State v. Evans
| Decision Date | 26 January 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 28, No. 32 |
| Citation | 723 A.2d 423,352 Md. 496 |
| Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Dwight EVANS. State of Maryland v. Charles Sykes-Bey. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Thomas K. Clancy, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for Petitioner.
Margaret A. Mead (Roland Walker, Walker Van Bavel, Amaral & Mead, P.A., Norman Hochberg, all on brief), Baltimore, for Respondent in No. 28.
Kreg Paul Greer, Towson, for Respondent in No. 32.
Before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, RAKER and WILNER, and ROBERT L. KARWACKI (retired, specially assigned), JJ.
In these two cases Respondents were physically detained by the police on the basis of probable cause to believe that each had participated in an illegal drug transaction. In both instances, the police searched Respondents while they were detained and released them with the intention of later charging them with violation of the controlled dangerous substance laws of this State. We shall hold that both detentions were lawful arrests under Maryland law, that the searches incident to those arrests were consistent with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and consequently that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City properly denied Respondents' motions to suppress.
These two cases present the identical issue for appeal. The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari in both Respondents' cases based upon the central question of what constitutes an arrest under Maryland law. Respondents argue that the disputed evidence in their cases should have been suppressed because the police obtained the evidence by conducting searches that were illegal because they were not incident to a lawful arrest. The crucial contention of Evans and Sykes-Bey is that their initial detentions, on June 9, 1994 and February 16, 1994, respectively, did not constitute arrests under Maryland law and therefore the searches conducted were unlawful. Because of this exact identity of the central issue debated by the parties, we have consolidated Respondents' two cases for purposes of deciding these appeals. The relevant facts of the two cases are set forth as follows:
A. State v. Evans
In June of 1994, Officer Kenneth Rowell was involved with other members of the Baltimore City Police Department Violent Crimes Task Force in an undercover operation known as "Operation Mid-East." The goal of Operation Mid-East was to identify and combat street-level drug transactions. In accordance with that goal, once the police had probable cause to believe a suspect had engaged in an illegal drug transaction, that suspect was not taken to the police station and processed. Instead, the police detained the suspect, ascertained the suspect's identity and address, performed an outstanding warrant check, conducted a search of the suspect's person, seized any drugs or currency, and, finally, released the suspect. The Baltimore City Police employed this procedure to protect the integrity of the ongoing undercover operation, later conducting a "mass sweep" of arrests of the suspects once the operation had concluded.1
At 7:45 p.m. on June 9, 1994, Officer Rowell was involved in Operation Mid-East in the vicinity of Monument and Port Streets in Baltimore City. Officer Rowell had been outfitted with a "Kel Set," or body wire. Although the record is not clear as to who approached whom, at that time a conversation took place between Officer Rowell and Respondent Dwight Evans. Rowell testified that he asked Evans if he was working and, if so, what Evans had. According to Officer Rowell, Evans responded that he had "dimes of coke." Rowell requested a dime.
Officer Rowell then accompanied Evans as the pair walked east on Monument Street. At that point, Rowell testified that Evans "reached into his rear end, down inside his pants, removed the cocaine, [and] handed me one." In exchange, Officer Rowell handed Evans a ten dollar bill. The serial number of the currency had previously been photocopied by the police for the purpose of subsequent identification. After this transaction, the pair separated.
Officer Rowell continued along Monument Street toward Milton Avenue. After Officer Rowell assured himself that no one was in the vicinity, he transmitted a description of Evans to a nearby "identification team" composed of task force members. Approximately five to ten minutes later, the team stopped Evans. Officer Rowell, who had entered his automobile and repeated his description of the suspect, drove by the area where Evans had been detained. Rowell confirmed that the person detained by the identification team was in fact the same individual from whom he had purchased the cocaine.
After the confirmation of Evans's identity as the suspected drug dealer, a member or members of the technical team searched Evans. Because the identification team had difficulty locating any suspected controlled substances, someone again contacted Officer Rowell. Rowell indicated that Evans had taken the cocaine from his "rear area." Based on this information, the identification team searched Evans again. The two searches eventually produced $163.00 in United States currency, including the ten dollar bill that Officer Rowell had earlier handed Evans, as well as nine green-topped vials containing cocaine.
Evans was given a receipt for the seized money and photographed by the technical team. Police procedure pursuant to Operation Mid-East required that a suspect verify his or her identity before being released. Accordingly, the police called Evans's father, who came to the area and confirmed his son's identity. At that time, the police did not transport Evans to the police station, nor did they formally charge him, nor did they take Evans before a District Court Commissioner. Rather, the officers apparently followed an internal procedure whereby one of them completed a document entitled "Investigated and Released."2 Evans was then released.
On July 5, 1994, the Grand Jury for Baltimore City indicted Evans on three counts: distribution of cocaine, in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1998 Supp.) Article 27, § 286;3 possession of cocaine with an intent to distribute, in violation of § 286; and possession of cocaine, in violation of § 287. Evans filed a motion to suppress all the evidence seized by the police. The suppression motion, heard in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City by Judge John N. Prevas, was based primarily on the ground that the nine vials of cocaine were not lawfully seized because Evans had not been arrested. The trial court denied the motion:
I think that your use and the officer's use of the word "arrest" is a word of art at this point because basically it was a detention and [Evans] was not free to go until they secured his identification. So, it really was, in fact, an arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes.
For Fourth Amendment purposes, it's not necessary that [Evans] be taken to the District Court Commissioner, given a statement of charges, and sent to a Commissioner for processing ... for bail in order for it to be an arrest.
At trial, Evans was convicted of distribution of cocaine and possession of cocaine with an intent to distribute. Evans was sentenced to a term of incarceration of fourteen years, ten years without the possibility of parole, for distribution of a controlled dangerous substance and to a consecutive term of incarceration of five years for possession with an intent to distribute. Evans noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.
B. State v. Sykes-Bey
Several months before the incident that led to the arrest of Respondent Evans, Officer Rowell was teamed with Officer Denise Wilkes. The pair assisted other members of the Baltimore City Police Department Violent Crimes Task Force in executing "Operation Midway," an undercover drug sting set up in much the same manner as that of Operation Mid-East. The remaining members of the police task force were divided into two groups: surveillance officers in a van who would videotape transactions involving Rowell and Wilkes, and an arrest team, or "identification team," that identified and searched the suspects after the occurrence of a suspected drug transaction.
On February 16, 1994, Officers Rowell and Wilkes went to the vicinity of Barclay and 24th Streets in Baltimore City to buy illegal drugs. Wilkes was told by the surveillance team to approach a man, later identified as Lorenzo Meeks, who was standing on the corner of Barclay and 24th Streets. Officer Wilkes asked Meeks if he was "working," to which Meeks responded, "What you want?" Wilkes replied, "I want some coke." Meeks declared that his inventory consisted only of readily smokeable rock or crack cocaine, as opposed to powder cocaine.4 By this point, Respondent Charles Sykes-Bey had joined Meeks and Officer Wilkes. Meeks either stated to or inquired of Sykes-Bey, "You got powder." Officer Wilkes was then asked how much powder cocaine she wanted; Wilkes answered that she wanted "two dimes." Sykes-Bey retorted, "Oh no, I thought she wanted some weight, I ain't going to go out and dig in no bag for no dime."5 Officer Wilkes, now joined by Officer Rowell, indicated to Sykes-Bey that she couldn't afford to buy "weight;" hence, she decided instead to purchase two dimes of rock cocaine from Meeks. Apparently dissatisfied by this turn of events in the competitive marketplace, Sykes-Bey commented, "Thanks a lot for nothing."
After the purchase, Officers Wilkes and Rowell walked away from Meeks and Sykes-Bey. Officer Wilkes transmitted a description of both Meeks and Sykes-Bey to the surveillance team, describing the latter as "the guy in the purple with black tennis shoes on and blue hoodie—all he is dealing is weight." Based on this description, surveillance team Officer Thomas Marucci ordered identification team Officer David Brendel to stop and detain Sykes-Bey.
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