State v. Evensen
| Decision Date | 11 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 33,338,33,338 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDMUND EVENSEN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TAOS COUNTY
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Paula E. Ganz, Assistant Attorney General
for Appellee
Alan Maestas Law Office, P.C.
Kathryn J. Hardy
Alan H. Maestas
Taos, NM
for Appellant
{1} Defendant Edmund Evensen appeals from a district court judgment entered pursuant to Defendant's conditional plea of guilty to the crimes of attempt to commit armed robbery, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-2 (1973), and NMSA 1978, Section 30-28-1(B) (1963), and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-5(A), (C) (1969). He raises two main issues. First, Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence that was gathered by police after they made a warrantless entry into his hotel room. Secondly, Defendant argues that his convictions violated his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy.
{2} We conclude that the district court's decision to deny Defendant's motion to suppress on the ground that Defendant consented to the warrantless entry was supported by substantial evidence. We further conclude that Defendant's convictions do not violate his right to be free from double jeopardy because distinct factual bases supported a finding of guilt as to each charge. We affirm.
{3} Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, this background section is limited to the factual and procedural events that are required to place our discussion in context. Additional facts are provided within the body of the Opinion as necessary.
{4} Steven Vigil (Victim) was parked at an ATM in Taos, New Mexico, when Defendant's girlfriend, Amanda Cruz, ran toward Victim's truck, told him that she was fighting with her boyfriend, and asked Victim for a ride. Victim responded to Ms. Cruz by lowering his window, and when he did, Defendant, armed with a knife, put his arm around Victim's neck and demanded money. Victim did not give Defendant any money; he told Defendant to relax, and Defendant cut Victim's neck with the knife. During an ensuing struggle between Victim and Defendant, Victim put his truck in reverse and got away from Defendant. Before Victim called the police, he saw Defendant run behind a nearby movie theater, and he saw Ms. Cruz walk toward a nearby hotel.
{5} Within fifteen minutes of the attack, law enforcement officers from the Taos County Sheriff's Department and the Taos Police Department spoke with a security guard who worked at the nearby hotel. Based on Victim's descriptions of Defendant and Ms. Cruz that one of the officers relayed to the security guard, the security guard told the officers that the two were guests at the hotel and led them to Defendant's room. Under circumstances that are a subject of this appeal and will be discussed in greater detail later, the officers entered the hotel room without a warrant. Defendant and Ms. Cruz were inside. Once inside, one of the officers seized a knife from underneath the refrigerator door. Defendant was arrested, and he was later indicted oncharges of attempt to commit armed robbery and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon.
{6} Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from the hotel room and all evidence derived as a result of the unlawful entry based on a theory that law enforcement officers made a warrantless entry into the hotel room that was not justified by any exception to the warrant requirement. In its response to Defendant's motion to suppress, the State argued, in relevant part, that the warrantless entry was authorized because Defendant consented to it and that once inside, one of the officers saw the knife in plain view. In support of its consent argument, the State attached to its response a supplemental report written by Deputy Jake Cordova of the Taos County Sheriff's Department who stated in the report that he knocked on Defendant's hotel room door and Defendant answered. He then asked Defendant whether he could enter into the room, and Defendant said, yes. According to Deputy Cordova's supplemental report, once he was inside the room, he observed what appeared to be a knife underneath the refrigerator door.
{7} The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress. Although Deputy Cordova did not testify at the hearing, the State relied on his supplemental report in its opening and closing arguments to support its contention that the law enforcement officers had Defendant's consent to enter the hotel room andthat the knife was in plain view. Defendant did not object to the State's reliance on Deputy Cordova's supplemental report, and in his closing argument, Defendant addressed the substance of the supplemental report, arguing that it was "a lie" that was contradicted by other evidence that had been presented at the hearing.
{8} In a letter decision issued after the evidentiary hearing, the district court, relying in part on Deputy Cordova's supplemental report, denied Defendant's motion to suppress. The district court concluded that the warrantless entry into Defendant's hotel room was authorized by Defendant, who, according to the court's letter decision, "opened the door and invited [Deputy Cordova] into the hotel room." The court further found that "[e]ven if" Deputy Cordova did not have Defendant's consent to enter the hotel room, the entry was justified by exigent circumstances. Further, the court concluded that the seizure of the knife was permissible because the knife was in Deputy Cordova's plain view once he had entered the hotel room.
{9} Defendant pleaded guilty to the crimes with which he had been charged. The plea, which was conditional, allowed Defendant to appeal the district court's ruling on his motion to suppress. He appeals from the court's judgment entered pursuant to the plea agreement.
{10} On appeal, Defendant argues, for the first time, that because the State failed to formally seek to admit Deputy Cordova's supplemental report into evidence, thedistrict court was not permitted to consider the supplemental report in ruling on Defendant's motion to suppress. Building on the premise that the supplemental report was "not evidence" of consent, Defendant argues that "there was no evidence presented by the State regarding consent" from which the district court could conclude that Defendant consented to Deputy Cordova's entry into the hotel room. Additionally, Defendant argues that exigent circumstances did not permit a warrantless entry into the hotel room. Since Deputy Cordova's warrantless entry was not justified by consent or exigent circumstances, Defendant argues, he was not lawfully positioned when he observed the knife in plain view. Alternatively, Defendant argues, the knife was not in plain view, but rather it was found after an unlawful warrantless search of the hotel room. Finally, Defendant argues that his convictions violated his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy.
{11} We do not consider Defendant's unpreserved argument that the district court could not rely on Deputy Cordova's supplemental report in its ruling on Defendant's motion to suppress. We conclude that sufficient evidence supported the district court's conclusion that Defendant consented to Deputy Cordova's warrantless entry into Defendant's hotel room and that Deputy Cordova saw the knife within plain view. Accordingly, we do not consider Defendant's exigent circumstances argument. Wefurther conclude that Defendant's convictions do not violate his right to be free from double jeopardy.
{12} "In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we observe the distinction between factual determinations which are subject to a substantial evidence standard of review and application of law to the facts, which is subject to de novo review." State v. Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 5, 146 N.M. 70, 206 P.3d 579 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). The district court's factual determinations are viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. Id. "Substantial evidence is . . . relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would find adequate to support a conclusion." State v. Brown, 2014-NMSC-038, ¶ 43, 338 P.3d 1276 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We review double jeopardy issues de novo. State v. Melendrez, 2014-NMCA-062, ¶ 5, 326 P.3d 1126, cert. denied, 2014-NMCERT-006, 328 P.3d 1188.
{13} Consent is a well-established exception to the constitutional prohibition against warrantless entries into a suspect's hotel room. See State v. Pool, 1982-NMCA-139,¶ 9, 98 N.M. 704, 652 P.2d 254 (); see also State v. Duffy, 1998-NMSC-014, ¶ 72, 126 N.M. 132, 967 P.2d 807 (), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 37 n.6, 275 P.3d 110. The State bears the burden of proving consent. State v. Flores, 1996-NMCA-059, ¶ 26, 122 N.M. 84, 920...
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