| Parties | STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LARRY EVANS, JR. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Larry Evans Jr. (Defendant) appeals from a judgment of criminal contempt. On 14 August 2007, in Columbus County Superior Court, the Honorable Gregory Weeks summarily found Defendant in direct criminal contempt and Judge Weeks sentenced Defendant and ordered him incarcerated for thirty (30) days. This punishment was later reduced to three (3) days incarceration. Defendant appeals. The relevant facts are: On the morning of 14 August 2007, Defendant was walking out of the Columbus County Courthouse when he was approached by his former probation Officer Eric Lammonds (Lammonds). Lammonds, who had previously been a probation officer for Defendant, mistook Defendant for a current probationer of his with an outstanding parole warrant. Lammonds attempted to stop Defendant in order to speak with him. As soon as Lammonds approached, Defendant refused to identify himself, turned away and started "cussing." In response, Lammonds grabbed Defendant and put him against a nearby cement wall. Defendant jerked away and continued using profanity. Lammonds thereafter confirmed Defendant's identity from a bystander, who told him that Defendant was not the person he was looking for. After Lammonds confirmed Defendant's identity, Lammonds stepped away and attempted to apologize. Defendant continued cussing and threatening.
Judge Weeks heard this commotion immediately outside the window from his chambers. At the time, Judge Weeks was beginning the second day of the jury selection process for the controversial case of State v. Troy. Because the case involved racial overtones and was the subject of significant media publicity, the court expected the jury selection process to be a challenging one. Judge Weeks heard Defendant using profanity and speaking in a loud voice outside his chambers and in close proximity to where the jurors were being sequestered. Judge Weeks also observed Lammonds attempting to talk to Defendant and to calm him down. Subsequently, Judge Weeks held Defendant in criminal contempt of court, concluding that the commotion which the Defendant created was loud enough for the jurors to hear and that his conduct was likely to interrupt or interfere with matters that were presently before the court.
Defendant argues that a de novo standard of review is applied to a finding of criminal contempt. Defendant further notes that when reviewing a finding of contempt de novo, the Court assesses the sufficiency of the evidence under the constitutional requirement that the evidence must be sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant's assessment of this Court's standard of review is incomplete. The standard of review of an appeal from a trial court's finding of criminal contempt is well-established. While conclusions of law are reviewable de novo, the findings of fact are not. See State v. Ford, 164 N.C. App. 566, 596 S.E.2d 846 (2004). On appellant review of a contempt order, "the trial judge's findings of fact are conclusive . . . when supported by any competent evidence and are reviewable only for the purpose of passing on their sufficiency." O'Briant v. O'Briant, 313 N.C. 432, 436-37, 329 S.E.2d 370, 374 (1985).
In the instant case, therefore, the appropriate standard of review is whether or not there was competent evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact and whether those findings of fact support a conclusion that Defendant was in criminal contempt. We find that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of fact, and that the findings support the conclusion that Defendant was in criminal contempt.
Defendant argues the trial court erred in finding him in direct criminal contempt because his actions were not willful and were not committed with the willful intent to interrupt or interfere with court proceedings.
Criminal contempt is defined as the "[w]illful disobedience of, resistance to, or interference with a court's lawful process, order, directive, or instruction or its execution." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-11(a)(3)(2007). Direct criminal contempt is "committed within the sight or hearing of a presiding judicial official[,]" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-13(a)(1)(2007), while indirect criminal contempt "'arises from matters not occurring in or near the presence of the court, but which tend to obstruct or defeat the administration of justice.'" State v. Simon, 185 N.C. App. 247,251, 648 S.E.2d 853, 855 (2007) (quoting Atassi v. Atassi, 122 N.C. App. 356, 361, 470 S.E.2d 59, 62 (1996)), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 702, 653 S.E.2d 158 (2007); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-13(b)(2007). The word willful when used in a criminal statute means that the act was conducted purposely and deliberately in violation of law and without authority, justification, or excuse. State v. Chriscoe, 85 N.C. App. 155, 354 S.E.2d 289 (1987). The term implies the act is done knowingly and of stubborn purpose or resistance. McKillop v. Onslow County, 139 N.C. App. 53, 61-62, 532 S.E.2d 594, 600 (2000); see also Clayton v. Clayton, 54 N.C. App. 612, 284 S.E.2d 125 (1981), andIn re Hege, 205 N.C. 625, 172 S.E. 345 (1933). Willfulness also connotes a "bad faith disregard for authority and the law." Forte v. Forte, 65 N.C. App. 615, 616, 309 S.E.2d 729, 730 (1983).
In this case, there is no doubt that Defendant acted willfully. He willfully "cussed" at Lammonds when he was originally approached. At trial, Defendant testified as follows:
Defendant's conduct clearly conveys stubborn resistance and general disregard for the law implied by the term "willful." Defendant could have easily revealed his identity to Lammonds and prevented the ensuing altercation. Instead of simply telling Lammonds who he was, Defendant shouted profanities. Even after he found himself pinned to the wall, Defendant refused to reveal his identity. We find that Defendant's disrespect and resistance in giving his name to the probation officer constituted willfulness in the context of criminal contempt. Defendant mischaracterizes his altercation with Lammonds as an unlawful arrest. However, Defendant was not arrested. Moreover, an unlawful arrest would not excuse Defendant's loud cursing by Lammonds. Lammonds merely approached Defendant and ultimately engaged in an altercation with him. None of Lammond's actions come close to the definition of arrest. Even assuming arguendo that the officer was attempting to make an unlawful arrest, ...
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