State v. Evans, 112,000.

• Decision Date: 23 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 112,000.,112,000.
• Citation: 360 P.3d 1086,51 Kan.App.2d 1043
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Dustin Alex EVANS, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

51 Kan.App.2d 1043

360 P.3d 1086

STATE of Kansas, Appellant,

v.Dustin Alex EVANS, Appellee.

No. 112,000.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Oct. 23, 2015.

Shawn E. Minihan, assistant district attorney, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant.

Thomas J. Bath, Jr., and Tricia A. Bath, of Bath & Edmonds, P.A., of Overland Park, for appellee.

Opinion

MALONE, C.J.

The State appeals the district court's decision to dismiss the aggravated battery charge against Dustin Alex Evans based upon a finding that Evans qualified for self-defense immunity under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21–5231. The State charged Evans with aggravated battery arising from an altercation with Jose Luis Pena, Jr., that took place in Evans' garage. During the altercation, Evans stabbed Pena, who was unarmed, with a sword. The district court held a pretrial hearing and, after weighing the conflicting evidence, found that the State had failed to establish probable cause that Evans' use of force in defending himself was unlawful. Thus, the district court found that Evans was immune from prosecution and dismissed the complaint. The only issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in applying K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21–5231, which grants a suspect immunity from prosecution based upon the lawful use of self-defense.

We will review the facts in detail. On the evening of June 18, 2013, Evans and Pena each went to different bars in Overland Park. The evidence indicates that both men became intoxicated over the course of the evening. At approximately 3 a.m. on June 19, after the bars closed, Pena stopped at Evans' house, about four houses from his own, to talk to Jason Dalton, who had given Evans a ride home from the bar. When Dalton left, Pena knocked on Evans' front door. Evans came to the door and allowed Pena to enter the house. Evans' friend, Jarod King, also was at the house, and the three men eventually moved out into the garage. Pena's wife joined the men for awhile, but she and King eventually left, leaving only Pena and Evans in the garage.

Evans suggested a wrestling match and pulled some wrestling mats from the garage and spread them in the driveway. The two men apparently agreed to a “grappling” match in which the winner would be the person who obtained a “tap out” by the other.

Evans and Pena provided different accounts of what happened next. Evans later told police that Pena covered Evans' mouth with his hand during the wrestling match. Evans attempted to move Pena's hand and became frantic when Pena kept replacing his hand over Evans' mouth. Evans was unable to breathe. He managed to break free, stood up, and moved into the garage. Evans accused Pena of trying to kill him. Pena followed Evans into the garage, threatening to kill Evans and his family. Evans repeatedly told Pena to step back, but Pena continued to advance toward Evans. Evans retrieved a katana-style sword he had stored in the garage and pointed it at Pena. When Pena continued to advance towards Evans, he stabbed Pena once in the chest with the sword.

Pena later testified that he accidentally placed his hand against Evans' throat during the wrestling match as he attempted to gain a better position. Evans jumped up, visibly angry, and walked into the garage. Pena got up and walked along the outside of the garage, asking Evans what was wrong and whether he was okay. Evans accused Pena of trying to kill him. As they talked, Pena became distracted by something and looked over his shoulder. Pena stated that as he was turning back to Evans, he realized that Evans was trying to stab him with a sword. Pena raised his arm in defense and prevented the first two blows, but he was stabbed in the chest on the third attempt. Pena noticed blood gushing out of his chest and pleaded with Evans to call someone to help. Evans responded, “Fuck you, mother fucker, die. That's what you get.” Pena retreated out of the garage and staggered down the driveway into the neighbor's yard, leaving a blood trail as he moved. He pounded on the neighbor's door several times before losing consciousness.

Evans eventually called 911 and reported that he had stabbed Pena. Originally, Evans only reported that he stabbed a man who had come onto his property. When the dispatcher asked for an explanation of the events that preceded the stabbing, Evans explained that he had been wrestling and knew the victim. Emergency personnel responded to the call and Pena was rushed to the hospital. At the hospital, Pena wavered in and out of consciousness. When asked why Evans stabbed him, Pena indicated that he did not know the reason. Pena stated, “One minute we were fine, the next we weren't.”

Pena received emergency surgery. The treating physician informed an officer that Pena had received a puncture into his chest measuring approximately 3 inches wide and about a foot deep, cutting through a rib bone. The woundcut Pena's liver and pancreas and nicked the pericardium, the sac surrounding the heart. Though the doctors indicated that the injuries were life threatening, Pena survived. A sample of Pena's blood was taken at the hospital, and later testing indicated a blood-alcohol content of .20.

The police arrested Evans on the night of the incident. On June 20, 2013, the State charged Evans with aggravated battery under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21–5413(b)(1)(A)(intentionally causing great bodily harm). At the preliminary hearing on September 11, 2013, during which only Pena testified, the district court found probable cause to believe Evans committed aggravated battery and bound him over for trial.

On January 16, 2014, about 1 week before Evans' scheduled jury trial, Evans filed a “Motion to Present the Jury a Complete Defense.” Evans also filed a “Motion to Enforce K.S.A. 21–5231.” Evans' motions did not seek dismissal of the aggravated battery charge. Instead, Evans asked the district court to conduct an analysis in conjunction with the jury trial in order to determine whether Evans was entitled to self-defense immunity. The State filed a memorandum in response to Evans' motions.

The district court held a hearing on the motions on April 7, 2014. The State presented the preliminary hearing transcript as evidence, and the parties stipulated to numerous exhibits, including police reports of the investigation surrounding the stabbing incident, crime scene reports, medical reports, photographs, and recordings of the 911 call and Evans' interviews with the police. In addition, Evans called as witnesses five law enforcement officers who had participated in the investigation.

The stipulated evidence presented at the hearing revealed some inconsistencies in Pena's version of the events. In his preliminary hearing testimony, Pena testified that after the wrestling match abruptly ended, he never followed Evans back into the garage. But the undisputed blood evidence indicated that the stabbing took place in the back area of the garage next to the door going into the house. Also, Pena testified at the preliminary hearing that Evans brandished the sword three times and Pena deflected the first two blows causing injury and scarring to his forearm. But the medical evidence indicated there were no injuries on Pena's arms. Finally, the stipulated evidence included a report from an emergency room doctor and director of a woundcare center who opined that the stabbing took place when Evans was in a defensive posture with both hands on the sword. After receiving the evidence, the district court took the matter under advisement.

On April 25, 2014, the district court filed a comprehensive order dismissing the State's case against Evans. Relying primarily upon Lemons v. Commonwealth,2012 WL 2360131 (Ky.App.2012)(unpublished opinion), rev'd437 S.W.3d 708 (Ky.2014), the district court found that it was permitted to weigh the credibility of the evidence presented on the issue of self-defense immunity. After weighing the evidence, the district court found that the State had failed to establish probable cause that Evans' use of force was unlawful. The district court found that Evans “was reasonably justified under these facts in using force because Pena was clearly a threat and a reasonable person in his position would have felt it necessary to defend himself and/or his home.” Accordingly, the district court granted self-defense immunity to Evans and dismissed the charge of aggravated battery. The State filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied. The State then filed a timely notice of appeal.

On appeal, the State contends that the district court erred in applying K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21–5231, which grants suspects immunity from prosecution based upon self-defense. The State argues that the district court improperly weighed the conflicting evidence instead of viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State. The State contends that the evidence did not support a finding that Evans' use of deadly force was objectively reasonable, and, thus, the court erred in granting Evans immunity.

Evans responds that the State cannot establish that the district court applied the wrong standard to determine whether he was immune from prosecution pursuant to K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21–5231. Evans contends that the district court should not be required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State at a hearing on a motion for self-defense immunity. In the alternative, Evans argues that even under a standard requiring the court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence supported the district court's decision to grant him immunity.

Resolution of this issue involves the interpretation and application of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21–5231and related self-defense statutes. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review. State v. Eddy,299 Kan. 29, 32, 321 P.3d 12 (2014). Likewise, when the State appeals the dismissal of a complaint, an appellate court's...