State v. Evans, 12513
| Decision Date | 14 April 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 12513,12513 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. John William EVANS. |
Robert J. Enright, Special Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were John T. Redway, State's Atty., and James G. Clark, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (State).
Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, DANNEHY and GLASS, JJ.
After a trial to a three judge panel, Spallone, Lexton and L. Dorsey, Js., the defendant, John W. Evans, was found guilty of the crime of felony murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-54a and 53a-54c. 1 The court, however, was divided. Two judges, Spallone and Lexton, Js., found the defendant guilty of felony murder. 2 One judge, L. Dorsey, J., found the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity. General Statutes § 53a-13. 3 This appeal followed. 4 The underlying facts are as follows: 5 On December 1, 1980, the defendant burglarized On December 4, 1980, Officer Gaylord Schurr of the Kent County sheriff's department in Grand Rapids, Michigan, was alerted to be on the lookout for a Connecticut registered motor vehicle which had been involved in a hit-and-run accident. Additionally, he was told that the vehicle had been reported stolen and had belonged to the victim of a homicide. Schurr observed the vehicle and, with the help of other officers, apprehended the defendant.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made by him in violation of his rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel under the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. He also claims that the majority of the three judge panel erred in failing to find him not guilty of felony murder by reason of insanity as defined in General Statutes § 53a-13
and stole various items [203 Conn. 216] from two summer residences on Bay Road in East Hampton. These residences were unoccupied at the time. On the same date, the defendant also burglarized the home of the victim. The victim, who had been home at the time of the burglary, was killed by the defendant during the course of that crime. The defendant stole the victim's motor vehicle, storing the articles he had taken during the three burglaries in the trunk. The defendant then drove to Michigan
While in custody for the felonious possession of a stolen motor vehicle and after having been advised of his Miranda rights, the defendant, on December 4, 1980, gave a tape recorded statement to the Michigan police, fully describing the burglaries and the homicide in Connecticut. Subsequently, on December 5, 1980, the defendant, while still held in Michigan, gave a second incriminating statement, this time to the Connecticut state police.
The majority opinion found that the two statements as to what had occurred in Connecticut were "substantially and materially consistent with each other." It also found that the two versions of what had occurred, however, were "not substantially and materially consistent" with that given to the two psychiatrists, Walter A. Borden and Colin C.J. Angliker, both of whom testified for the defendant at the trial. Additionally, the majority opinion found that the defendant "understood and appreciated that it was wrong and against the law to commit burglary and larceny, and [that the defendant] was not driven by any inner 'compulsion' to perpetrate said crimes." The majority concluded that the defendant had been capable of forming an intent to commit burglary and larceny and was "free of any compulsion to do so by reason of a mental disease."
We address first the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements in violation of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel under the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. 6 The state maintains that the trial court properly admitted into evidence the defendant's incriminating statements. The state essentially argues that after the defendant first informed the police of his desire for a lawyer, interrogation ceased and that it was only after the defendant had initiated discussion with the police and validly waived the constitutional rights that he had previously invoked, that he made the inculpatory statement of December 4, 1980. According to the state, the December 5, 1980 statement was made after an explicit and valid waiver of his rights and there was no "taint" from the earlier statement. The state maintains, therefore, that both statements were obtained after the defendant's constitutional rights had been fully respected. We agree with the state.
The defendant claims that his statements, given to the Michigan police on December 4, 1980, and to the Connecticut state trooper on December 5, 1980, were erroneously admitted into evidence because both were made without a valid voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights. In addition to the claim of a lack of a valid waiver, he claims that the statement of December 5, 1980, was "tainted" by the constitutional violations of the December 4, 1980 statement. The invalidity of the second statement, he argues, goes beyond the "letting the cat out of the bag" rationale. See United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 67 S.Ct. 1394, 91 L.Ed. 1654 (1947)
Certain background circumstances will be helpful in the discussion of this issue. Immediately after leaving the victim's home, the defendant loaded the items taken in the three burglaries into the victim's car and drove to Michigan. 7 At approximately 10:50 a.m. on December 4, 1980, Schurr was alerted on his police car radio to be on the lookout for a dark blue Plymouth car with Connecticut license plate 3121 that had been involved in a hit-and-run accident at a shopping mall in North Kent. Schurr sighted the Connecticut car at approximately 11:47 a.m., radioed for assistance, and, with the help of additional police, apprehended the defendant. About ten to fifteen minutes after Schurr had initially observed the car, he handcuffed the defendant and they proceeded to the Kent County sheriff's department in Grand Rapids.
At 1:09 p.m., Detective Sergeant Larry French of the Kent County sheriff's department first saw the defendant in an interview room at the sheriff's department in Grand Rapids. Present with him was Detective Sergeant Clara Kidder. French removed the handcuffs from the defendant, who at the time was quietly sitting in a chair. Immediately after he removed the handcuffs, French asked the defendant "if he had any idea why he was at the police department?" The defendant replied, stating that "no, he didn't care." After French remarked that the defendant must be curious as to why the police were holding him, the defendant said, "Well, I don't care to know." French informed the defendant of why he had been apprehended, introduced Kidder and advised the defendant of his constitutional rights.
Prior to interviewing the defendant, French had spoken to a lieutenant of the Connecticut state police department. During this discussion, which occurred at approximately 12:40 p.m., French advised the Connecticut police "essentially" that they had a person in custody who had been driving a vehicle wanted by Connecticut as stolen and that that person had no identification on him. French also informed the Connecticut police that this person fit the description of a person who earlier that day had been involved in an accident in Kent When French gave the defendant his Miranda warnings, he advised the defendant that if he decided to answer questions, he could stop at any time and request an attorney and that an attorney would be appointed for him if he could not afford one. Although the defendant refused to sign the rights form proffered by French, he did indicate that he understood his rights and that he did not have any question as to what his rights were. He then stated that he wanted an attorney. Although the Michigan police did not contact an attorney at that time, French informed the defendant that "we would see that he got an attorney."
County. The Connecticut lieutenant told French at that time that the vehicle was believed to have been taken from a residence in Connecticut where a woman had been found dead in her home, that "they had [as a suspect] an individual [named] John Evans" who lived within one mile of the victim, that Evans had been missing since December 1, 1980, and that Evans' whereabouts were then unknown. At that time, French did not know that the person they then admittedly had in custody for the Michigan felony of possession of a stolen motor vehicle was actually John Evans. He was not in custody for any other reason at that point
At that time, Kidder told the defendant that there was "an identification form" that had to be filled out as he was to be locked up in jail. The information sought included such things as his name, address, date of birth, height, weight, color of eyes, driver's license number, social security number and nearest relative. The defendant, although nervous, appeared alert and was responsive to the questions, none of which had anything to do with why he was arrested. The information was obtained by use of a form which is customarily used by the county sheriff's department for booking purposes in all cases of this kind. Kidder left the interview at approximately 1:30 p.m. in order to obtain a search warrant for examination of the defendant's bodily substances and clothes. 8
After Kidder left, French returned to the interview room and proceeded with the paper work involved in processing ...
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